Liggins v. Burger

• Decision Date: 01 September 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-1893.,04-1893.
• Citation: 422 F.3d 642
• Parties: Stanley Carter LIGGINS, Petitioner — Appellant, v. Ken BURGER, Warden, Respondent — Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

422 F.3d 642

Stanley Carter LIGGINS, Petitioner — Appellant, v. Ken BURGER, Warden, Respondent — Appellee.

No. 04-1893.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: December 13, 2004.

Filed: September 1, 2005.

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Kent Simmons, argued, Davenport, IA, for appellant.

Robert P. Ewald, argued, Des Moines, IA, for appellee.

Before BYE, HANSEN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

BYE, Circuit Judge.

Stanley Carter Liggins was convicted in Iowa state court of first-degree murder in the death of nine-year-old Jennifer Lewis. Liggins's direct appeal and state petition for post-conviction relief were denied. Thereafter, he petitioned the federal district court for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court¹ dismissed the petition and issued a certificate of appealability (COA). On appeal, Liggins asks us to dismiss the indictment or vacate his conviction and remand for a new trial. We affirm.

I

The burned body of nine-year-old Jennifer Lewis was found on the grounds of Jefferson Elementary School in Davenport, Iowa, at approximately 9:00 p.m. on September 17, 1990. A medical examination revealed her death was caused by manual strangulation; she had been sexually abused prior to death and was not alive at the time her body was burned. Jennifer, who lived with her mother Sherry Glenn and stepfather Joseph Glenn in Rock Island, Illinois, had last been seen at approximately 6:30 p.m. purchasing gum at Mac's Liquor Store in Rock Island.

On July 27, 1992, Liggins was charged in Iowa state court with first-degree murder willful injury, first-degree sexual abuse, first-degree kidnapping and arson. He entered not guilty pleas. On October 1, 1992, Liggins moved to set aside or dismiss the charges, arguing, among other things, Iowa lacked criminal jurisdiction. The court denied Liggins's motion and on February 10, 1993, the case proceeded to trial. At the close of the state's case, the court granted Liggins's motion for judgment of acquittal on the arson charge but denied the motion as to the remaining charges. The jury found Liggins guilty on all remaining counts and he was sentenced to three life terms and a term not to exceed ten years on the willful injury conviction.

On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed the willful injury, first-degree sexual abuse, and first-degree kidnapping convictions concluding the state failed to present evidence establishing territorial jurisdiction. The Court denied Liggins's motion to set aside the murder conviction on sufficiency of evidence grounds, but reversed the conviction because the trial court erred by allowing in evidence of Liggins's drug dealing. State v. Liggins, 524 N.W.2d 181, 186, 188-89 (Iowa 1994) (Liggins I). In July 1995, the state retried Liggins on the first-degree murder charge. The jury found him guilty and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.

In his direct appeal following the second trial, Liggins argued the state lacked territorial jurisdiction over the murder charge because there was no proof the murder occurred in Iowa. Liggins also argued one of the jury instructions erroneously advised the jury it did not have to find the murder occurred in Iowa. Finally, he argued there was insufficient evidence to prove he murdered Jennifer.² The Iowa Supreme Court rejected Liggins's arguments and affirmed the first-degree murder conviction. State v. Liggins, 557 N.W.2d 263, 270 (Iowa 1996) (Liggins II). Liggins's state-court petition for post-conviction relief was also denied. Liggins v. State, No. 99-1188, 2000 WL 1827164, at *10 (Iowa Ct.App. Dec.13, 2000) (Liggins III).

Liggins next filed a § 2254 habeas corpus petition arguing 1) ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, 2) lack of territorial jurisdiction, 3) instructional error, 4) Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment violations, 5) sufficiency of the evidence, 6) violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and 7) newly discovered evidence. The district court dismissed the petition but granted a COA. In this appeal, Liggins argues 1) there was insufficient evidence to prove he murdered Jennifer, 2) Iowa lacked jurisdiction to try him for murder because there was insufficient evidence to show the murder occurred in Iowa, 3) the jury was improperly instructed regarding the proof necessary to establish territorial jurisdiction, 4) the prosecution violated Brady, and 5) the federal district court erred when it denied his motion for discovery and an evidentiary hearing on his claim of newly discovered evidence.

II

Our review of Liggins's claims is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996(AEDPA). We may not grant a writ of habeas corpus with respect to any issue decided by the Iowa courts unless the decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court" or the decision "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). In Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001), the Supreme Court reiterated its interpretation of § 2254(d)(1)'s "contrary to" and "unreasonable application of" federal law standards.

A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established precedent if the state court either "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases," or "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent." A state court decision will be an "unreasonable application of" our clearly established precedent if it "correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case."

* * * * * *

Distinguishing between an unreasonable and an incorrect application of federal law, we clarified that even if the federal habeas court concludes that the state court decision applied clearly established federal law incorrectly, relief is appropriate only if that application is also objectively unreasonable.

532 U.S. at 792-93, 121 S.Ct. 1910 (citations omitted).

When reviewing a district court's denial of a § 2254 petition, we review the district court's findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law (as cabined by AEDPA) de novo. King v. Bowersox, 291 F.3d 539, 540 (8th Cir.2002).

A

Liggins first argues there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first-degree murder. Within the context of § 2254, we consider "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ("[U]nder 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ... the applicant is entitled to habeas corpus relief if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.") (citation omitted). We presume the findings of fact made by the Iowa courts are correct unless Liggins rebuts the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Hall v. Luebbers, 341 F.3d 706, 712 (8th Cir.2003).

Based on the evidence presented at trial, the Iowa courts held the jury properly convicted Liggins of first-degree murder. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, demonstrates the following. At the time of the murder, Liggins resided at the Hillside Motel in Rock Island. He became acquainted with Joseph and Sheri Glenn the summer before the murder and frequently visited their home. About a week before the murder, a neighbor noticed Liggins's car parked a block from the Glenn home at about 6:30 p.m. and saw Jennifer talking to him through the window. On the day of the murder, Liggins stopped by the Glenns' house at approximately 5:30 p.m. At about 6:00 p.m., Jennifer's stepfather told her she could ride her bicycle to a friend's home. Within minutes, Liggins excused himself and left. A neighbor testified she saw Liggins drive his car down the street and stop before motioning Jennifer over to his car. The two spoke briefly before Jennifer got on her bicycle and returned home. Liggins returned to the Glenn house ahead of Jennifer and reentered. After Jennifer returned, Liggins said he wanted some chewing gum and Jennifer produced a dollar bill saying she was going to nearby Mac's Liquor store to buy him gum. Within minutes of Jennifer's departure, Liggins left the Glenn home.

Charlotte McCray, the owner of Mac's, testified Jennifer bought a package of gum from her at approximately 6:30 p.m. A second witness, Antonio Holmes, testified he stopped at Mac's at 6:30 p.m. and saw a man matching Liggins's description standing outside the store next to a car. Upon entering the store, Holmes saw a young girl buying a package of gum with a dollar bill. When he left, Holmes noted the girl and Liggins were nowhere to be seen; Jennifer was not seen alive again. Two days after the murder, Holmes picked Liggins's photograph from a photographic lineup.

Jennifer's burned body was discovered across the river in Davenport, Iowa around 9:00 p.m. The investigation revealed her body had been doused in gasoline and set on fire. A witness, Lloyd Eston, testified he and his wife drove by Jefferson School between 8:15 and 8:30 p.m. and saw a man standing by a red four-door foreign-looking car (Liggins frequently drove a red Peugeot registered to his girlfriend Brenda Adams). Eston could not describe the man or state conclusively whether he made these observations on the night Jennifer was killed, but testified he was "pretty sure" the car was the red Peugeot.

A second witness, Wanda Hughes, testified ...