Lilly v. Town of Lewiston

• Decision Date: 27 March 2020
• Docket Number: 1:18-CV-00002 EAW
• Parties: David E. LILLY, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF LEWISTON, Scott Stafford, individually and in his official capacity as a Town of Lewiston Police Officer, and Christopher Salada, individually and in his official capacity as Chief of Police of the Town of Lewiston, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

449 F.Supp.3d 190

David E. LILLY, Plaintiff,

v.TOWN OF LEWISTON, Scott Stafford, individually and in his official capacity as a Town of Lewiston Police Officer, and Christopher Salada, individually and in his official capacity as Chief of Police of the Town of Lewiston, Defendants.

1:18-CV-00002 EAW

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed March 27, 2020

David E. Lilly, Lewiston, NY, pro se.

Daniel T. Cavarello, Jenna W. Klucsik, Sugarman Law Firm LLP, Buffalo, NY, Jenna W. Klucsik, Sugarman Law Firm LLP, Syracuse, NY, for Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff David E. Lilly ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se , brings the instant lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York state law alleging defendants Town of Lewiston ("Lewiston"), Scott Stafford ("Stafford"), and Christopher Salada ("Salada") (collectively "Defendants") illegally seized him and retaliated against him. Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Dkt. 11). For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is granted in part and denied in part, and Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is denied as moot.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 10).¹ As is required at this stage of the proceedings, the Court treats Plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations as true.

Plaintiff entered the United States Air Force on or about July 26, 2011, where he advanced to the rank of staff sergeant before honorably separating from the Air Force on or about January 25, 2018. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-25). On December 29, 2014, at 4:00 p.m., Plaintiff was visiting his parents in Lewiston, New York, and drove to Artpark to walk his golden retriever and take photographs. (Id. at ¶ 36). Artpark enjoys over 150,000 visitors annually, and these visitors include numerous individuals with vehicles bearing license plates, registration, and/or inspection stickers issued by states other than New York. (Id. at ¶¶ 34-35). Plaintiff drives a 1994 Toyota compact pickup truck with valid Virginia license plates, registration, and inspection stickers.² (Id. at ¶ 38). He parked in a parking lot at Artpark, where he observed at least two other vehicles parked in the same lot as him. (Id. at ¶¶ 38-39).³

While walking his dog, Plaintiff noticed a Lewiston Police Department Patrol SUV stop behind his vehicle for approximately 30 seconds. (Id. at ¶¶ 40, 44). Plaintiff alleges he was unable to identify the occupant of the patrol vehicle at that time, but that upon information and belief it was Stafford. (Id. at ¶¶ 43, 45).⁴ Stafford requested a license plate search of Plaintiff's vehicle, but not of the other two vehicles in the parking lot. (Id. at ¶¶ 46-47). Stafford did not immediately receive back any identification information about Plaintiff's vehicle. (Id. at ¶ 64). Plaintiff waved at Stafford in an attempt to identify himself as the owner of the vehicle, but was not acknowledged by Stafford. (Id. at ¶ 48). Plaintiff continued to walk his dog, and observed Stafford exit the lot Plaintiff's car was in to park in the main Artpark parking lot next to the only entrance and exit road to Artpark. (Id. at ¶¶ 49, 53). Numerous other vehicles were parked in the main parking lot, but Stafford did not run a license plate check on any of those vehicles. (Id. at ¶¶ 50-52).

Plaintiff returned to his truck, and at approximately 4:45 p.m. he drove past Stafford and began driving from Artpark to the Sand Docks at Lewiston Landing Park,⁵ which was about one mile away. (Id. at ¶¶ 60-61). The Sand Docks provide a panoramic view of the Niagara River and Canada, and attract numerous visitors, including individuals with out-of-state vehicles. (Id. at ¶¶ 57-59). Plaintiff arrived at the Sand Docks parking lot at approximately 4:50 p.m., and backed his vehicle into a parking space so that his vehicle was facing west toward the sunset.⁶ (Id. at ¶ 70). There was a steep embankment behind Plaintiff's vehicle, and vacant parking spaces to either side. (Id. at ¶¶ 71-72). Plaintiff began taking photographs of the Niagara River and Canada from his car. (Id. at ¶ 76).

Stafford entered the Sand Docks parking lot and instead of parking in one of the vacant spots next to Plaintiff, he stopped at a 90-degree angle immediately in front of Plaintiff's vehicle, blocking the truck between the patrol vehicle and the embankment. (Id. at ¶¶ 78-80). Plaintiff saw a dog in the car, and believed the dog to be a canine named Taser. (Id. at ¶¶ 87-88). Plaintiff alleges that "[b]ased upon information and belief, Taser, among other things, was trained to be aggressive and/or intimidating," and that the Lewiston Police Department had knowledge that Taser was aggressively trained. (Id. at ¶¶ 92-93). Plaintiff placed both of his hands on his steering wheel. (Id. at ¶ 100). Stafford stayed in his patrol vehicle and lowered his driver window, and Plaintiff used his left hand to lower his driver-side window before placing his hand back on the steering wheel. (Id. at ¶¶ 101-02). Stafford stated that he saw Plaintiff at Artpark and asked Plaintiff what he had been doing there. (Id. at ¶ 103). Plaintiff told Stafford he had been walking his dog and taking photographs. (Id. at ¶ 104). Stafford then asked Plaintiff if he was Edward Lilly's son, to which Plaintiff responded yes. (Id. at ¶¶ 105-06). Next, Stafford asked if "he knew Plaintiff from Kiwanis Park," and Plaintiff "indicated affirmatively." (Id. at ¶¶ 107-08). Plaintiff asked Stafford "why Plaintiff was being seized," but Stafford did not answer and instead asked Plaintiff "a series of additional questions" which continued for approximately 10-15 minutes. (Id. at ¶¶ 111-14).

Plaintiff commenced the instant lawsuit on January 2, 2018. (Dkt. 1). Defendants filed their Answer on April 18, 2018 (Dkt. 2), and on June 22, 2018, they filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) (Dkt. 7). The Court granted Defendants' motion on June 17, 2019, and dismissed Plaintiff's claims without prejudice and with leave to replead. (Dkt. 9). On July 16, 2019, Plaintiff submitted an Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 10). Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss on July 30, 2019 (Dkt. 11), and no response to the motion was filed.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

"In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the complaint." DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C. , 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010). A court should consider the motion by "accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Trs. of Upstate N.Y. Eng'rs Pension Fund v. Ivy Asset Mgmt. , 843 F.3d 561, 566 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 2279, 198 L.Ed.2d 703 (2017). To withstand dismissal, a claimant must set forth "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Turkmen v. Ashcroft , 589 F.3d 542, 546 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ).

"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal quotations and citations omitted). "To state a plausible claim, the complaint's ‘[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’ " Nielsen v. AECOM Tech. Corp. , 762 F.3d 214, 218 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

When a plaintiff proceeds pro se , the Court is "obliged to construe his pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations." McEachin v. McGuinnis , 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004).

II. Section 1983 Claims

The Court begins with Plaintiff's claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, over which this Court has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."). Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action against persons who, under color of state authority, caused the deprivation of any rights, privilege, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Municipalities and other local government entities are considered "persons" under § 1983. Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to § 1983.

A. Fourth Amendment Claims

The Fourth Amendment states: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause[.]" U.S. Const. amend IV. "[A] seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions. So long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his business, the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required." Florida v. Bostick , 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382...