Lightfeather v. Prey

• Decision Date: 03 March 2022
• Docket Number: 8:21CV211
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska
• Parties: AUSTIN EDWARD LIGHTFEATHER, Plaintiff, v. KEN PREY, Administrator; BRAD JOHNSON, Director of Administrations; MR. CRAPO, Religous Cordnator; OFFICER SPEKA; JENKINS, A.P.R.N.; STEPHENIE LAST NAME UNKNOWN, Mental Health LMHP; LINTON N. BAKER, Inmate; ROBERT HAZE, Inmate; TRAVIS GOLDEN, Inmate; CORNILEOUS WEAVER, Inmate; JOHN THOMSON, Inmate; and DAWNING, Officer, All in Their Individual Capacities, Defendants.

AUSTIN EDWARD LIGHTFEATHER, Plaintiff,
v.
KEN PREY, Administrator; BRAD JOHNSON, Director of Administrations; MR. CRAPO, Religous Cordnator; OFFICER SPEKA; JENKINS, A.P.R.N.; STEPHENIE LAST NAME UNKNOWN, Mental Health LMHP; LINTON N. BAKER, Inmate; ROBERT HAZE, Inmate; TRAVIS GOLDEN, Inmate; CORNILEOUS WEAVER, Inmate; JOHN THOMSON, Inmate; and DAWNING, Officer, All in Their Individual Capacities, Defendants.

No. 8:21CV211

United States District Court, D. Nebraska

March 3, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Richard G. Kopf, Senior United States District Judge

Plaintiff, who claims to be a “bi-racial indigenous Choctaw native American, ” is currently incarcerated at the Lancaster County Jail as a pretrial detainee.^[1] (Filing 1 at CM/ECF p. 8.) The court has granted Plaintiff permission to proceed in forma pauperis (Filing 13), and the court now conducts an initial review of the Complaint (Filing 1) to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e) and 1915A.

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I. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff makes the following factual allegations against the following Defendants:

No Defendant Named: Plaintiff was placed in “segregation isolation” from July 2, 2020, to June 1, 2021, causing dehumanization, desensitization, psychological instability, identity conflicts, and two unreported suicide attempts in Plaintiff's cell. (Filing 1 at CM/ECF p. 4, 6.) During such isolation, Plaintiff has been “undergoing harsh racial discrimination for being the color white, but the race Choctaw.” (Id. at p. 10.)

Unidentified “Officers”: Plaintiff has been “racially discriminated against with verbal abuse, ” such as being called a “fake Indian” who uses a “fake language” and being instructed to “turn your life over to Christ” and “read the Bible.” (Id. at p. 4 (capitalization corrected).) Officers allegedly shamed and challenged Plaintiff's use of the Choctaw language. (Id.) The verbal abuse directed at Plaintiff caused the unnamed officers to issue misconduct reports to Plaintiff after he reacted in anger, frustration, and “emotional stress.” (Id. at p. 6.)

APRN Jenkins: Plaintiff participated in “psych visits” with Jenkins from October to December 2020, during which Jenkins allegedly asked him if he was “delusional” when he stated that his grandfather was a Choctaw code talker and that Plaintiff was a Native American. Jenkins prescribed Plaintiff medications that Plaintiff felt he did not need because he was not delusional. (Id. at p. 5.) Plaintiff continued to be kept in segregation upon Jenkins's recommendation based on Plaintiff's refusal to take medication.

Mr. Crapo: Crapo, who is alleged to be a religious coordinator, supposedly denied Plaintiff's requests for a white bandana to represent his “indigenous belief system” and a “Buddhist bind book to study while my relief is pending” because, according to Crapo, the bandana was related to indigenous gang activity and the only books allowed in segregation are Bibles. (Id. at pp. 3, 7.)

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LMHP Stephenie: Stephenie treated inmates in the segregation unit on a weekly basis. In response to Plaintiff's frustration with Defendant Crapo, who Plaintiff felt was denying him his right to worship, Stephenie supposedly told Plaintiff that “Christ is the only way to salvation.” (Id. at p. 8.)

Unspecified “Inmates”: Unnamed “inmates” called Plaintiff a “fake Indian” and threatened to beat him up.

Officer Dawning: Dawning called Plaintiff a “fake Indian, ” after which Plaintiff punched him. A Lincoln Police Department officer came to visit Plaintiff after the incident, but decided not to ticket him after Plaintiff explained what happened and after a “larger investigation” concluded that Officer Dawning racially targeted Plaintiff. (Id. at p. 9.) Defendant Baker: Inmate Baker sprayed a bag of his bodily fluids all over Plaintiff while calling him a “fake Indian” and “autistic bitch.” Baker was later criminally charged. (Id. at pp. 9-10.) Plaintiff purports to make claims under the “Indigenous Dawes Act”; 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Fourteenth Amendment race discrimination; Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment; First Amendment free exercise of religion); and 42 U.S.C. 12101. (Filing 1 at CM/ECF p. 2.) For relief, Plaintiff requests “[h]abeas corpus prisoner relief mandatory injunction” due to “immediate danger by other non-indigenous inmates”; reinstatement of State of Nebraska developmental disability services for his autism; and a white bandana for purity and a “Buddhist bind book.” (Filing 1 at CM/ECF p. 3 (spelling corrected).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW

The court is required to review prisoner and in forma pauperis complaints seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. 1915(e) and 1915A.

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The court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b).

Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, ” or “their complaint must be dismissed.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).

“The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party ‘fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.'” Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)). However, “[a] pro se complaint must be liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties.” Topchian, 760 F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Dawes Act

Plaintiff purports to assert a claim under the Dawes Act, 25 U.S.C. 331, et seq., which was enacted in 1887 “to prevent alienation of Indian-owned lands by replacing the fee-simple-ownership of early allotments with a trust-based model in which the President allotted tracts to individual Indian landowners.” Chase v. Andeavor Logistics, L.P., 12 F.4th 864, 873 (8th Cir. 2021). The Dawes Act “resulted in much of the reservation land becoming privately owned land, thereby creating a ‘checkerboard' of trust land and private land.” F.T.C. v. Payday Fin., LLC,

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935 F.Supp.2d 926, 930 (D.S.D. 2013). The Dawes Act was repealed by the Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-462, 101-103, 114 Stat. 1991. Chase, 12 F.4th at 873 n.5.

Because the Dawes Act has no relationship whatsoever to the factual allegations at issue, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under this Act. Plaintiff's purported claims under the Dawes Act will be dismissed without leave to amend because amendment would be futile.

B. 42 U.S.C. 1983 Claims

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the conduct of a defendant acting under color of state law deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the United States Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. 1983. Here, Plaintiff raises claims under the Fourteenth Amendment (race discrimination), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual punishment), and the First Amendment (free exercise of religion).

1. Fourteenth Amendment

a. Race Discrimination

Plaintiff alleges that mostly unidentified “officers” and inmates discriminated against him based on his bi-racial Choctaw heritage when they verbally abused him, called him names, threatened him, discounted his chosen religion by telling him to read the Bible and accept Christ, and accused him of being delusional when he claimed to be Choctaw. “Prisoners are protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invidious discrimination based on race.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).

“The Equal Protection Clause generally requires the government to treat similarly situated people alike.” Klinger v. Dep't of Corr., 31

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F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 1994), citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). “Thus, the first step in an equal protection case is determining whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that []he was treated differently than others who were similarly situated to h[im].” Id. “Absent a threshold showing that []he is similarly situated to those who allegedly receive favorable treatment, the plaintiff does not have a viable equal protection claim.” Id.

In re Kemp, 894 F.3d 900, 909 (8th Cir. 2018) (“‘[d]issimilar treatment of dissimilarly situated persons does not violate equal protection'”) (quoting Klinger, 31 F.3d at 731); Patel v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807, 815 (8th Cir. 2008) (for equal protection claim, prisoner must show that he is treated differently than similarly situated inmates and that the different treatment is based on suspect classification or a fundamental right).

An equal protection violation also requires “an intent to discriminate.” In re Kemp, 894 F.3d at 910; see also Henley v. Brown, ...