Lillian A. Healey v. Frank B. Cady

• Decision Date: 22 June 1932
• Citation: 161 A. 151,104 Vt. 463
• Parties: LILLIAN A. HEALEY v. FRANK B. CADY
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

161 A. 151

104 Vt. 463

LILLIAN A. HEALEY v. FRANK B. CADY

Supreme Court of Vermont

June 22, 1932

May Term, 1932.

Intoxicating Liquors---G. L. 6579---Right of Action against Person Selling or Furnishing Intoxicating Liquor---Statutes, Construction of---Pleading---Proof Where Party Has Pleaded More Facts Than Necessary---Failure To Submit Nonessential Issues to Jury To Support Which Evidence Was Introduced---Election of Remedies.

1. G L. 6579, giving right of action to certain persons who may be injured in person, property, or means of support by an intoxicated person, or in consequence of intoxication of any person, against party who by selling or furnishing intoxicating liquor to such person causes in whole or in part his intoxication, is to be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose.

2. Scope of G. L. 6579, giving right of action to certain persons who may be injured in person, property, or means of support by an intoxicated person, or in consequence of intoxication of any person, against party who by selling or furnishing intoxicating liquor to such person causes in whole or in part his intoxication, is not to be enlarged by judicial construction, but should be interpreted according to its true intent and meaning, having in mind evil to be remedied and object to be obtained.

3. G L. 6579, by necessary implication, changed common-law rule of proximate cause, and does not require that sale of furnishing of intoxicating liquor shall be proximate cause of injury but only that injury be caused by intoxicated person, or in consequence of intoxication of any person.

4. Widow seeking to recover under G. L. 6579 from person selling intoxicating liquor to her husband and another, for husband's death occasioned by injuries received while he was intoxicated, in fight with such other person, need not establish that latter was intoxicated, although complaint contained such allegation.

5. Party by pleading more facts than necessary does not thereby obligate himself to prove them.

6. Facts which it is not necessary for party to prove need not be submitted to jury, although proof is offered to support them.

7. Court having properly submitted to jury issues essential to recovery, its failure to submit non-essential issues did not constitute error.

8. In ACTION OF TORT by widow under G. L. 6579 seeking to recover from person selling intoxicating liquor to her husband and another, for husband's death from injuries inflicted upon him by such other person, fact that complaint alleged that such other person was intoxicated when such injuries were inflicted held not election to stand on that provision of statute giving right of action for injury caused by intoxicated person, allegations being broad enough also to cover other provision of statute giving right of action for injury caused in consequence of intoxication of any person.

ACTION OF TORT under G. L. 6579. Plea, general issue. Trial by jury at the December Term, 1931, Windsor County, Bicknell, J presiding. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case.

Judgment affirmed.

Raymond Trainor for the defendant.

Fenton, Wing, Morse & Jeffords for the plaintiff.

Present: POWERS, C. J., SLACK, MOULTON, THOMPSON, and GRAHAM, JJ.

OPINION

SLACK

The plaintiff is the widow of John J. Healey who died from injuries inflicted upon him by one Oscar Leneau. She seeks to recover for the loss of her means of support occasioned by the death of her husband.

The action is brought under G. L. 6579, which provides: "A husband, wife, child, guardian, employer or other person who is injured in person, property or means of support by an intoxicated person or in consequence of the intoxication of any person, shall have a right of action in his or her own name, jointly or severally, against a person or persons, who by selling or furnishing intoxicating liquor, have caused in whole or in part such intoxication."

The declaration alleges, in substance, that on May 6, 1931, the defendant sold intoxicating liquor to Healey and also to Leneau upon which both became intoxicated; that while so intoxicated Healey and Leneau got into a fight between themselves in which Leneau, "who was then and there intoxicated," inflicted injuries upon Healey that resulted in the latter's death, whereby the plaintiff was injured in her means of support, etc. The plea is the general issue. The plaintiff had a verdict and judgment, and the case is here on defendant's exception to the charge.

The court charged the jury in part as follows: "If you find that they or either of them (referring to Healey and Leneau) became intoxicated on cider that was furnished by the defendant, then you should inquire whether or not the fight resulting in the death of Healey came about wholly or in part by reason of the intoxication of one or both of these men; and if you find that his death resulted from the stab wound in the heart inflicted by Leneau while Leneau and he or either of them was under the influence of intoxicating liquor, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover."

This was excepted to on the ground that there could be no recovery under the declaration unless the jury found that Leneau was intoxicated at the time he inflicted upon Healey the injuries from which he died.

That part of the charge excepted to was later changed, but not in a manner to affect the exception. The statute under which this suit is brought gives a right of action to certain persons who may be injured in person, property or means of support by an intoxicated person against the party who by selling or furnishing intoxicating liquor to such person causes in whole or in part his intoxication. It also gives a like remedy to the persons named who may in the same manner be injured in consequence of the intoxication of any person. This statute was enacted to compel those who will hazard causing damage by furnishing intoxicating liquor to others to answer for such damage to those who may suffer it. It created a remedy for wrong where there was none before, and is, on familiar principles, to be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose. Smith v. Wilcox, 47 Vt. 537. This does not mean, of course, that its scope is to be enlarged by judicial construction, but that it is to be interpreted according to its true intent and meaning, having in mind the evil to be remedied and the object to be attained. Mead v. Stratton,...