Ligons v. Crittenton Hosp.
| Citation | 490 Mich. 61,803 N.W.2d 271 |
| Decision Date | 29 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 139978.Calendar No. 3. |
| Parties | Dujuan LIGONS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Edris Ligons, Plaintiff–Appellant,v.CRITTENTON HOSPITAL, a/k/a Crittenton Hospital Medical Center, David Bruce Bauer, M.D., and Rochester Emergency Group, P.C., Defendants–Appellees. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Michigan |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Mark Granzotto, P.C., Royal Oak (by Mark Granzotto), and Turner & Turner, P.C., Southfield (Matthew L. Turner), for Dujuan Ligons.Tanoury, Nauts, McKinney & Garbarino, P.L.L.C. (by William A. Tanoury and Anita Comorski), for David Bauer and Rochester Emergency Group, P.C.Mellon Pries, P.C., Troy (by James T. Mellon and David A. Kowalski), for Crittenton Hospital Medical Center.
We are called upon to answer the question whether a medical malpractice suit must be dismissed if a defective affidavit of merit (AOM) is filed after both the limitations period and the saving period have expired. We hold that in such cases, dismissal with prejudice must follow because allowing amendment of the deficient AOM would directly conflict with the statutory scheme governing medical malpractice actions, the clear language of the court rules, and precedent of this Court. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing plaintiff's case with prejudice.
Edris Ligons underwent a colonoscopy on January 14, 2002, and four days later developed vomiting, diarrhea, chills, and fever.1 On January 22, 2002, still suffering from those symptoms, Ligons went to the emergency room at defendant Crittenton Hospital, where she was treated by defendant Dr. David Bauer. An abdominal x-ray suggested the possibility of a partial small-bowel obstruction. When Ligons refused to be admitted to the hospital, she was given antibiotics, treated for dehydration, and discharged with instructions to follow up with her treating physician the next day. Ligons did so and was immediately sent to the emergency room, where she was admitted.
After extensive testing and the involvement of seven doctors, it was determined that surgery was necessary. Ligons initially refused any surgery, but eventually agreed. Exploratory surgery performed on January 24, 2002, revealed a perforated colon, an inflamed pelvic mass, and an abscess. The exploratory surgery further showed that Ligons had an advanced form of liver failure and that her liver had become hard and rocklike in appearance. Ligons had been an alcoholic for more than 30 years and suffered from acute cirrhosis with ascites, alcoholic pancreatitis, alcoholic hepatitis, coagulopathy, diverticulosis coli, and colon polyps. Removal of her colon was impossible because of these preexisting conditions. Ligons never recovered from the surgery and died on January 29, 2002.
Plaintiff was appointed personal representative of Ligons's estate on February 22, 2005, and delivered to defendants a notice of intent to sue 2 (NOI) on June 8, 2005. On October 21, 2005, plaintiff delivered a supplemental NOI providing more detail regarding proximate cause. He filed a complaint in the Oakland Circuit Court on April 7, 2006, accompanied by two AOMs.
The first AOM, signed March 8, 2005, was executed by Dr. George Sternbach, an emergency-medicine specialist. Although the AOM contained 23 paragraphs regarding the manner in which the standard of care had been breached, only two of those paragraphs pertained specifically to this case:
v. [The failure to a]dmit the patient to the hospital on January 22, 2002.
w. [The failure to o]btain appropriate consults on January 22, 2002. Regarding the manner in which these breaches were the proximate cause of the injury, the AOM provided, “As a direct and proximate cause of the imprudent acts and omission committed by the individuals identified herein, Edris Ligons, died.”
The second AOM, signed on June 17, 2005, by Dr. Fred Thomas, did not address the required standard of practice or care, the breach of the standard of care, or the actions that should have been taken or omitted to comply with the standard of care. Rather, the Thomas AOM addressed only the manner in which the breach of the standard of practice or care was the proximate cause of the alleged injury: “It is my opinion that had the defendants admitted the patient to the hospital on January 22, 2002, and obtained the appropriate consults on January 22, 2002, as outlined in Dr. Sternbach's affidavit[,] that Edris Ligons would not have died.”
In March 2007, Bauer and defendant Rochester Emergency Group, P.C. (Bauer's practice group) moved for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiff's NOIs and AOMs did not comply with the governing statutes. In April 2007, Crittenton concurred in the motion. The trial court denied defendants' motions on May 22, 2007.
Bauer and Rochester Emergency applied for leave to file an interlocutory appeal, which the Court of Appeals initially denied.3 Bauer and Rochester Emergency then applied for leave to appeal in this Court and, in lieu of granting their application, we remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted.4 The Court of Appeals later granted Crittenton's application for leave to file a delayed cross-appeal 5
On remand from this Court, the Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiff's two NOIs collectively satisfied the requirements of MCL 600.2912b. 6 But a majority of the panel disagreed with the trial court's ruling that the AOMs were sufficient, concluding that neither AOM contained the required statement describing “[t]he manner in which the breach of the standard of practice or care was the proximate cause of the injury alleged in the notice.” 7 The majority reasoned that “it is insufficient to merely allege that the defendant's alleged negligence caused the injury,” and the AOMs “contain[ed] no explanation regarding how Dr. Bauer's decision not to admit the decedent on January 22, 2002, or obtain appropriate consultations was the proximate cause of the decedent's death.” 8 “[E]ven when read as a whole,” the AOMs “establish[ed] no connection between the purpose of the consultations, or what condition they might have revealed, and the cause of the decedent's death,” nor did they explain how a one-day delay in admitting Ligons resulted in death rather than recovery.9
Recognizing that the defective AOMs required dismissal of the case under Kirkaldy v. Rim,10 the Court of Appeals further held that dismissal in this case had to be with prejudice.11 The Court of Appeals reasoned that, although filing a complaint and an AOM tolls the statutory limitations period pursuant to MCL 600.5856(a) until the AOM is successfully challenged,12 tolling was unavailable here because plaintiff had not filed his complaint within the limitations period. Plaintiff filed his complaint after the limitations period expired, but within the saving period afforded him as a personal representative under MCL 600.5852. Under Waltz v. Wyse,13 statutes that toll periods of limitations or statutes of repose, such as MCL 600.5856(a), do not toll saving provisions. 14 The Court of Appeals concluded that no tolled time remained during which plaintiff could refile his suit after defendants successfully challenged his AOMs. Thus, dismissal with prejudice was required on statute-of limitations-grounds.15
Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff's argument that he should be permitted to amend his defective AOMs under the then existing version of MCR 2.118(A), which permitted the amendment of “pleadings.” The Court noted that the term “pleading” was restrictively defined by MCR 2.110(A) to include only complaints, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints, answers to any of these documents, and replies to those answers. This list does not include “mandatory attachments” such as AOMs.16 Finding no “positive authority suggesting that an affidavit of merit may be amended pursuant to MCR 2.118(A),” the Court concluded that “the only permissible remedy for a defective affidavit of merit is the one prescribed in Kirkaldy, which is dismissal.” 17 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded the case for entry of an order of dismissal with prejudice.18
Plaintiff applied to this Court for leave to appeal the Court of Appeals' decision. We granted leave and directed the parties to address the following issues: “(1) whether the plaintiff may amend his affidavits of merit in light of Bush v. Shabahang, 484 Mich. 156
(2009), and/or MCL 600.2301, and (2) whether the recent amendment of MCR 2.118 applies to the plaintiff's affidavits of merit.” 19
We review de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary disposition.20 This case involves questions of statutory interpretation, which we also review de novo.21 We interpret court rules using the same principles that govern the interpretation of statutes. 22 Our goal when interpreting and applying statutes or court rules is to give effect to the plain meaning of the text. If the text is unambiguous, we apply the language as written without construction or interpretation. 23
MCL 600.2912d was enacted in 1986 and amended in 1993 as an element of broad tort reforms established by the Legislature.24 In part, the legislation placed “enhanced responsibilities” on medical malpractice plaintiffs.25 MCL 600.2912d(1) requires the following:
Subject to subsection (2), the plaintiff in an action alleging medical malpractice or, if the plaintiff is represented by an attorney, the plaintiff's attorney shall file with the complaint an affidavit of merit signed by a health professional who the plaintiff's attorney reasonably believes meets the requirements for an expert witness under [MCL 600.2169].26 The affidavit of merit shall certify that the health professional has reviewed...
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