Lile v. State

• Citation: 671 N.E.2d 1190
• Decision Date: 10 October 1996
• Docket Number: No. 79A05-9511-PC-486,79A05-9511-PC-486
• Parties: William L. LILE, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

Page 1190

671 N.E.2d 1190

William L. LILE, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent.

No. 79A05-9511-PC-486.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Oct. 10, 1996.

Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, Stephen T. Owens, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for Appellant-Petitioner.

Pamela Carter, Attorney General, Michael K. Ausbrook, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellee-Respondent.

OPINION

SHARPNACK, Chief Judge.

William Lile appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief. Lile raises two issues for our review which we restate as:

1) whether the post-conviction court erroneously determined that the juvenile court properly waived its jurisdiction over him; and

2) whether the post-conviction court erroneously determined that his petition was barred by the doctrine of laches.

We affirm.

The facts most favorable to the judgment follow. On February 28, 1978, the State filed a petition of delinquency against Lile, who was then seventeen years old. The petition alleged that Lile had committed a series of burglaries. On March 1, 1978, the State filed a motion requesting that the juvenile court waive jurisdiction and that Lile be charged as an adult in the circuit court. On June 1, 1978, the juvenile referee conducted a hearing on the motion. After the hearing, Lile entered into a plea bargain in which he agreed to plead guilty to burglary, a class B felony. On July 18, 1978, the juvenile referee entered his findings and recommended that the juvenile court waive jurisdiction over Lile. The juvenile court later approved this recommendation.

On July 21, 1978, the State formally charged Lile with burglary. After conducting a hearing on the plea agreement, the trial court accepted Lile's guilty plea. The trial court later sentenced Lile to six years.

On December 26, 1989, Lile filed a pro se motion for the production of documents relating to his burglary conviction. In this motion, Lile asserted that he needed these documents to collaterally attack an habitual offender conviction. On June 22, 1990, Lile filed a second pro se motion requesting the documents.

On February 13, 1992, Lile filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. While it is unclear what happened to this petition, Lile filed another petition for post-conviction relief with the assistance of counsel on August 22, 1994. In this petition, Lile alleged that the juvenile court improperly waived its jurisdiction over him. The State filed an answer which denied Lile's claim and raised several affirmative defenses, including laches. After conducting an evidentiary hearing on June 23, 1995, the post-conviction court denied Lile's petition. In its judgment, the post-conviction court found that the juvenile court properly waived its jurisdiction and that Lile's petition was barred by laches. Lile now appeals the denial of his petition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

To prevail on a petition for post-conviction relief, the petitioner must establish the grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1 § 5; Barker v. State, 622 N.E.2d 1336, 1337 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), reh'g denied, trans. denied. On appeal from a denial of the petition, the petitioner must show that the evidence is without conflict and leads only to a conclusion opposite that of the court. Id. at 1337-1338.

In the present case, the post-conviction court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon pursuant to P-C.R. 1 § 6. In such circumstances, we cannot affirm the judgment on any legal basis, but rather, will affirm if the court's findings are sufficient to support the judgment. Douglas v. State, 634 N.E.2d 811, 815 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), opinion corrected on rehearing, 640 N.E.2d 73, trans. denied. "On review, we look at all the evidence before the post-conviction court." England v. State, 625 N.E.2d 1264, 1265 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

I. JURISDICTION

The first issue raised for our review is whether the post-conviction court erroneously determined that the juvenile court properly waived its jurisdiction. Lile asserts that "[t]here was not sufficient evidence that a juvenile waiver was properly done and that Lile was properly waived into adult court." Appellant's brief, p. 10.

At the time the juvenile court entered its waiver order, the waiver of juvenile jurisdiction was governed by Ind.Code § 31-5-7-14, which provided in part:

"Whenever a child fourteen (14) years of age or older is charged with committing an act which would amount to a crime if committed by an adult, the court, upon motion by the prosecuting attorney and after full investigation and hearing, may waive jurisdiction and order the child held for trial under regular procedure of the court which would have jurisdiction of an act if committed by an adult, if the court finds that there is probable cause to believe that the case has specific prosecutive merit, that the child is beyond rehabilitation under the regular statutory juvenile system, that it is in the best interest of the public welfare and security he stand trial as an adult, and that the act charged is either:

(1) heinous or of an aggravated character ...; or

(2) part of a repetitive pattern of acts, even though less serious in nature."

I.C. § 31-5-7-14(a) (repealed 1979) (emphasis added). ¹ Pursuant to this statute, the juvenile court must waive its exclusive jurisdiction over the child before a criminal court can obtain jurisdiction. See Cartwright v. State, 168 Ind.App. 517, 520, 344 N.E.2d 83, 85 (1976). An improper waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court voids any subsequent criminal action. Shepard v. State, 273 Ind. 295, 297, 404 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1980).

Lile argues that the juvenile court improperly waived its jurisdiction over him. Essentially, Lile contends that there was insufficient evidence presented to the juvenile referee to support the statutory requirements of I.C. § 31-5-7-14. However, our review of this issue is frustrated by Lile's inability to provide a transcript of the waiver hearing in the record. On appeal from the denial of a petition for post-conviction relief, the burden is on the petitioner to provide a record adequate for review. Maxey v. State, 596 N.E.2d 908, 912 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). When a transcript is unavailable, the petitioner may attempt to reconstruct the transcript pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 7.2(A)(3)(C). ² Adams v. State, 575 N.E.2d 625, 627 (Ind.1991); see Zimmerman v. State, 436 N.E.2d 1087, 1088-1089 (Ind.1982) (holding that because App.R. 7.2(A)(3)(C) provides a means to produce an otherwise lost record, the rule abrogates the old practice of ordering a new trial when the transcript is unavailable). In the alternative, the petitioner must demonstrate that the record cannot be reconstructed. Wilburn v. State, 499 N.E.2d 1173, 1175 (Ind.Ct.App.1986), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Where such a showing is made, the petitioner is entitled to post-conviction relief. Id.

At the post-conviction hearing, Lile established that the transcript of the waiver hearing was unavailable. Sandra Curry, a court reporter, testified that after searching Lile's file, she was unable to find the transcript of the waiver hearing. Curry stated that she only found the docket sheet, which provided:

"6/1/78 Comes now Billy Lile, in person and by his attorney, Greg Donat. Come also the State of Indiana by Lew Gumper, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, and Joe Hooker, Tippecanoe County Probation Officer. And the Court now hears evidence on the motion of the State of Indiana for waiver of jurisdiction of juvenile court. And the Juvenile Referee having heard the evidence now recommends that juvenile jurisdiction of William Leon Lile be waived to adult court. (See order.)--David Crouse, Juvenile Referee.

Above recommendation considered and approved this date.--[Warren B. Thompson]."

Record, p. 599.

Based on this docket sheet, Lile made a diligent effort to reconstruct the transcript by presenting the testimony of Donat, Hooker, Crouse, and Thompson. However, these witnesses stated that they had no independent recollection of the waiver hearing.

We find that Lile has sufficiently demonstrated that the lost transcript of the waiver hearing cannot be reconstructed. See Wilburn, 499 N.E.2d at 1175. Without this transcript, we cannot conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's waiver of its jurisdiction. See A.I.C. § 31-5-7-14(a) (repealed 1979). Accordingly, we hold that Lile has presented a valid claim for relief.

II. LACHES

We next turn to the issue of whether Lile's claim was barred by the doctrine of laches. While post-conviction relief is available at any time, the right to relief may be directly or impliedly waived. Smith v. State, 565 N.E.2d 1114, 1115 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), reh'g denied, trans. denied. In a post-conviction proceeding, the State may raise the affirmative defense of laches, which acts as a legitimate waiver of the petitioner's right to challenge a judgment. Id.; see Baxter v. State, 636 N.E.2d 151, 152 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), reh'g denied, trans. denied. For the doctrine of laches to bar relief, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner unreasonably delayed in seeking relief and that the State was prejudiced by the delay. Perry v. State, 512 N.E.2d 841, 843 (Ind.1987), reh'g denied.

Lile argues that the State failed to prove the two requirements for its affirmative defense of laches. Lile contends that his delay in filing the petition was reasonable and that the delay did not prejudice the State. We will address each contention in turn.

First, Lile argues that the State did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his delay in seeking relief was unreasonable. Implicit in this requirement is that the petitioner had knowledge and acquiesced to the existing conditions which caused the delay. Id. at 844; see Baxter, 636 N.E.2d at 152. "Unless a...