Lima v. William H. Haskell Mfg. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 December 1965
• Docket Number: No. 3263,3263
• Citation: Lima v. William H. Haskell Mfg. Co., 215 A.2d 229, 100 R.I. 312 (R.I. 1965)
• Parties: Macey LIMA v. WILLIAM H. HASKELL MANUFACTURING COMPANY. Eq.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 229

215 A.2d 229

100 R.I. 312

Macey LIMA v. WILLIAM H. HASKELL MANUFACTURING COMPANY.

Eq. No. 3263.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Dec. 13, 1965.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 23, 1965.

Abedon, Michaelson & Stanzler, Richard A. Skolnik, Providence, for petitioner.

Vincent J. Chisholm, Providence, for respondent.

JOSLIN, Justice.

This is an original petition for workmen's compensation. It is here on the employee's appeal from a decree of the workmen's compensation commission, entered over the dissent of one commissioner, affirming a decree of the trial commissioner which denied and dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner had failed to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the injury sustained arose out of and in the course of his employment.

There is no substantial dispute on the facts. Although his work day did not commence until 7 a. m. and notwithstanding that a plant rule prohibited employees from punching in on the time clock prior to 6:45 a. m., petitioner, a long-time employee of respondent, was accustomed to arrive at his employer's premises each working day between 6:30 and 6:45 in the morning. On May 31, 1963 he entered the plant at about 6:37 a. m. and at approximately 6:40 a. m., as he was making his way toward a table near his work station with the intention of depositing his lunch there, he stepped on a bolt on the floor and twisted his knee.

At issue is whether application of the 'going-and-coming rule' will exclude petitioner from the benefits of the compensation act. Under that rule it is held that an injury does not arise out of and in the course of employment if sustained by an employee either while going to or coming from his place of work, Peters v. Bristol Mfg. Corp., 94 R.I. 255, 179 A.2d 853, or while on his employer's premises before the commencement or after the completion of his day's work. See Distante v. United Electric Rys., 53 R.I. 258, 165 A. 772. The courts, recognizing that the rule was arbitrary as well as unjust, were quick to find that the circumstances of a case often justified an exception. 8 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation (perm. ed. 1951) § 1710, p. 7. This is true in this state where we do not deny relief merely because the injury occurs off the premises or at a time other than during an employee's regular working hours, but instead we examine the particular facts and circumstances of each case, Peters v. Bristol Mfg. Corp., supra, in order to ascertain whether they establish a nexus, Tromba v. Harwood Mfg. Co., 94 R.I. 3, 177 A.2d 186, Peters v. Bristol Mfg. Corp., supra, or a causal relationship, Clarke v. Coats & Clark, Inc., R.I., 196 A.2d 423, between the injury and the employment. In our search for the 'nexus' or 'causal relationship' we apply the criteria first suggested in DiLibero v. Middlesex Construction Co., 63 R.I. 509, 9 A.2d 848, and many times since reiterated, Nowicki v. Byrne, 73 R.I. 89, 54 A.2d 7, Corry v. Commissioned Officers' Mess (Open), 78 R.I. 264, 81 A.2d 689, Palmer v. Friendly Pharmacy, Inc., 84 R.I. 98, 121 A.2d 665, Sullivan v. State, 89 R.I. 119, 151 A.2d 360, Grassel v. Garde Mfg. Co., 90 R.I. 1, 153 A.2d 527, and we initially attempt to ascertain whether the injury occurred within the period of employment at a place where the employee might reasonably have been and while he was either reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment or doing something incidental thereto or to the conditions under which those duties were to be performed. Once we find that DiLibero standards are met, we depart from the 'going-and-coming rule' and conclude that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment, that it was incidental to the employer-employee relationship, and that the injured worker is entitled to compensation benefits.

Turning now to this case, were it not for the employment practice restricting the right of employees to punch in prior to 6:45 a. m., we would in the circumstances here present unhesitatingly find that the period of petitioner's employment included the twenty-minute interval preceding starting time and that the deposit of his lunch on a table customarily used by him and other employees for that purpose was incidental to his duties. Distante v. United Electric Rys., supra. Nor are we dissuaded from that conclusion by the employer's rule prohibiting its employees from punching in until fifteen minutes before...