Lilly v. Lilly
Decision Date | 25 February 2011 |
Docket Number | No. 20090933–CA.,20090933–CA. |
Citation | 250 P.3d 994,2011 UT App 53,676 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 |
Parties | Korilee LILLY, Petitioner and Appellee,v.Aaron M. LILLY, Respondent and Appellant. |
Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Mark W. Wiser, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.David R. Blaisdell, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.Before Judges ORME, ROTH, and CHRISTIANSEN.
¶ 1 Aaron M. Lilly, who physically resides in California due to his active duty service in the military but claims legal residence in Utah, appeals the district court's dismissal of his petition to modify a child support order that was originally issued in California as part of a California divorce decree. In dismissing the petition to modify, the district court concluded that under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B–14–205, –613 (2008) (setting forth the relevant provisions regarding jurisdiction to modify a child support order),1 subject matter jurisdiction to modify a child support order is determined by a person's physical residence rather than that person's domicile or legal residence. We reverse and remand.
¶ 2 Aaron M. Lilly (Father) is an active duty member of the United States Marine Corps. He is currently stationed in California. Father was born and raised in Utah and graduated from high school in Utah. His home of record 2 is Utah as he was a Utah resident when he enlisted in the Marines in 1994. Father claims that he has maintained his Utah domicile since his enlistment in the Marines by paying Utah taxes, registering to vote in Utah, having a Utah driver license, listing his home state as Utah, and declaring his intent to return to Utah when he is released from military service.
¶ 3 In 2001, Father married Korilee Lilly (Mother). One child (Child) was born during the marriage. In April 2005, Mother attempted to file for divorce in Utah but could not because, at that time, she resided in California with Father and Child. Mother then filed for divorce in California, which was finalized in December 2006. The divorce decree included an order that Father pay Mother child support in the amount of $1000 every month. In June 2005—after filing for divorce but before the divorce was finalized—Mother and Child moved to Utah. Mother and Child have resided in Utah ever since.
¶ 4 In November 2007, Father filed a petition in Utah to modify the child support order to take into account Mother's increased income from employment she obtained after moving to Utah. In support of his petition, Father asserted that Utah has jurisdiction to modify the child support order because Utah is the resident state of Father, Mother, and Child. In September 2008, a commissioner recommended that Father's petition be denied. Father filed a timely objection, and in October 2008, the district court upheld the commissioner's recommendation and denied Father's petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court concluded that Utah's jurisdiction to modify a child support order is determined by where “a parent physically lives” and reasoned that because “[Father] ... physically lives in California,” California has jurisdiction to modify the child support order, and Utah “lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to ... modify [the] child support [order].” The district court based its decision on the fact that Father physically resides in California and made no findings regarding whether Utah is Father's domicile.
¶ 5 While Father's petition to modify was pending in Utah, Mother filed her own petition in California to modify the child support order. In December 2007—before any decision had been reached on Father's Utah petition to modify—the California court dismissed Mother's petition, essentially deferring the issue of which state had jurisdiction to the earlier-filed Utah petition, but explained that “[i]f Utah refuses to exert jurisdiction over the issue, ... either party may file a motion requesting modification of child support to be heard before this court.” Before the Utah court had acted on the matter, however, Mother renewed her petition in California; and in September 2008—after the Utah commissioner recommended denial of Father's petition but before the district court acted on Father's objection—the California court granted Mother's petition to modify the child support order, raising Father's monthly obligation from $1000 to $1225. Father now appeals the district court's determination that Utah lacks subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child support order.3
¶ 6 This appeal presents two related issues for our review. First, Father challenges the district court's denial of his petition, arguing that Utah, and not California, has subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child support order because Utah is the resident state of Father, Mother, and Child. Father supports his position by arguing that Utah's subject matter jurisdiction to modify a child support order is based on a person's domicile or legal residence rather than physical residence. “Whether a [district] court has subject matter jurisdiction [to modify a child support order] presents a question of law which we review under a correction of error standard, giving no particular deference to the [district] court's determination.” Case v. Case, 2004 UT App 423, ¶ 5, 103 P.3d 171 (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, Mother argues that this court must give full faith and credit to California's modified child support order. Whether a sister state's judgment must be given full faith and credit presents a question of law. See In re Estate of Jones, 858 P.2d 983, 985 (Utah 1993). Further, resolution of both of these issues requires statutory interpretation, which is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See State v. Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, ¶ 6, 203 P.3d 984 ().
¶ 7 All the issues here involve the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). UIFSA governs “the establishment, enforcement, [and] modification of support orders across state lines,” and has been enacted in every state “to further national uniformity in the enforcement of child support orders.” Case, 2004 UT App 423, ¶¶ 7–8, 103 P.3d 171 (internal quotation marks omitted). The purpose of UIFSA is “to recognize that only one valid support order may be effective at any one time.” Id. ¶ 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 8 Two particular provisions of UIFSA are relevant to our analysis, both of which govern when a state has subject matter jurisdiction to modify a child support order. These provisions as adopted in Utah and California are virtually identical. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 78B–14–205(1)(a) (2008), with Cal. Fam.Code § 4909(a)(1) (Deering 2010); 4 and compare Utah Code Ann. § 78B–14–613(1), with Cal. Fam.Code § 4962(a). 5 Because the Utah and California versions of these provisions are not materially different, as a convenience to the reader we will refer to them consistently throughout this opinion as UIFSA section 205 and UIFSA section 613. UIFSA section 205, which is codified as Utah Code section 78B–14–205 and California Family Code section 4909, governs under what circumstances a state that has issued a child support order may exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify that child support order. It provides that a “state that has issued a child-support order ... has and shall exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its child-support order ... [if the issuing] state is the residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order is issued.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B–14–205(1)(a); accord Cal. Fam.Code § 4909(a)(1). UIFSA section 613, which is codified as Utah Code section 78B–14–613 and California Family Code section 4962, governs when another state may obtain jurisdiction to modify the original child support order. It provides that “[i]f all of the parties who are individuals reside in [the other] state and the child does not reside in the issuing state, a tribunal of [the other] state has jurisdiction to enforce and to modify the issuing state's child support order.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B–14–613(1); accord Cal. Fam.Code § 4962(a).
¶ 9 As we have explained, this appeal presents two issues for our review: (1) whether Utah has subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child support order and (2) whether California's modification of the child support order is entitled to full faith and credit. Ordinarily, a full faith and credit analysis is a threshold issue that must be considered before reaching any other issues raised on appeal. However, the issue of whether California's modified child support order is entitled to full faith and credit is resolved by determining whether California had subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child support order. See infra ¶¶ 24–26. And whether California had subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child support order is governed by UIFSA. See infra ¶ 26. Moreover, the central issue presented by this appeal is whether Utah or California has subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child support order under UIFSA. Thus, both issues raised on appeal require interpretation of UIFSA; and resolution of the full faith and credit issue will ultimately turn on resolution of the subject matter jurisdiction issue. Accordingly, for ease of analysis, we will first address the subject matter jurisdiction issue and will conduct the required analysis under UIFSA; we will then address the full faith and credit issue.
¶ 10 The central issue presented for our review is whether Utah or California has subject matter jurisdiction under UIFSA to modify the child support order. Father asserts that the district court erred in denying his petition, arguing that Utah, and not California, has subject...
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