Lien v. Rowe, No. 9692
| Court | Supreme Court of South Dakota |
| Writing for the Court | ROBERTS |
| Citation | 92 N.W.2d 922,77 S.D. 422 |
| Docket Number | No. 9692 |
| Decision Date | 13 November 1958 |
| Parties | Peter C. LIEN, Charles H. Lien and Bruce H. Lien, copartners doing business under the firm name and style of Pete Lien & Sons, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Warren G. ROWE, County Treasurer of Pennington County, South Dakota, Defendant and Respondent. |
Page 922
doing business under the firm name and style of
Pete Lien & Sons, Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
v.
Warren G. ROWE, County Treasurer of Pennington County, South
Dakota, Defendant and Respondent.
[77 S.D. 423] Stephens, Riter & Mayer, Pierre, for plaintiffs and appellants.
James H. Wilson, State's Atty., Rapid City, for defendant and respondent.
ROBERTS, Judge.
This action was brought by appellants against the County Treasurer of Pennington
Page 923
County, South Dakota, for the purpose of obtaining judgment for the recovery of motor vehicle compensation fees paid under protest. Motion to dismiss the complaint was granted by the trial court. Plaintiffs appeal.The sole question presented is whether or not the complaint states a cause of action. The complaint alleges that plaintiffs as copartners are engaged under the name of Pete Lien & Sons in the business of operating limerock mines; that certain motor vehicles were leased by Lien, Inc., a South Dakota corporation, to plaintiff copartners who own equally the capital stock of the corporation and were exclusively used by them in the transportation of products originating in or produced from their mining operations; that officers of the law threatened to arrest and prosecute plaintiffs for failure to pay compensation for the unusual use of public highways and to display compensation plates; [77 S.D. 424] and that plaintiffs made payment not voluntarily, but under protest and compulsion to prevent the stopping of the operation of their motor vehicles upon public highways.
SDC Supp. 44.0422 (Chap. 238, Laws 1953) prior to its amendment by Chap. 230, Laws 1957, defined the term 'motor carrier' in so far as material to the present appeal as follows: 'The term 'motor carrier', when used in the succeeding sections of this chapter, means any person owning, controlling, operating, or managing any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer for the transportation of persons or property over the public highways of this state, but shall not include corporations in so far as they own, control, operate, or manage motor vehicles * * * when exclusively used in relation or incidental to farming, mining, excavating or logging operations, or motor vehicles exclusively used in the transportation of products originating in or produced from or necessary to or for farming, mining, or logging or excavating operations when transporting such products actually produced or owned by the owner of such motor vehicle or motor vehicles, or occasionally used in hauling such products in the ordinary exchange of work'. Motor carriers, not so excepted by these or other provisions of the motor carrier compensation act, are forbidden to operate their motor vehicles without first having complied with its provisions. SDC 44.9927.
The declared purpose of the motor carrier compensation act is set forth in the Revised Code of 1939 as follows:
'44.0420 Declaration of policy. The business of operating as a motor carrier as defined in section 44.0422 upon the highways of this state is declared to be a business affected with the public interest. The rapid increase in motor carrier traffic over the highways of this state tends to subject said highways to unusual wear and impairs the said highways disproportionately to the travel thereon by the general public, necessitating compensation to the state for the maintenance, upkeep, and policing of the said highways, to the end that said highways may be maintained in the best possible condition for the convenience and use of the general public.'
[77 S.D. 425] '44.0421 Unusual use of the highway. For the purpose of this chapter, any person as herein defined, using the public highways of this state as a motor carrier, shall be deemed to be making unusual use of said highways.'
The original statute, Section 3 of Chapter 139, Laws of 1933, excluded 'corporations or persons'...
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1st American Systems, Inc. v. Rezatto, No. 13189
...with statutory exceptions, this court construes the language strictly resolving doubt in favor of the general provision. Lien v. Rowe, 77 S.D. 422, 426, 92 N.W.2d 922, 924 (1958). Moreover, we construe the provision consistent with the overall purpose of the entire statute. Western Surety C......
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Jensen Ranch, Inc. v. Marsden, Nos. 16244
...4 This court has previously held that the term "owner" may include one not holding the legal title to property. See Lien v. Rowe, 77 S.D. 422, 92 N.W.2d 922 (1958); see also Lord v. Black Hills Mining Corp., 68 S.D. 79, 298 N.W. 677 (1941). Other jurisdictions have held that the term is app......
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Loving Saviour Church v. United States, Civ. No. 82-4176.
...depend for its significance upon the connection in which it is used, and at times may include one not holding legal title. Lien v. Rowe, 77 S.D. 422, 92 N.W.2d 922 Therefore, the fact that title to the levied property is in the name of Loving Saviour Church is not dispositive of the issue h......
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Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Com., BROWNING-FERRI
...definition solid waste or garbage might be given for other purposes, we think that consistent with our holding in Lien v. Rowe, supra [77 S.D. 422, 92 N.W.2d 922], the solid waste transported by appellant over the highways of this state must be deemed to be Page 605 property within the mean......
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1st American Systems, Inc. v. Rezatto, No. 13189
...with statutory exceptions, this court construes the language strictly resolving doubt in favor of the general provision. Lien v. Rowe, 77 S.D. 422, 426, 92 N.W.2d 922, 924 (1958). Moreover, we construe the provision consistent with the overall purpose of the entire statute. Western Surety C......
-
Jensen Ranch, Inc. v. Marsden, Nos. 16244
...4 This court has previously held that the term "owner" may include one not holding the legal title to property. See Lien v. Rowe, 77 S.D. 422, 92 N.W.2d 922 (1958); see also Lord v. Black Hills Mining Corp., 68 S.D. 79, 298 N.W. 677 (1941). Other jurisdictions have held that the term is app......
-
Loving Saviour Church v. United States, Civ. No. 82-4176.
...depend for its significance upon the connection in which it is used, and at times may include one not holding legal title. Lien v. Rowe, 77 S.D. 422, 92 N.W.2d 922 Therefore, the fact that title to the levied property is in the name of Loving Saviour Church is not dispositive of the issue h......
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Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Com., BROWNING-FERRI
...definition solid waste or garbage might be given for other purposes, we think that consistent with our holding in Lien v. Rowe, supra [77 S.D. 422, 92 N.W.2d 922], the solid waste transported by appellant over the highways of this state must be deemed to be Page 605 property within the mean......