Lillie v. Shriver

• Decision Date: 01 November 1920
• Docket Number: No. 32615.,32615.
• Citation: 179 N.W. 632,190 Iowa 861
• Parties: LILLIE v. SHRIVER ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

190 Iowa 861

179 N.W. 632

LILLIE

v.SHRIVER ET AL.

No. 32615.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 1, 1920.

Appeal from District Court, Iowa County; R. P. Howell, Judge.

The suit of the plaintiff, brought to quiet title, was based on an alleged gift of lands made to her by her grandfather, Michael Shriver. In addition to joining issue generally, the appellees affirmatively defended with accord and satisfaction. The petition of the plaintiff was dismissed, and she appeals. Affirmed.Stapleton & Stapleton, of Marengo, for appellant.

Havner, Roller & Hatter and Sullivan & Kirky, all of Marengo, for appellees.

SALINGER, J.

I. Before appellant brought the present suit she instituted a similar one. In both suits she seeks to quiet title to described lands, claiming that same became her property by gift of her grandfather, Michael Shriver. In both she claims that from March, 1896, on she and her husband had lived on the land, claiming to be absolute owners in fee simple; that plaintiff has maintained hostile, adverse, and uninterrupted possession as against the world; and that the defendants, the children of Michael Shriver, are making adverse claims and denying that said gift was made.

Plaintiff dismissed the first suit in writing, and in words as follows:

“Comes now Mary Lillie, plaintiff in the above-entitled cause of action, and asks the court to dismiss said cause of action at plaintiff's costs. That the said Mary Lillie, plaintiff herein, further states that she makes no further claim of any kind on the real estate or personal property belonging to the estate of Michael Shriver, deceased, and she fully releases the estate from any claim that she may have against the said estate or the administrators thereof, of every kind and character. Mary Lillie.”

The defendants urge this writing in bar of the instant suit. They plead the same as being an accord and satisfaction; that said writing of dismissal was on the consideration that plaintiff should be permitted to remain on the land until March 1st, next ensuing; that she was to dismiss and surrender all rights she claimed in and to said land if that permission were given; and that it was given. Further, that plaintiff agreed to pay rent and to become the tenant of defendants until said time, and that by this agreement to become tenant and to pay rent plaintiff is now estopped to avoid the said dismissal and settlement.

The plaintiff pleads in avoidance that while the first suit was pending the defendant, William Shriver, her uncle, represented to her that her grandmother was greatly worried about the suit, and that plaintiff was driving the grandmother to her grave; that unless the suit were dismissed it would kill the grandmother; that, if plaintiff would dismiss, the matter could be settled without suit, and that defendants wanted everything done and settled, as plaintiff's grandfather, Michael Shriver, wanted it done; that plaintiff fully relied on these “representations.” Finally, it is pleaded that, believing the heirs of her grandfather would assent to the gift made to her by the grandfather, and fully believing she was but signing a paper that would dismiss her cause without prejudice, she signed without reading, on the representation of one Sullivan, an attorney for the defendants, that the paper signed was not more than a mere dismissal without prejudice.

The plaintiff as a witness testified, in substance, that these representations were made, and Mary, a daughter of the plaintiff, 11 years old at the time of the trial, says she heard her uncle William Shriver say he wanted plaintiff to dismiss the case; that it would send grandmother to the grave in disgrace, and that he wanted it settled just as grandpa wanted them to settle. Appellant urges that here is a case of false representations, mixed with a promise which it was at the time not intended to keep, and that therefore a fraud was committed, against which a court of equity will relieve.

[1] Grant that this is a correct abstract statement. But the question remains whether the plaintiff in signing without reading was not guilty of such negligence as that she may not now assert that she is not bound by all the provisions of the paper signed by her. It is elementary law that, though there be a fraud committed in obtaining a signature, the perpetrator of the fraud may still urge that nothing prevented the party from reading before signing, and that therefore he may have no relief even though there were false representations as to the contents of the paper. Bonnot v. Newman, 108 Iowa, 580, 80 N. W. 655;Bannister v. McIntire, 112 Iowa, at 604, 84 N. W. 709;Gulliher v. Railway, 59 Iowa, at 422, 13 N. W. 429;Hopkins v. Company, 57 Iowa, 203, 10 N. W. 605, 42 Am. Rep. 41;McCormack v. Molburg, 43 Iowa, 561;Reid v. Bradley, 105 Iowa, 220, 221, 74 N. W. 896;Wallace v. Railway, 67 Iowa, 547, 25 N. W. 772;Jenkins v. Company, 82 Iowa, at 621, 48 N. W. 970;McKinney v. Herrick, 66 Iowa, 414, 23 N. W. 767. As said in Crim v. Crim, 162 Mo. 544, 63 S. W. 489, 54 L. R. A. 502, 85 Am. St. Rep. 521, to permit defending against what was signed that the signer did not read what he signed, and therefore did not know the contents of what he signed, “would absolutely destroy the value of all contracts.” To avoid the signing, something must have prevented reading. That is manifest. There can be no occasion to avoid a charged fraud without assuming there was a fraud to be avoided. If something which is a defense though a fraud has been committed cannot avail because a fraud has been committed, the value of the right so to avoid would be wholly academic. See Spitler v. Lot Company, 179 N. W. 69, filed at this term. In fewer words, according to the cases we have cited, it is hornbook law that, if through a false representation of the contents of a paper one sign that paper without reading it and nothing in the way of trick, artifice, or fraud working a prevention of the reading has been practiced, then, though it be assumed that the contents were falsely represented, the party who signs without reading, when he might have read, “must accept the consequences of his own folly.” In still fewer words, if one, who is able to read and was not prevented from reading, signs without reading, the false representation that induced the signing was not the proximate cause of injury, because if the paper had been read the false representation would have been ineffectual.

[2] II. We have so far assumed the truth of what plaintiff charges. But the fact is these charges were not established by a preponderance. Plaintiff says that she knew or heard it stated that Sullivan was called to prepare dismissal papers; that defendant William Shriver told Vette for what purpose plaintiff had come, and that he wanted her to dismiss. Vette testifies that plaintiff asked him if he thought the heirs would be willing to let her stay on the place if she would sign the paper, and that he told her he was satisfied such an arrangement could be made. He testifies that plaintiff told him that she wanted to dismiss; he thinks she said she was awfully glad she had done so, and that it had been worrying her a great deal; that when Sullivan came he began talking to plaintiff, and she told him she wanted to dismiss; that she said, “Well, I have decided to dismiss this action that was started, and I want to know what you advise me to do in the case,” and that he told her that he was in no position to advise her; that he did not want her to go and tell her attorneys he was giving that kind of advice, and that if she dismissed she would have to do so on her own account.

Sullivan testifies that when he asked plaintiff whether she was satisfied to not go any further with the suit, and to make no further claim on the Shriver estate, she...