Lillie v. Thompson
| Decision Date | 10 September 1947 |
| Docket Number | No. 206,206 |
| Citation | 332 U.S. 459,68 S.Ct. 140,92 L.Ed. 73 |
| Parties | LILLIE v. THOMPSON. On Petition for Certiorari Distributed |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. N. Murray Edward, of St. Louis, Mo., and Grover N. McCormick, of Memphis, Tenn., for petitioner.
No appearance for respondent.
Petitioner sued for damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.1 The essence of her claim was that she was injured as a result of the respondent's negligence in sending her to work in a place he knew to be unsafe without taking reasonable measures to protect her.
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action and entered summary judgment for the respondent. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. 6 Cir., 162 F.2d 716.
There is thus a single issue in the case: Could it be found from the facts alleged in the complaint, as supplemented by any uncontroverted allegations by the respondent, that petitioner's injuries resulted at least in part from respondent's negligence?2
Petitioner's allegations may be summarized as follows: Respondent required her, a 22 year jold telegraph operator, to work alone between 11:30 p.m. and 7:30 a.m. in a one-room frame building situated in an isolated part of respondent's railroad yards in Memphis. Though respondent had reason to know the yards were frequented by dangerous characters, he failed to exercise reasonable care to light the building and its surroundings or to guard or patrol it in any way. Petitioner's duties were to receive and deliver messages to men operating trains in the yard. In order for the trainmen to get the messages it was necessary for them to come to the building at irregular intervals throughout the night, and it was petitioner's duty to admit them when they knocked. Because there were no windows in the building's single door or on the side of the building in which the door was located, petitioner could identify persons seeking entrance only by unlocking and opening the door. About 1:30 a.m. on the night of her injury petitioner responded to a knock, thinking that some of respondent's trainmen were seeking admission. She opened the door, and before she could close it a man entered and beat her with a large piece of iron, seriously and permanently injuring her.
In support of his motion for summary judgment respondent alleged, and petitioner did not deny, that the assailant was not an employee of the respondent and that the attack was criminal.
The district court stated, in explanation of its action, that there would be no causal connection between the injury and respondent's failure to light or guard the premises, and that the law does not permit re overy 'for the intentional or criminal acts' of either a fellow-employee or an outsider.3
We are of the opinion that the allegations in the complaint, if supported by evidence, will warrant submission to a jury. Petitioner alleged in effect that respondent was aware of conditions which created a likelihood that a young woman performing the duties required of peti- tioner would suffer just such an injury as was in fact inflicted upon her. That the foreseeable danger was from intentional or criminal misconduct is irrelevant; respondent nonetheless had a duty to make reasonable provision against it.4 Breach of that duty would be negligence, and we cannot say as a matter of law that petitioner's injury did not result at least in part from such negligence. The cases cited by the district court,5 we believe, do not support the board proposition enunciated by it, and do not cover the fact situation set forth by the pleadings in this case.
Certiorari is granted, and the judgment is...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist.
...at p. 490, 135 Cal.Rptr. 296; 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal.Law, supra, Torts § 643, pp. 2922-2923.) (See also Lillie v. Thompson (1947) 332 U.S. 459, 68 S.Ct. 140, 92 L.Ed. 73 [railroad liable for assault by stranger where woman railroad telegrapher negligently placed in isolated building at ni......
-
Ferguson v. Cormack Lines
...Co., 331 U.S. 477, 67 S.Ct. 1334, 91 L.Ed. 1615; affirmance of judgment n.o.v. for defendant reversed. 1947 Term. Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459, 68 S.Ct. 140, 92 L.Ed. 73;* affirmance of dismissal of complaint reversed. Hunter v. Texas Electric R. Co., 332 U.S. 827, 68 S.Ct. 203, 92 L.Ed......
-
Wilkerson v. Carthy
...91 L.Ed. 1261; Myers v. Reading Co., 331 U.S. 477, 67 S.Ct. 1334, 91 L.Ed. 1615, Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 11; Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459, 68 S.Ct. 140; Anderson v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co., 333 U.S. 821, 68 S.Ct. 854; Eubanks v. Thompson, 334 U.S. 854, 68 S.Ct. 1528; Penn.......
-
Poignant v. United States
...452, 67 S.Ct. 401, 91 L.Ed. 416; Ellis v. Union Pac. R. Co., 1947, 329 U.S. 649, 67 S.Ct. 598, 91 L.Ed. 572; Lillie v. Thompson, 1947, 332 U.S. 459, 68 S.Ct. 140, 92 L.Ed. 73; Johnson v. United States, 1948, 333 U.S. 46, 68 S.Ct. 391, 92 L.Ed. 468; Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 1949, 336 U.S. 53, ......
-
Speak No Evil: Negligent Employment Referral and the Employer's Duty to Warn (or, How Employers Can Have Their Cake and Eat it Too)
...master-servant relationship imposes on an employer a duty of care for the safety of his or her employees. See, e.g., Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459, 461 (1947); Bartlett v. Hantover, 9 Wash. App. 614, 620-21, 513 P.2d 844, 849 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 84 Wash. 2d 426, 526 P.2d 1217......