Lightbourn v. County of El Paso, Tex.
| Decision Date | 01 August 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-50564,96-50564 |
| Parties | , 7 A.D. Cases 51, 22 A.D.D. 618, 10 NDLR P 203 Margarita LIGHTBOURN; Burns Taylor; Olivia Schonberger; Grant Downey; Ann Lemke; Disabled Ability Resource Environment, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The COUNTY OF EL PASO, TEXAS; The Republican Party of El Paso County; The Democratic Party of El Paso County, Texas; Antonio O. Garza, Jr., Secretary of State of Texas, Defendants, Antonio O. Garza, Jr., Secretary of State of Texas, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
James C. Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.
James C. Harrington, Texas Civil Rights Project, Austin, TX, Redge Westbrook, El Paso, TX, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.
Before JOLLY, DUHE and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
Antonio O. Garza, Jr., the Secretary of State of Texas, appeals the district court's order finding him in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, and requiring him to undertake certain remedial actions. We reverse and render judgment for the Secretary.
The plaintiffs are five blind residents of El Paso, Texas, one mobility-impaired El Paso resident, and a private nonprofit group that aids disabled persons. They sued El Paso County ("El Paso") and the local Republican and Democratic parties under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (" § 504"), and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134. Subsequently, El Paso impleaded the Secretary, and the plaintiffs also added him as a defendant.
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants discriminated against them by failing to ensure that persons with visual and mobility impairments have access to "polling sites and voting procedures." Specifically, the blind plaintiffs asserted that the voting equipment available at their polling places only permitted them to vote with the assistance of an election worker or other person, and the defendants had not taken steps to ensure that they could vote with complete secrecy. 1 Thus, they contended, the defendants violated § 504 and the ADA. In addition, the wheelchair-bound plaintiff maintained that she had trouble locating a parking space next to and using the restroom facilities at her polling place. She asserted that the defendants breached their obligation to ensure that polling places are accessible to handicapped voters and hence violated § 504 and the ADA.
The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification of all Texas citizens of voting age who are blind or severely mobility-impaired. The district court then granted the local Republican Party's motion to dismiss and denied the Secretary's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs settled their claims against El Paso and the local Democratic Party, leaving the Secretary as the sole defendant in this lawsuit. 2
After a bench trial, the district court made several findings in a written opinion. The court initially observed that Texas law provides a right to a secret ballot for all voters. The court found that the burdens the state alleged it would suffer if compelled to ensure blind voters a completely secret ballot were "speculative." To the contrary, the district court concluded that the Secretary could accommodate blind (as well as mobility impaired) voters without affecting the voting methods of nondisabled persons. The district court also determined that the Secretary was a "public entity" subject to § 504 and the ADA, and that he is responsible for ensuring "uniformity in the various voting systems in use throughout the state." The district court ultimately concluded that "[t]he system of voting in the State of Texas" violates the ADA. 3
After the subsequent remedies phase of the trial, the district court issued supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law and crafted a remedy for the § 504 and ADA violations it discovered. The court found both that the Secretary has a duty to ensure that local election authorities comply with Title II of the ADA, and that "[t]he Secretary has joint responsibility with the state's local election authorities in assuring compliance with the ADA and Section 504 in conducting elections." The court also determined that the Secretary had failed to take several possible actions to remedy discrimination against blind or mobility-impaired voters, such as encouraging the development of voting systems that enable blind voters to vote with complete secrecy. The court found that statutory methods of assisting blind persons to vote both abridge the right to a secret ballot and cause "embarrassment and sometimes humiliation." With respect to mobility-impaired voters, the court determined that the evidence before it indicated "widespread non-compliance throughout Texas" with the physical accessibility requirements of § 504 and the ADA. Finally, the court concluded that modification of "the current policies, practices, and procedures that result in the denial of the secrecy of the ballot for blind voters would not cause a fundamental alteration in the nature of the State's voting program."
The district court ordered extensive and detailed remedial measures to effect its "intention to have an ADA-compliant voting system in place for the next national election in the year 2000." The court emphasized that "only those matters over which the Secretary has direct control are addressed [in the remedial order]." First, the district court ordered that after December 1, 1996, the Secretary approve only voting systems that comply with the ADA and that enable blind voters to vote in total secrecy. Second, the court ordered the Secretary to issue directives, guidelines and instructions based on the ADA and its implementing regulations and distribute them to local election authorities within eighteen months of the court's order. The directives, guidelines and instructions must state that: (1) voting systems purchased after December 31, 1997 must be accessible to blind and mobility-impaired voters and ensure a secret ballot for blind voters; (2) by December 31, 1998, current voting systems must be modified to be accessible to blind and mobility-impaired voters and ensure a secret ballot for blind voters; and (3) by December 31, 1999, all voting systems must be modified to be accessible to blind and mobility-impaired voters and ensure a secret ballot for blind voters. The district court ordered the Secretary to submit the directives, guidelines and instructions to it for review. The court further instructed the Secretary to "devise a system of systematically monitoring" § 504 and ADA compliance by local election authorities and to compile a detailed report regarding compliance to be "delivered, on the anniversary date of this Judgment, to the Court throughout the duration of this Judgment." Last, the district court directed that it would retain jurisdiction over the judgment for enforcement purposes. The Secretary appeals.
The Secretary presents three arguments on appeal. First, he contends that the district court improperly certified the plaintiffs to represent all Texas citizens of voting age who are blind and severely mobility-impaired. Second, he argues that the plaintiffs cannot state a claim against him under § 504. Third, he asserts that the district court erred in holding that he violated the ADA by breaching a duty to ensure that local election authorities comply with the ADA. We address each argument in turn.
The Secretary initially contends that the district court improperly certified the plaintiffs to represent all Texas citizens of voting age who are blind or mobility-impaired. He maintains that class certification was improper because none of the plaintiffs has voted outside of El Paso since enactment of the ADA, the plaintiffs have settled their claims against El Paso, and the punch-card voting system used in El Paso differs from the paper-ballot voting system used in many Texas counties.
The district court did not make any specific findings of fact with respect to the plaintiffs' class certification motion. The district court did, however, specifically find that the plaintiffs met the prerequisites of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(1) and (2). 4 The district court has wide discretion in deciding whether to certify a proposed class. McGrew v. Texas Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 47 F.3d 158, 162 (5th Cir.1995). Assuming that the court considered the Rule 23 criteria, we may reverse its decision only for abuse of discretion. Id.
The Secretary does not dispute the numerosity and adequacy of representation elements of Rule 23(a). In addition, Rule 23(b)(2) clearly applies to this case because the Secretary has "acted or refused to act" on grounds generally applicable to the class. Hence, we need only address whether the plaintiffs satisfy the commonality and typicality elements of Rule 23(a).
The commonality test is met when there is at least one issue, the resolution of which will affect all or a significant number of the putative class members. Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., 994 F.2d 1101, 1106 (5th Cir.1993). Several such issues exist in this case, including whether the Secretary violated § 504 or the ADA by failing to direct local election officials to enforce these statutes. Furthermore, allegations of similar discriminatory practices generally meet the commonality requirement. Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir.1993). The plaintiffs here allege that the Secretary similarly discriminated against all class members by failing to direct local election officials to comply with § 504 and the ADA. Thus, the plaintiffs satisfy the commonality requirement for class certification.
The test for typicality, like the test for commonality, is not demanding. Fo...
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