Lillard v. Delaware State Hosp. for Chronically Ill

• Decision Date: 07 December 1982
• Docket Number: 81-570 and 82-159.,Civ. A. No. 81-143,81-327
• Parties: Dora Marie LILLARD and Nancy McKinnon, Plaintiffs, v. DELAWARE STATE HOSPITAL FOR the CHRONICALLY ILL, et al., Defendants. Vernon L. GRICE, Plaintiff, v. SUSSEX COUNTY VOCATIONAL TECHNICAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants. Madelyn KOPEC, Plaintiff, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE; The State of Delaware; Colonial School District, Defendants. Carol A. REED, Plaintiff, v. The STATE of Delaware, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

552 F. Supp. 711

Dora Marie LILLARD and Nancy McKinnon, Plaintiffs, v. DELAWARE STATE HOSPITAL FOR the CHRONICALLY ILL, et al., Defendants.

Vernon L. GRICE, Plaintiff, v. SUSSEX COUNTY VOCATIONAL TECHNICAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.

Madelyn KOPEC, Plaintiff, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE; The State of Delaware; Colonial School District, Defendants.

Carol A. REED, Plaintiff, v. The STATE of Delaware, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. Nos. 81-143, 81-327, 81-570 and 82-159.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

December 7, 1982.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John J. Schmittinger and Philip Eric Herrmann, Schmittinger & Rodriguez, Dover, Del., for plaintiffs in Civ. A. No. 81-143.

Regina M. Mullen, State Sol., and Susan H. Kirk Ryan, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, Del., for defendants in Civ. A. No. 81-143.

John J. Schmittinger, and Philip Eric Herrmann, Schmittinger & Rodriguez, Dover, Del., for plaintiff in Civ. A. No. 81-327.

James F. Waehler, Tunnell & Raysor, Georgetown, Del., for defendants in Civ. A. No. 81-327.

Harvey B. Rubenstein, Wilmington, Del., for plaintiff in Civ. A. No. 81-570.

Roger A. Brown, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, Del., for defendants State Dept. of Finance and the State of Delaware in Civ. A. No. 81-570.

David H. Williams, Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams, Wilmington, Del., for defendant Colonial School Dist. in Civ. A. No. 81-570.

Hank R. Bernstein, Wilmington, Del., for plaintiff in Civ. A. No. 82-159.

Roger A. Brown, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, Del., for defendants State of Delaware, The State Dept. of Finance, The State Dept. of Public Instruction, Dennis Sullivan, II and William B. Keene in Civ. A. No. 82-159.

David H. Williams, Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams, Wilmington, Del., for defendants Red Clay Consolidated School Dist. and Joseph E. Johnson in Civ. A. No. 82-159.

OPINION

MURRAY M. SCHWARTZ, District Judge.

Five plaintiffs, in four lawsuits involving 23 defendants,¹ desire this Court to proceed on their claims in these cases joined for argument. The defendants request that this Court abstain from deciding these four cases, or alternatively dismiss plaintiffs' suits to allow defendants an opportunity to obtain dispositive rulings from the Delaware Supreme Court on critical state law issues affecting plaintiffs' federal law claims. An examination of the relevant state law, as applied to the factual context giving rise to the claims of each of the five plaintiffs, is necessary to explicate fully the abstention problem these cases present.

STATE LAW FRAMEWORK

Prior to 1975, when a state merit system employee was incapacitated by reason of disease or injury sustained by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, the employee continued to receive the equivalent of full pay. This was accomplished by complementing Workmen's Compensation payments with the employee's sick leave benefits in an amount equal to the difference between the Workmen's Compensation payment and full pay. The additional payments made from the employee's sick leave benefits, however, resulted in a corresponding reduction in the amount of sick leave available to the employee.

In 1975, the Delaware State Legislature concluded it was not "equitable or fair for a Merit System employee to be forced to use sick leave ... for a job related accident or illness"² not arising out of the employee's own negligence. Its response was to enact 29 Del.C. § 5933 covering all State of Delaware employees. That statute as passed in 1975 provided:

The rules shall provide for annual, sick and special leaves of absence, with pay or at reduced pay. No employee of the State, including those exempted under § 5903 of this title, shall be charged sick leave for any period of absence from work due to injury, personal injury or occupational disease sustained by accident arising out of and in the course of actual employment with the State, providing such injury or illness is not the direct result of the employee's misconduct, and occurs during a period of employment for which the employee is entitled to receive pay.

The 1975 statute was administratively interpreted to require the employing agency to make supplemental payments in an amount equal to the difference between Workmen's Compensation payments and full pay³ for "as long as an individual receives workmen's compensation and⁴ remains an employee of the state."⁵

This open ended obligation to pay supplemental benefits elicited a response from employing state agencies and the Delaware State Legislature. The former resorted to terminating employees receiving Workmen's Compensation in order to end their obligation to make supplemental wage payments. The Delaware General Assembly responded by amending 29 Del.C. § 5933 to limit the obligation of a state employer to make supplemental payments to a maximum period of three months. 29 Del.C. § 5933 as amended — effective July 1, 1981 — provides:

Whenever an officer or employee of the State, including those exempt from the classified service, qualifies for Workmen's Compensation benefits, such officer or employee, for a period not to exceed three months from the date such compensation begins, shall not be charged sick leave and shall receive from the State the difference, if any, between the total of: a) the amount of such compensation; b) any disability benefits received under the Federal Social Security Act; and c) any other employer supported disability program, and the amount of wages to which the officer or employee is entitled on the date such compensation begins, provided the injury or disease for which such compensation is paid is not the direct result of such officer or employee's misconduct and occurs during a period of employment for which the employee is entitled to receive wages.

C.A. No. 82-159, Doc. No. 10, A-4.

The four present suits all arise out of the cessation of the payment of supplementary salary benefits provided for by 29 Del.C. § 5933.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Civil Action No. 81-143 (Lillard and McKinnon)

Plaintiffs, Dora Marie Lillard ("Lillard") and Nancy McKinnon ("McKinnon"), were employees of the Delaware Hospital for the Chronically Ill. Lillard, a food services worker, and McKinnon, an attendant, were both injured on the job in 1975. Both were awarded Workmen's Compensation and received supplemental pay benefits under 29 Del.C. § 5933 until April 1980, at which time they were terminated, presumably because they were unable to work. Because they were no longer employees of the State of Delaware, payment of supplemental benefits under 29 Del.C. § 5933 immediately ceased, although both plaintiffs continued to receive Workmen's Compensation.

The cessation of payment of supplemental benefits resulted in the filing of a complaint in this Court on March 30, 1981 against the Delaware State Hospital, and three state administrators in their official and individual capacities, alleging substantive due process and equal protection violations. Thereafter, on August 28, 1981, the matter was stayed upon the suggestion of the defendant, and without opposition by plaintiffs, because a case containing possible dispositive legal issues, Young v. Milford School District,⁶ was wending its way to the Delaware Supreme Court.

No decision was reached by the Delaware Supreme Court in Young because that case was settled.⁷ No defendant in the present cases, however, was a defendant in Young, and therefore was not in a position to insist upon a definitive statutory interpretation by the State's highest court.

Following dismissal of Young in December, 1981, the State of Delaware, et al., filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment on January 8, 1982⁸ in the State Superior Court, and sought certification to the Delaware Supreme Court. In response to this action by the State of Delaware, plaintiffs in this case moved to dissolve the stay granted August 28, 1981. Plaintiffs contend that the stay is no longer warranted because the Young case has been finally resolved. The State has countered by urging the stay be continued in effect on abstention grounds. On April 28, 1982, the Superior Court refused the State's request to certify the issues involving 29 Del.C. § 5933 to the Delaware Supreme Court until this Court resolves the abstention question.⁹

Civil Action No. 81-327 (Grice)

Plaintiff, Vernon L. Grice ("Grice"), a non-merit tenured school teacher employed by the Sussex Vocational-Technical School District, was first injured in 1976. After collecting Workmen's Compensation, he returned to work in the fall of 1978, only to leave again in January, 1980. The parties agree that plaintiff could not work for medical reasons. They disagree, however, as to the underlying medical cause for his inability to work. Plaintiff asserts he suffered a recurrence of his 1976 injury, while the defendant school district contends the 1980 leave was caused by other medical reasons.

Irrespective of the cause of the incapacitating medical condition, the parties do agree Grice was terminated as of June 30, 1980, although they disagree as to cause of termination. Plaintiff claims he was terminated so that defendant could avoid paying supplemental benefits under 29 Del.C. § 5933. The defendant asserts that plaintiff's termination was a statutorily authorized reduction in force ("RIF").¹⁰ While there is disagreement as to the reason for termination, there is no dispute that Grice was afforded a post-termination hearing on August 28, 1980. At that hearing, no challenge was made to the School Board's right to terminate plaintiff in order to avoid the payment of supplemental benefits under 29 Del.C. § 5933. Further, plaintiff did not petition for judicial review of the termination decision under 14 Del.C. § 1414. Instead, he filed this action in federal court against the school district and eight other school district officials in their official and individual...