Life Ins. Co. of North America v. Evans
| Full Citation | Life Ins. Co. of North America v. Evans, 195 Mont. 242, 637 P.2d 806 (Mont. 1981) |
| Decision Date | 06 November 1981 |
| Citation | 195 Mont. 242,637 P.2d 806 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-257,81-257 |
| Parties | LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, Petitioner and Appellant, v. Judith Ann EVANS, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Lorenzo Lloyd Evans, Deceased, Respondent and Respondent. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Anderson, Brown, Gerbase, Cebull & Jones, Billings, for appellant.
Douglas & Bostock, Libby, for respondent.
Honorable Russell E. Smith, a senior United States District Judge for the District of Montana, has certified to us a question of law in which it appers there are substantial grounds for difference of opinion, the adjudication of which by this Court would materially advance a decision in federal litigation. The following questions were certified:
Are the decisions of law set down in Kingsland v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (1934), 97 Mont. 558, 37 P.2d 335, and Sullivan v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (1934), 96 Mont. 254, 29 P.2d 1046, still law in Montana?
If the Kingsland and Sullivan cases still state the law in Montana, are the differences in the language of the "exclusions" clauses sufficient to distinguish the policy involved here from those considered in Kingsland and Sullivan ?
Lorenzo Lloyd Evans lived at an isolated location, known as "Copper Creek," fifty miles from Libby, Montana, and twelve miles from Noxon, Montana. He was a lawyer, admitted to practice in Montana, with offices in Libby. Evans kept various wild animals and birds at his place on Copper Creek, including an eleven-year-old wolf which he had raised from a pup. On the morning of June 27, 1979, Lloyd Evans was feeding his wolf when the wolf attacked and bit him on his right hand and wrist. Evans went back to the house, wrapped his hand with a towel, and sat down.
Within a period of approximately eight to fifteen minutes after the wolf attack, Evans indicated to his wife that the bit had precipitated a heart attack and that he should be driven to a hospital right away. Evans walked to his car and laid down in the backseat. His wife had called an ambulance, and when they had traveled a little over half of the distance to Libby, they met the ambulance on the highway. Evans was transferred to the ambulance where oxygen was administered to him, and his pulse was monitored. While in the ambulance, and after a lapse of approximately forty-five to sixty minutes following the wolf attack, Evans' pulse stopped, and he went into cardiac arrest. Oxygen and C.P.R. were administered, and Evans showed some signs of life when the ambulance arrived at the hospital emergency room in Libby. Approximately fifteen minutes after arrival at the hospital, Lloyd Evans died.
Lloyd Evans had previously suffered a heart attack on April 4, 1979. He was hospitalized at the Veteran's Administration hospital in Spokane, Washington, for about three weeks. On April 25, 1979, he was given a regular discharge and returned to the care of his physician, with the recommendation that he be in house rest for another six weeks and gradually resume his prehospital activities.
Medical evidence indicates that the immediate cause of Lloyd Evans' death was heart attack, but that the heart attack was "triggered" by the wolf bite. The wolf bite was not severe enough, by itself, to have caused the death of Evans.
Lloyd Evans had applied for, and Life Insurance Company of North America had issued, a certain group voluntary accidental death and dismemberment insurance policy, No. OK-2598, in the principal sum of $50,000, effective November 1, 1972. The policy was in full force and effect, according to its terms, on the date of Lloyd Evans' death. The policy contained this language:
The issue here is whether Kingsland v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (1934), 97 Mont. 558, 37 P.2d 335, and Sullivan v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (1934), 96 Mont. 254, 29 P.2d 1046, are still law in the State of Montana. After a review of the rules in these cases, we agree with respondent Judith Evans that the reasoning and rules set down in Sullivan and Kingsland are strict and harsh.
In Sullivan, the insured tripped over a piece of sheet metal and fell, hitting his head. Five days later he died of a cerebral hemorrhage. Evidence was submitted at the trial that the insured was suffering from high blood pressure and arteriosclerosis at the time of the fall. Evidence also indicated that had a man not suffering from high blood pressure and arteriosclerosis tripped over the sheet metal, in all probability, no hemorrhage would have resulted.
The insurance policy in Sullivan provided coverage if the insured sustained "bodily injuries, solely through external violent and accidental means, resulting directly and independently of all other causes." The Court in Sullivan admitted that a reasonable scope of insurance was contemplated by the policy. Nevertheless, because of the clear and unequivocal nature of this language in the policy, the Court held that there would be no recovery if "... the insured might suffer an accident resulting in death to which disease or bodily infirmity contributed indirectly or partially ..." Sullivan, 29 P.2d at 1052. Because the insured was suffering from arteriosclerosis, which contributed to and actively cooperated with the accident to cause the insured's death, there was no recovery.
In Kingsland, the insured had stepped onto a chair sitting on an uneven cement surface; he lost his balance and fell head first on the rough cement. The insured died shortly after the fall. The cause of the insured's death was described as a ruptured aneurysm of the aorta, precipitated by the fall and by striking his head on the cement floor.
The Court in Kingsland first looked to the language of the insurance policy which contained the condition that death must be shown to result "solely through external, violent and accidental means." Kingsland, 37 P.2d at 337. The Court then reasoned that the term "proximate cause" is inapt in this class of cases because "recovery can be had only if death resulted 'solely' (not...
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