Ligonier Tavern, Inc. v. W.C.A.B. (Walker)

• Decision Date: 20 July 1998
• Parties: LIGONIER TAVERN, INC., Appellant, v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (WALKER), Appellee.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 1008

714 A.2d 1008

552 Pa. 237

LIGONIER TAVERN, INC., Appellant, v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (WALKER), Appellee.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Sept. 16, 1997.

Decided July 20, 1998.

William J. Ober, H. Reginald Belden, Jr., Greensburg, for Ligonier Tavern, Inc.

Kenneth B. Burkley, Greensburg, for Julie Walker.

Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO and NEWMAN, JJ.

OPINION

ZAPPALA, Justice.

The issue before us in this workers' compensation case is whether the Commonwealth Court erred in determining that Section 320 of the Workers' Compensation Act ¹ (Act) is constitutionally sound. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the Commonwealth Court's decision.

Julie Walker (Claimant) began working for Appellant, Ligonier Tavern, Inc., as a dishwasher on December 23, 1991. Her average weekly wage was $95.72. At the time she began working for Appellant, Claimant was seventeen years and almost four months old, her date of birth being August 29, 1974. On April 24, 1992, while she was still under the age of eighteen, Claimant suffered a work-related laceration of her right arm when she came into contact with broken glass in a trash bag. As a result, Claimant ceased working and subsequently underwent surgery. Appellant issued a notice of compensation payable and Claimant began receiving the minimum weekly compensation at the rate of $151.67.

Claimant filed a petition for compensation on March 23, 1993, alleging the loss of use of her right arm for all practical intents and purposes. ² Claimant also sought "additional compensation" pursuant to Section 320(a) of the Act. ³

The matter proceeded before the referee ⁴ who found that Claimant was under eighteen years old at the time of her work-related injury and that Claimant was illegally employed because Appellant failed to obtain a work permit for her prior to the incident. ⁵ Accordingly, the referee issued an order awarding Claimant additional compensation in the amount of 50% of Claimant's weekly compensation. This elevated Claimant's weekly compensation to the new rate of $227.51. ⁶

The Board affirmed the referee's decision, declining to address the constitutional issues raised by Appellant. ⁷ On appeal, the Commonwealth Court held that Section 320 of the Act, as written, does not violate Article III, § 18 of the Pennsylvania Constitution regarding the reasonableness of compensation. ⁸ The court further held that awarding illegally employed minors 50% additional compensation does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution or Article III, § 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution ⁹ by virtue of the Act's failure to establish reasonable and logical classifications regarding child labor law violations. ¹⁰

Appellant asserts the same constitutional arguments on appeal, namely, whether Section 320 of the Act violates the foregoing constitutional provisions. As before the Commonwealth Court, Appellant asserts that Rudy v. McCloskey & Company, 152 Pa.Super. 101, 30 A.2d 805 (1943), aff'd. per curiam on the opinion of the Superior Court, 348 Pa. 401, 35 A.2d 250 (1944), mandates a finding that Section 320 of the Act is unconstitutional. The Commonwealth Court distinguished the facts of Rudy from the facts of this case and we find its analysis to be proper.

In Rudy, a minor employee fell fifty feet and died while working as a construction laborer. The minor's employment was illegal based solely on the fact that employer failed to procure an employment certificate in accordance with the Child Labor Law. It was agreed that decedent's widow and minor children were entitled to death benefits totaling $10,129.56. The dispute in Rudy concerned whether the deceased minor's family was entitled to an additional payment of $10,129.56 as provided for under Section 320(a) of the 1937 amendment to the Act. ¹¹

In adopting the Superior Court's decision, we held that the payment of additional compensation of 100% to a minor employed in violation of the Child Labor Law, considered either as compensation or a penalty, was so excessive as to violate the pertinent constitutional provisions. ¹²

The Commonwealth Court distinguished Rudy from this case on the basis that at the time Rudy was decided the Act required an employer to pay 100% additional compensation to injured minors, whereas here, the Act only requires an additional payment of 50%. Additionally, the Commonwealth Court noted that Rudy did not per se conclude that any additional compensation payment to an illegally employed minor would be found unconstitutional. Rather, the Rudy court held that requiring a payment of double compensation was excessive and, therefore, unconstitutional as to amount. The court specified:

We think that the legislature may impose reasonable penalties under the [constitution] ... to enforce compliance with the ... act, but a penalty though payable as compensation, is open to objection if excessive; it also must be reasonable to amount.

Id. 35 A.2d at 254 (emphasis added). ¹³

The Commonwealth Court has consistently applied the legislative mandate found at Section 320 where, as here, the award of a 50% additional compensation payment was based solely on the fact that a work permit was not acquired prior to the minor's commencing employment. See e.g. Wingert & Brechbill v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 44 Pa.Cmwlth. 55, 402 A.2d 1157 (1979) (parents of minor who was killed within the scope of his employment were entitled to additional compensation where employer failed to obtain a work permit); Saloon Restaurant Enterprises v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Martinez), 75 Pa.Cmwlth. 408, 462 A.2d 337 (1983) (father of seventeen and a half year old minor was entitled to additional compensation where minor was shot and killed while employed as a dishwasher and employer failed to obtain an employment certificate). The Commonwealth Court in the foregoing cases relied on the fact that the statutory language of Section 320 of the Act is clear and unambiguous regarding an illegally employed minor's right to collect additional compensation regardless of the manner in which an employer has violated the Child Labor Law.

We too now hold that the legislature's clear and unambiguous mandate that all illegally employed minors under the age of eighteen be awarded 50% additional compensation does not violates the "reasonable compensation" provision of Article III, § 18 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Additionally, we hold that the Act's failure to establish specific classifications in accordance with the Child Labor Law does not violate the Equal Protection clause of the Federal Constitution and Article III, § 32 of Pennsylvania's Constitution.

In providing an award of an additional 50% compensation to be paid by an offending employer, the Legislature has clearly sought to effect compliance with the provisions of the Child Labor Law, the purpose of which is to protect minors by requiring employers to hire minors in the manner and only for such jobs as are specified in the Child Labor Law. ¹⁴ Such payment, be it compensation or a penalty, was contemplated by the court in Rudy as being proper where reasonable as to amount. See Rudy, 35 A.2d at 254. We hold an award of 50% additional compensation to be reasonable as to amount in order to enforce compliance with the mandates of the Child Labor Law.

In addition to the foregoing, the application of Section 320 to all minors under the age of eighteen does not constitute special legislation nor offend equal protection as the Legislature's classification in this regard constitutes a reasonable and logical means of achieving its purposes set forth in the Child Labor Law. Under an equal protection analysis, a classification, which does not impermissibly interfere with a fundamental right or disadvantageously affect a suspect class will be upheld as long as it passes a rational relationship test. Commonwealth v. Burnsworth, 543 Pa. 18, 669 A.2d 883 (1995). Neither the equal protection guarantee of the federal constitution nor the corresponding protection in our state constitution forbids the drawing of distinctions, so long as the distinctions have a rational basis and relate to a legitimate state purpose. See e.g. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Department of Labor & Industry, 461 Pa.68, 334 A.2d 636 (1975).

As noted, the Legislature, in requiring that all illegally employed minors under the age of eighteen be awarded 50% additional compensation from an offending employer, has sought to effect compliance with the mandates of the Child Labor Law. Such measure appears less likely to offend equal protection than Appellant's proposal that the Legislature be required to set forth a detailed breakdown of specific violations of the Child Labor Law with diverse attendant consequences. The result of such legislation would clearly discourage compliance with the Child Labor Law in some respects while promoting compliance as to others. This would not serve as a reasonable or logical means of effecting the legitimate purposes of the Child Labor Law, i.e., to protect minor employees. We conclude that the Legislature's enactment of Section 320, and its inclusion of all minors under the age of eighteen, is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose, and, accordingly, does not offend the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution or Article III, § 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm Commonwealth Court's order.

1 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 672.

2 No issues relating to this claim are before us on appeal.

3 Section 320(a), 77 P.S. § 672(a), provides:

If the employe at the time of the injury is a minor, under the age of eighteen years, employed or permitted to work in violation of any provisions of the laws of this Commonwealth relating to minors of such age,...