Lighthouse Shores, Inc. v. Town of Islip

• Decision Date: 02 December 1976
• Citation: Lighthouse Shores, Inc. v. Town of Islip, 390 N.Y.S.2d 827, 41 N.Y.2d 7, 359 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1976)
• Parties: , 359 N.E.2d 337, 7 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,290 LIGHTHOUSE SHORES, INC., et al., Respondents, v. TOWN OF ISLIP et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 827

390 N.Y.S.2d 827

41 N.Y.2d 7, 359 N.E.2d 337, 7 Envtl.

L. Rep. 20,290

LIGHTHOUSE SHORES, INC., et al., Respondents, v. TOWN OF ISLIP et al., Appellants.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 2, 1976.

Francis G. Caldeira, Town Atty., Islip (William J. Kent, Islip, of counsel), for appellants.

Robert M. Calica, Mineola, for respondents.

Donald J. Cohn and John E. Runnells, New York City, for Erie Island Assn., amicus curiae.

COOKE, Judge.

Fire Island is an elongated sandspit in Suffolk County. Lying between the Great South Bay and Atlantic Ocean, just off the south central shore of Long Island, its overall length is about 31 1/2 miles and its width varies from 200 yards to half a mile. Marked by its almost uninterrupted stretch of sand beach backed up by low dunes, it is a natural barrier reef of very low elevation, one portion, the 'sunken forest' being below sea level. Although a popular summer resort, it is windswept and frequently battered by autumn hurricanes. Interestingly, it acquired its name from fires built there as signals to vessels during the War of 1812.

Towards its western end, Fire Island is connected with the mainland of Long Island by the Robert Moses Causeway. As one proceeds from the southerly terminus of the causeway on Fire Island, he or she first proceeds on an inland route, easterly on a paved road through the Fire Island State Park, then continues on a paved roadway through an area under control of the United States Government, then through more State park lands still on a paved road and then travels on a sandy unpaved road about 435 feet to the westerly line of a section known as Lighthouse Shores. At this junction, the inland route connects with the westerly terminus of a walk known as Cedar Court. Lighthouse Shores lies in an unincorporated area of Fire Island known as Kismet, a part of the Town of Islip.

Plaintiff Lighthouse Shores, Inc., is a property owner and the individual plaintiffs are residents and property owners in Kismet. In this action, besides certain injunctive relief, plaintiffs seek a declaration that an ordinance of the Town of Islip, as amended, regulating the use of vehicles on that part of Fire Island within said town, exclusive of lands within an incorporated village and of lands within the Fire Island National Seashore, is void. Special Term found that the walks in the Lighthouse Shores section were private and owned by plaintiff corporation 'except for two lots', that so much of the ordinance as purports to regulate traffic over State-owned and maintained roads between the causeway and the westerly line of Lighthouse Shores is beyond the powers of the town, that the amendment of the ordinance requiring that applicants be year-round residents with no other residence was invalidly adopted, that this amendment is also invalid because it makes an invidious discrimination and that the general welfare of the community is not promoted by the barring of owners of homes in Lighthouse Shores from the walks therein and from the route extending from the causeway to the westerly line of Lighthouse Shores. The Appellate Division affirmed, without opinion.

Section 1604 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, entitled 'Local ordinances prohibited', provides in pertinent part: 'local authorities shall have no power to pass, enforce or maintain any ordinance, rule or regulation requiring from any owner of a motor vehicle or motorcycle, or from any operator or chauffeur to whom this chapter is applicable, any tax, fee, license or permit for the use of the public highways, or excluding any such owner, operator or chauffeur from the free use of such public highways * * * or in any other way restricting motor vehicles or motorcycles * * * or use of the public highways * * * and no ordinance, rule or regulation contrary to or in any wise inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, now in force or hereafter enacted shall have any effect.' In turn, section 118 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law defines a highway as '(t)he entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel.' A public highway, under said law, includes any highway ( § 134). The proof at Special Term presented a question of fact as to whether the inland route stretching from the southerly terminus of the causeway to the westerly bounds of Lighthouse Shores was a public highway (see People v. County of Westchester, 282 N.Y. 224, 231, 26 N.E.2d 27, 30). Special Term, upon adequate proof, found that it was and the Appellate Division has affirmed that finding. Section 61--1 of the ordinance specifically excludes from its ambit 'lands contained within the Fire Island National Seashore' and, therefore, that portion of the inland route insofar as it traverses the National Seashore is unaffected by the ordinance. Consequently, Special Term's determination as to said inland route should not be disturbed.

Subdivision A of section 61--2 of the ordinance provides that, except for official vehicles and school buses in specific instances, '(n)o motor vehicle shall be operated on or across Fire Island except under permit issued by the Board of Commissioners.' Subdivision H of this section, an amendment added February 13, 1973, provides that '(a)ll applicants for permits must submit a sworn affidavit that their twelve month sole residency is on Fire Island.' The contention that this amendment was invalidly adopted because no notice of hearing thereof was given is untenable. So far as relevant, section 130 of the Town Law provides: 'The town clerk shall give notice of such (public) hearing by the publication of a notice in at least one newspaper circulating in the town, specifying the time when and the place where such hearing will be held, and in General terms describing the proposed ordinance. Such notice shall be published once at least ten days prior to the day specified for such hearing.' (Emphasis added.) The rather lengthy notice published on December 20, 1972 for the hearing of January 2, 1973 complied with said section. The notice indicated that the purpose of the public hearing was to consider amending the ordinance entitled 'Vehicular Uses: Fire Island' and listed proposed amendme...