Life of Georgia Ins. Co. v. Bolton, 2918.
Court | Court of Appeals of South Carolina |
Writing for the Court | HEARN. |
Citation | 333 S.C. 406,509 S.E.2d 488 |
Parties | LIFE OF GEORGIA INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Donna BOLTON and Edna T. Bolton, Defendants, Of Whom, Life of Georgia Insurance Company and Edna T. Bolton are, Respondents, and Donna Bolton is, Appellant. |
Docket Number | No. 2918.,2918. |
Decision Date | 21 December 1998 |
333 S.C. 406
509 S.E.2d 488
v.
Donna BOLTON and Edna T. Bolton, Defendants, Of Whom, Life of Georgia Insurance Company and Edna T. Bolton are, Respondents, and
Donna Bolton is, Appellant
No. 2918.
Court of Appeals of South Carolina.
Submitted December 8, 1998.
Decided December 21, 1998.
Timothy S. Mirshak, of Augusta, Georgia; and Charles H. Williams, of Williams & Williams, of Orangeburg, for respondents.
HEARN, Judge:
In this declaratory judgment action involving a life insurance policy, Life of Georgia Insurance Company (Life of Georgia) asked the court to declare the beneficiary of the proceeds of a policy it issued to Fielding L. Bolton, Jr. (Bolton). Bolton died in February of 1996. Before his death Bolton substantially complied with Life of Georgia's procedures for changing the beneficiary from his ex-wife, Donna Bolton (Donna), to his mother, Edna T. Bolton (Edna). The master in equity held Edna was the sole beneficiary of the proceeds.1 Donna appeals. We affirm.2
Standard of Review
Whether a declaratory judgment action is legal or equitable in nature is determined by the nature of the underlying issue. Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Langford, 330 S.C. 578, 581, 500 S.E.2d 496, 498 (Ct.App.1998). In general, an action on a life insurance policy is a legal action involving a question of contract law. Estate of Revis by Revis v. Revis, 326 S.C.
Factual Background
In September of 1992, Bolton purchased a life insurance policy from Life of Georgia with a face value of $150,000. He designated Donna, his wife at the time, as sole beneficiary. The policy contained the following provisions:
OWNERSHIP
The owner of this policy is the named insured if he or she has reached the age of majority.... The owner may exercise all rights under this policy.
BENEFICIARY
The beneficiary will receive any death benefits of this policy, subject to any assignment you have made .... The beneficiary may be changed on receipt of your written request at our home office. After we record receipt of your request, the change will take effect as of the date of the request, but will not affect any action already taken. The rights of the former beneficiary will cease at that same time. We may require the policy to reflect the change.
Bolton and Donna separated on January 31, 1995. Thereafter, Donna filed an action for divorce; Bolton counterclaimed for the right to live separate and apart. Both parties sought equitable division of the marital property. By order dated September 27, 1995, Donna's request for a divorce was denied, but Bolton was granted the right to live separate and apart. Additionally, the order awarded the insurance policy, which had a cash value of $5016 at that time, to Bolton.
Sometime during the summer of 1995, Bolton asked his mother, Edna, to contact Walker Fogle, Life of Georgia's agent, to arrange a time when Bolton could change the beneficiary of the policy. Edna made the telephone call as
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Parker v. Shecut, 3167.
...365 (1999). The aforementioned rule applies with equal force to actions before masters-in-equity. Life of Georgia Ins. Co. v. Bolton, 333 S.C. 406, 509 S.E.2d 488 (Ct.App.1998); Global Protection Corp. v. Halbersberg, 332 S.C. 149, 503 S.E.2d 483 (Ct.App. 1998). Accordingly, the issue is no......
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Kosciusko v. Parham, Appellate Case No. 2017-000016
...children , to arbitration and thus deprive the family court of its traditional powers of enforcement over those disputes." Id . at 395, 509 S.E.2d at 488 (emphasis added).428 S.C. 503 Accordingly, we find that our state's precedent precludes the submission of issues involving child custody ......
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Singh v. Singh, Appellate Case No. 2015-000434
...children , to arbitration and thus deprive the family court of its traditional powers of enforcement over those disputes." Id. at 395, 509 S.E.2d at 488 (emphasis added). Although we did not expressly address the enforceability of arbitration clauses pertaining to the determination of child......
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Swentor v. Swentor, 3023.
...to binding arbitration. Once they agree, then the Arbitration Act governs, unless they agree otherwise. See Messer, 333 S.C. at 391, 509 S.E.2d at 488 (applying Arbitration Act to provision in separation agreement requiring parties to submit disputes to 2. While an agreement concerning alim......
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Parker v. Shecut, 3167.
...365 (1999). The aforementioned rule applies with equal force to actions before masters-in-equity. Life of Georgia Ins. Co. v. Bolton, 333 S.C. 406, 509 S.E.2d 488 (Ct.App.1998); Global Protection Corp. v. Halbersberg, 332 S.C. 149, 503 S.E.2d 483 (Ct.App. 1998). Accordingly, the issue is no......
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Kosciusko v. Parham, Appellate Case No. 2017-000016
...children , to arbitration and thus deprive the family court of its traditional powers of enforcement over those disputes." Id . at 395, 509 S.E.2d at 488 (emphasis added).428 S.C. 503 Accordingly, we find that our state's precedent precludes the submission of issues involving child custody ......
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Singh v. Singh, Appellate Case No. 2015-000434
...children , to arbitration and thus deprive the family court of its traditional powers of enforcement over those disputes." Id. at 395, 509 S.E.2d at 488 (emphasis added). Although we did not expressly address the enforceability of arbitration clauses pertaining to the determination of child......
-
Swentor v. Swentor, 3023.
...to binding arbitration. Once they agree, then the Arbitration Act governs, unless they agree otherwise. See Messer, 333 S.C. at 391, 509 S.E.2d at 488 (applying Arbitration Act to provision in separation agreement requiring parties to submit disputes to 2. While an agreement concerning alim......