Ligon v. Brooks

• Decision Date: 22 November 1937
• Citation: 39 Del. 113,196 A. 200
• Court: Delaware Superior Court
• Parties: WILLIAM D. LIGON, JR., v. CHARLES E. BROOKS

196 A. 200

39 Del. 113

WILLIAM D. LIGON, JR., v. CHARLES E. BROOKS

Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County

November 22, 1937

Superior Court for New Castle County. Action on the Case for Negligence, No. 8, January Term, 1937.

The plaintiff was a drafting engineer and was employed at the government navy-yard in New York, but his legal residence was in Baltimore, where his family lived. On the tenth day of August, 1936, while driving through the State of Pennsylvania, on his way to Baltimore, his car collided with a bakery truck, driven by the defendant, near Lenape, in Delaware County. His automobile was badly damaged by the collision, and one of the questions before the court was the extent of that damage, and how it could be proved.

The following questions were asked the plaintiff by Mr. Morford his attorney:

"Q. What kind of an automobile were you driving? A. Buick coupe.

"Q. Was it your automobile? A. My car.

"Q. Was it titled in your name? A. Yes, in my name.

"Q. When had you purchased that Buick coupe? A. I purchased it in November 1930, I believe. It was a 1931 model.

"Q. How much did you pay for it new? A. $ 1560.

"Q. How far had it been driven? A. I should say around 50,000 miles.

"Q. What was its mechanical and running condition? A. Excellent first class. "

In response to the questions asked him, the plaintiff then stated that after the collision, his car was first taken to Chadds Ford, Pennsylvania, and from there to the Wilmington Automobile Company, the Buick Agency in the City of Wilmington, where it was repaired; he, also, stated that he still had that automobile in his possession.

He was then asked "What, in your opinion, was the reasonable market value of your Buick automobile in good running condition immediately before the accident?"

Mr Isaacs, the attorney for the defendant, objected to the question, claiming that this court had repeatedly held that the value of an automobile immediately before the collision, which damaged it, could only be shown by expert testimony, and that the plaintiff had not been qualified as an expert witness.

Mr. Morford stated that the circumstances were such that he had no expert witness available, and contended that the general rule with respect to the necessity for expert knowledge, in order to qualify a witness, should not apply to the owner of the damaged car; and that he should be permitted to give his best estimate as to its value immediately before the collision. He cited Teets v. Hahn, 104 N. J. L. 357, 140 A. 427; Huddy's Ency. of Automobile Law, Vol. 17-18, p. 548, and note; Chamb. Modern Law of Evid., § 2143.

The defendant's objection is overruled.

James R. Morford (of Marvel, Morford, Ward and Logan) for plaintiff.

Henry R. Isaacs for defendant.

HARRINGTON J., sitting.

OPINION

HARRINGTON, J.

: There may be exceptions to the rule, but the owner of personal property is usually permitted to state his estimate as to its value (Chamb. Mod. Law of Evid., §§ 2140, 2143; Chamb. H. B. on Evid., § 758; Huddy's Ency. of Auto Law, Vol. 17-18, p. 548; Berry on Automobiles, Vol. 5, p. 390; 1 Wig. on Evid., § 716); and I think that that general rule should be applied in this case. Chamb. Mod. Law of Evid., §§ 2140, 2143; Chamb. H. B. on Evid., § 758; Huddy's Ency. of Auto Law, Vol. 17-18, p. 548; see, also, Teets v. Hahn, 104 N.J.L. 357, 140 A. 427; Grath v. Wilson Motor Car Co. (Mo. App.), 253 S.W. 776; Anderson v. Elect. Laundry Co., 146 A. 683, 7 N.J. Misc. 567; Shea v. Hudson, 165 Mass. 43, 42 N.E. 114.

As was pointed out in Chamberlayne's Modern Law of Evidence, § 2143: "He (the owner) may give the value of his household furniture, including articles of clothing or the contents of the stable, carriages, and similar articles. Such an owner may appraise his horses, cattle or other animals. If he has building materials, machinery, or the like, he may estimate as to what they are fairly worth."

Where the property is not what may be fairly termed of the common usual and ordinary nature, the reason for that rule is apparently because the owner's relation to his property is such that it may be fairly regarded as creating in and of itself a species of special knowledge, with respect to its value. Chamb. H. B. on Evid., § 758; Chamb. Mod. Law of Evid., § 2140; Shea v. Hudson, 165 Mass. 43, 42 N.E. 114.

The weight of such evidence necessarily depends on the circumstances,...