Lilly v. Smith, 89-293-II

Decision Date02 February 1990
Docket NumberNo. 89-293-II,89-293-II
Citation790 S.W.2d 539,61 Ed.LawRep. 363
PartiesBeverly LILLY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dr. Charles SMITH, Commissioner of the Department of Education For the State of Tennessee; Walter L. Price, Chairman of the Tennessee Higher Education Commission; Dr. Arliss L. Roaden, Executive Director of the Tennessee Higher Education Commission; Tennessee Higher Education Commission; Lamar Alexander, President of the University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee System; Thomas J. Garland, Chancellor of the State University and Community College System of Tennessee; the State University and Community College System of Tennessee; the Board of Nursing of the State of Tennessee; Dolores Moore, Chairman of the Board of Nursing of the State of Tennessee; Elizabeth Lund, Executive Director of the Board of Nursing of the State of Tennessee; Dr. Karan A. Bowyer, President of Dyersburg State Community College; Dyersburg State Community College; Raymond C. Bowen, President of Shelby State Community College; Shelby State Community College; and Dr. Margaret N. Perry, Chancellor of the University of Tennessee at Martin; University of Tennessee at Martin, Defendants-Appellees. 790 S.W.2d 539, 61 Ed. Law Rep. 363
CourtTennessee Court of Appeals

James D. Senter III, Senter & Senter, Humboldt, Randy C. Camp, Alamo, for plaintiff-appellant.

Charles Burson, Atty. Gen. and Reporter, Jane W. Young, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, Beauchamp E. Brogan, Gen. Counsel, Catherine S. Mizell, Associate Gen. Counsel, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, for defendants-appellees.

OPINION

LEWIS, Judge.

Plaintiff brought this suit on behalf of herself and others similarly situated against the defendants when she was refused admission to a state nursing school based on a policy which she alleged was invoked, executed and enforced in violation of art. I, sec. 8, of the Tennessee Constitution and the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Tenn.R.Civ.P. 12.02(1) and 12.02(6) in which they alleged lack of jurisdiction and the failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court sustained the motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Tenn.R.Civ.P. 12.02(6).

A Tenn.R.Civ.P. 12.02(6) motion admits the truth of all relevant and material averments contained in the complaint, but asserts that such facts do not constitute a cause of action. Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188, 190 (Tenn.1975). In scrutinizing a complaint in the face of a Tenn.R.Civ.P. 12.02(6) motion, "the court should construe the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff, taking all of the allegations of fact therein as true." Sullivant v. Americana Homes, Inc., 605 S.W.2d 246 (Tenn.App.1980) (quoting Huckeby v. Spangler, 521 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tenn.1975)).

The pertinent facts as contained in the complaint and which, for purposes of the motion to dismiss, are admitted as true are as follows:

The two "D" grade policy prevails at all public colleges, community colleges and universities of the State of Tennessee, the policy being prescribed, promulgated, executed and enforced by the defendants. The policy states that if two "D" grades or below are received during the nursing program in any school of nursing in the State of Tennessee, not only must dismissal take place, but the person receiving such grades is never eligible for re-admission into the nursing programs of any of the public schools of nursing in the State of Tennessee.

This policy was consistently invoked, executed and enforced over a period of years.

The plaintiff, a thirty-six-year-old female, entered the nursing program at Dyersburg State Community College (Dyersburg State) in January of 1984. After taking a year of prerequisites to nursing school, she entered the nursing school program which consisted of seven quarters. During her second quarter at Dyersburg State she received one "D". She later repeated this course and received a grade of "B". In her fifth quarter she received a second "D" grade. Pursuant to Dyersburg State's policy, she was not allowed to repeat this course. Because she had received two "D" grades while in nursing school, she was dismissed from the nursing program.

The plaintiff re-applied for admission to the school of nursing at Dyersburg State, but was denied admission because of the two "D" grade policy. She subsequently applied to Shelby State Community College for admission to its nursing school and was informed she would not be admitted because of the two "D" grade policy. She then applied to the University of Tennessee at Martin School of Nursing but was denied admission also under the two "D" grade policy.

The trial court, in its order dismissing plaintiff's complaint, stated in part as follows:

The Court grants the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for constitutional violations. The Court does not rule on the issues of sovereign or qualified immunity. In this case, it is important to note that the plaintiff is not alleging that she is treated differently than any other similarly situated nursing student by reason of the 2 "D" policy; she is not alleging that she received the "Ds" pursuant to a discriminatory practice; nor is she alleging any due process violation in connection with the awarding of the "D" grades.

The plaintiff merely alleges that an academic policy which applies to the plaintiff and all other similarly situated students is unfair.

Plaintiff insists that the action of the trial court in limiting plaintiff's classification to nursing students at state schools who have received two or more "Ds" in previous nursing courses is an "obvious error." She insists that the class consists of all students in state colleges and universities, whether it be students in law school, medical school, nursing school or others. She admits in her brief and at oral argument "that she is not being treated differently from the nursing students in state schools."

Plaintiff also argues that the trial court did not consider the question of whether the two "D" grade policy was unconstitutional and that therefore the only question before this Court is whether the court erred in limiting her classification to nursing students at state schools.

The trial court did consider the question of whether the two "D" grade policy was unconstitutional. The trial court, in its order, states: "The Court grants the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for constitutional violations." The court noted that the plaintiff did not allege that she was treated differently from any other similarly situated nursing student by reason of the two "D" policy and then summarized plaintiff's arguments by stating that "[t]he plaintiff merely alleges that an academic policy which applies to the plaintiff and all other similarly situated students is unfair."

As did the trial court, we find nothing in plaintiff's complaint alleging that she has been treated differently from others in her class and it is clear that plaintiff's class is nursing students who have been subjected to the two "D" grade policy.

We also find that the two "D" grade policy does not violate substantive due process or equal protection.

The record sustains the trial court's holding that "plaintiff merely alleged that an academic policy which applies to the plaintiff and all other similarly situated students is unfair." While we may think the two "D" policy is unfair or unwise, determining the wisdom of an academic policy which may appear stringent to some is better left to the discretion of the nursing faculty, not lawyers and judges. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225, 106 S.Ct. 507, 513, 88 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985).

We are not persuaded by plaintiff's argument that...

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3 cases
  • Riggs v. Burson
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • 10 March 1997
    ...correctly applied this analysis in the context of the defendant's motion to dismiss under Tenn.R.Civ.P. 12.02(6). In Lilly v. Smith, 790 S.W.2d 539 (Tenn.App.1990), for example, the plaintiff raised an equal protection challenge to the State's grade policy for admission into state nursing s......
  • Dobbs v. Guenther
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • 21 October 1992
    ... ... Smith v. Lincoln Brass Works, Inc., 712 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tenn.1986) ...         While it is ... Allen, 698 S.W.2d 58, 59 (Tenn.1985); Holloway v. Putnam County, 534 S.W.2d at 296; Lilly ... Page 274 ... v. Smith, 790 S.W.2d 539, 540 (Tenn.Ct.App.1990) ...         The ... ...
  • McPherson v. Shea Ear Clinic, P.A., No. W2004-00690-COA-R3-CV (TN 5/18/2005)
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • 18 May 2005
    ...plaintiff's favor. Lewis v. Allen, 698 S.W.2d 58, 59 (Tenn. 1985); Holloway v. Putnam County, 534 S.W.2d at 296, Lilly v. Smith, 790 S.W.2d 539, 540 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). Id. at Circuit courts should not dismiss cases appealed from general sessions court because of "any informality whateve......

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