Lilley v. Peeler, Case No. 1:15-cv-128

• Decision Date: 10 August 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:15-cv-128
• Parties: STEPHEN R. LILLEY, Plaintiff, v. HON. ROBERT PEELER, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

STEPHEN R. LILLEY, Plaintiff, v. HON. ROBERT PEELER, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:15-cv-128

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION

August 10, 2015

Barrett, J.

Bowman, M.J.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initiated this action on February 23, 2015 by filing a lengthy complaint against multiple Defendants. Pursuant to local practice, this case has been referred to the undersigned for initial consideration and a Report and Recommendation on four motions to dismiss that have been filed by the Defendants. (Docs. 15, 16, 22, 26). For the reasons that follow, all of the Defendants' motions should be granted.

I. Background

Plaintiff's Complaint spans 185 typed pages and contains 705 paragraphs.¹ He alleges that, "the actions in this complaint have taken place over a period of approximately nineteen years," causing him "Post Traumatic Stress Disorder/Legal Abuse Syndrome (PTSD/LAS),"² through "legal and mental abuse in the Warren CountyCourt of Common Pleas." (Complaint, Doc. 1, ¶¶22-23; Doc. 21 at 3). By way of background, Lilley's lengthy complaint refers to an "unresolved Guardianship Conspiracy [that] spun-off into 13 years of Lawless Violence and trickery during the Probate Period plummeting into a Grave Miscarriage of Justice." (Doc. 1, ¶ 25).

Plaintiff generally alleges that attorney Brenda Dunlap, Guardian Patricia Suttman, Pamela Lilley, and others "known and unknown, engaged in criminal conspiracies to embezzle $150,000 of survivorship accounts for personal gain." (Id., ¶30). He explains that this federal lawsuit touches upon multiple underlying cases in state court, referencing seven different case numbers. He states that his complaint involves a "thirteen year long probate case, Case Number 971061 that involved the conversion and depravation of Plaintiff's $100,000 of personal property, four years as a victim in Case Numbers: 06CV66195, 07CV69736, 07CV69823, 07CV69890, during the Lawsuits for Redress Period in an attempt to recover Plaintiff's $100,000 of personal property along with other damages caused during the Probate Period, and a defendant in the General Division, Case Numbers: 12CV81588 and 13CV84556 which had been conceived as a result of a gross miscarriage of justice during the Probate Period and the Lawsuits for the Redress Period." (Doc. 21 at 4).³

Despite identifying Brenda Dunlap, Patricia Suttman, and Pamela Lilley as playing central roles in the alleged wrongdoing, Plaintiff has not named those individuals as parties to this lawsuit. Instead, Plaintiff's federal complaint identifies as Defendants the following individuals, groups, and entities: (1) Robert Peeler, individually and in his official capacity as Justice of the Warren County Court of Common Pleas, General Division; (2) Magistrate Andrew Hasselbach (also individually and in his officialcapacity); (3) Eric Holder, the United States Attorney General (in his official capacity) as well as 100 John Doe Employees of the Department of Justice individually; (4) Mike DeWine, the Attorney General of the State of Ohio (in his official capacity) and 100 John Doe Employees of the State of Ohio individually; (5) the Board of Commissioners of Warren County (in their official capacity) and 100 John Doe employees of Warren County individually; (6) First Financial Bank NA; (7) Jack C. McGowan; (8) American Express Bank FSB; and (8) GE Money Bank.

At the outset, it must be noted that Plaintiff's complaint fails to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), which provides that the complaint contain a "short and plain statement of the claim." Because of its length, level of detail and the over-inclusive nature of plaintiff's allegations stemming from numerous incidents that allegedly occurred over many years, the complaint presents a difficult challenge to the Defendants in terms of the preparation of their respective responsive pleadings, and to this Court to conduct orderly litigation. Cf. Flayter v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corr., 16 Fed. Appx. 507, 508-09 (7th Cir. 2001)(concluding that the district court could have dismissed the 116-page complaint for failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 in case where the complaint set forth "in tedious and difficult-to-follow detail what appears to be every request for medical attention Flayter made while in . . . custody and every medical examination he has had since his injury in 1990" and contained allegations "relating to numerous different incidents and defendants"); see also Banks v. Doe, 523 Fed. Appx. 503, 2013 WL 3822132 (10th Cir. July 25, 2013)(affirming sua sponte dismissal of action for non-compliance with Rule 8 in case where the amended complaint expanded from 28 pages to 91 pages with over 30 defendants, and was based on "numerous instances of allegedly illegal and unconstitutional treatment [from May 2009 through December 2012] while [the plaintiff] was housed in different detention facilities"); Levinson v.WEDU-TV, 505 Fed. Appx. 919, 920 (11th Cir. 2013)(per curiam) (finding no error by the district court in dismissing case without prejudice where the plaintiff originally filed a 500-page "petition" and 300-page "addendum" and, in response to the court's order to submit a short and plain statement of his claim, thereafter filed a 263-page amended complaint). Nevertheless, the Defendants have done their best to address the varying allegations against them by filing separate motions to dismiss.⁴ As discussed below, those motions should now be granted.

Assuming the four pending motions are granted, the only remaining Defendants would be those who have not filed any answer or otherwise appeared: First Financial Bank NA, Jack C. McGowan, American Express Bank FSB, and GE Money Bank. Because there is no indication in the record that any of those Defendants have been properly served, the time for service has passed, and because it is abundantly clear that there is no federal jurisdiction over any of Plaintiff's claims, this case should be dismissed in its entirety.

II. Standard of Review

For the convenience of the Court, each of the Defendants' respective motions is separately addressed below: (1) the motion of the judicial defendants; (2) the motion of Ohio Attorney General and 100 John Doe state employees; (3) the motion of the United States Attorney General and 100 John Doe Department of Justice employees; and (4) the motion of the Warren County Board of Commissioners and 100 John Doe county employees. The same standards of review apply to all four motions.

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under Rule 12(b)(1)

All four motions at least partially challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of this Court under Rule 12(b)(1), while alternative arguments assert that Plaintiff has failed to state any cognizable claim under Rule 12(b)(6). In general, a motion to dismiss based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be considered before a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Pritchard v. Dent Wizard Intern. Corp., 210 F.R.D. 591, 592 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (explaining that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenge becomes moot if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, citing Moir v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority, 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990)).

A facial attack on the subject matter jurisdiction alleged by the complaint merely questions the sufficiency of the pleading. Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. U.S., 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990). In reviewing such a facial attack, a trial court takes the allegations in the complaint as true, which is a similar safeguard employed under 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. Id. On the other hand, a factual attack on jurisdiction is "not a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleading's allegations, but a challenge to the factual existence of subject matter jurisdiction." United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994). "On such a motion, no presumptive truthfulness applies to the factual allegations ... and the court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case." Id. (citing Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co., 922 F.2d at 325).

B. Failure to State a Claim Under Rule 12(b)(6)

In contrast to a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) operates to test the sufficiency of the claims. The court is required to construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, and accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true. See Scheuer v.Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) and Lewis v. ACB Business Services, 135 F.3d 389, 405 (6th Cir. 1998). A court, however, will not accept conclusions of law or unwarranted inferences which are presented as factual allegations. Blackburn v. Fisk University, 443 F.2d 121, 124 (6th Cir. 1974). A complaint must contain either direct or reasonable inferential allegations that support all material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory. Lewis v. ACB, 135 F.3d at 405 (internal citations omitted). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(citations omitted); Association of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6^th Cir. 2007). Even though a complaint need not contain "detailed" factual allegations, its "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. (citations omitted).

III. Analysis of Four Motions

A. Motion of Judicial Defendants (Doc. 15)

1. Causes of...