Lime Rock Park, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n of the Town of Salisbury

• Decision Date: 22 May 2020
• Docket Number: SC 20237, (SC 20238), (SC 20239)
• Citation: 335 Conn. 606,264 A.3d 471
• Parties: LIME ROCK PARK, LLC v. PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF SALISBURY
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

335 Conn. 606

264 A.3d 471

LIME ROCK PARK, LLC

v.PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF SALISBURY

SC 20237, (SC 20238), (SC 20239)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 13, 2019

Officially released May 22, 2020^*

Timothy S. Hollister, with whom were Andrea L. Gomes and, on the brief, Joette Katz and Jessica Colin-Greene, for the appellant in Docket No. SC 20237 and the appellee in Docket Nos. SC 20238 and SC 20239 (intervening defendant).

Charles R. Andres, for the appellant in Docket No. SC 20238 and the appellee in Docket Nos. SC 20237 and SC 20239 (named defendant).

Maureen Danehy Cox, with whom were James K. Robertson, Jr., and Jennifer Sills Yoxall, for the appellant in Docket No. SC 20239 and the appellee in Docket Nos. SC 20237 and SC 20238 (plaintiff).

Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, Mullins, Kahn, Ecker and Vertefeuille, Js.

VERTEFEUILLE, J.

These appeals arise from the adoption by the defendant, the Planning and Zoning Commission (commission) of the Town of Salisbury (town), of certain amendments to the town's zoning regulations restricting motor vehicle racing activities on property owned by the plaintiff, Lime Rock Park, LLC. The plaintiff appealed to the trial court from the adoption of the amendments. Thereafter, the intervening defendant, Lime Rock Citizens Council, LLC (council), filed a motion to intervene in the appeal, which the trial court granted. After a trial to the court, the court sustained the plaintiff's appeal in part and dismissed it in part. All three parties appealed from the decision, raising numerous claims.¹ We conclude that the trial court incorrectly (1) sustained the portion of the plaintiff's appeal claiming that the provision of the amended regulations prohibiting racing activities on Sundays was preempted by General Statutes § 14-164a(a),² (2) denied the portion of the appeal claiming that the commission lacked the authority to condition the filing of a petition to amend the regulations on obtaining a special permit, and (3) concluded that the amended regulations prohibited racing activities on Saturdays. We further conclude that the trial court correctly (1) determined that the plaintiff did not waive its right to challenge the regulation prohibiting Sunday racing, and (2) denied the portion of the plaintiff's appeal claiming that the amendments' restrictions on unmufflered racing are subject to the provision of General Statutes § 22a-73(c), requiring the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection to approve municipal noise control ordinances. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court's judgment.

The record reveals the following facts, which were found by the trial court or that are undisputed, and procedural history. It is appropriate to warn the reader at the outset that these facts reveal a long and complex history of disagreement between the owners of the property on which the racing activities take place and neighboring landowners regarding the use of the property. The plaintiff owns property located at 497 Lime Rock Road in the town (property). Since 1957, motor vehicle races and other contests and demonstrations of speed and skill have been conducted on a racetrack located on the property. In addition, the property has been the site of automobile shows and exhibitions, food concessions, camping, and television, movie and radio productions, with the associated use of lighting and sound equipment. At the time that these activities commenced in 1957, the town had no zoning regulations.

In 1958, a group of town residents and entities brought a nuisance action against the then owners of the property, in which they alleged that the racing activities on the property generated excessive noise, traffic and disruptive behavior that interfered with the plaintiffs' enjoyment of their property. See Adams v. Vaill , 158 Conn. 478, 480, 262 A.2d 169 (1969) ( Vaill III ) (discussing allegations of original nuisance action). After a hearing, the trial court in the nuisance action rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the property owners from conducting racing activities on Sundays. In addition, the injunction limited mufflered racing activities to weekdays between 9 a.m. and 10 p.m., and prohibited unmufflered racing except during specified hours on Tuesdays, ten Saturdays per year, and certain holidays. See Adams v. Vaill , Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. 15,459 (May 12, 1959) (Vaill I ); see also Vaill III , supra, at 480–81, 262 A.2d 169.

Shortly after the trial court rendered judgment in Vaill I , the town adopted zoning regulations for the first time. The regulations placed the property in a "Rural Enterprise" zoning district, in which a track for racing motor vehicles and accessory uses were permitted uses. Salisbury Zoning Regs. (1959) § 8.1.17. The regulations also allowed racing "during such hours as are permitted by [s]tatute." Id., § 8.1.17.1. At the time, the controlling statute provided that "any race, contest or demonstration of speed or skill with a motor vehicle as a public exhibition ... may be conducted at any reasonable hour of any week day or after the hour of two o'clock in the afternoon of any Sunday, provided no such race or exhibition shall take place contrary to the provisions of any city, borough or town ordinances." General Statutes (1958 Rev.) § 29-143(a).

In 1966, the parties to the Vaill case entered into a stipulation providing that the judgment in Vaill I would be modified to provide that the prohibition of Sunday racing applied to both mufflered and unmufflered racing, as well as several other changes. See Adams v. Vaill , Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. 15,459 (March 2, 1966) (Vaill II ) (stipulation between parties). The judgment was again modified in 1968 by a court order prohibiting unmufflered racing on the property. See Adams v. Vaill , Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. 15,459 (August 26, 1968), aff'd, 158 Conn. 478, 262 A.2d 169 (1969). The impetus for this modification was the legislature's amendment of General Statutes (Cum. Supp. 1967) § 14-80 (c) to provide that the use of unmufflered motor vehicles was prohibited not only on public streets, but in all locations. See Vaill III , supra, 158 Conn. at 482–84, 262 A.2d 169 ; see also Public Acts 1967, No. 846 (deleting words "while such motor vehicle is being operated upon a street or highway" from statute prohibiting use of motor vehicles without mufflers).

In 1977 and 1978, a flurry of appeals were brought from certain decisions of the Salisbury Zoning Board of Appeals to the trial court regarding the activities that were permitted on the property (ZBA actions). The ZBA actions were resolved when the parties entered into a stipulation restricting the use of the property by campers and the hours that campers would be permitted to use the track entrance, as well as restricting the parking of nonofficial motor vehicles during certain hours of the day. Judgment was rendered accordingly in each of the ZBA actions (ZBA judgments).

At some point after March 11, 1974—the date on which the second revision to the Salisbury zoning regulations was adopted—and before February 23, 1981—the date on which the sixth revision was adopted—the commission amended the regulations applicable to racing activities on the property to provide that "[n]o races shall be conducted on any such track except during such hours as are permitted by [c]ourt [o]rder dated [May 12, 1959]," the date of the judgment in Vaill I .³ Salisbury Zoning Regs. (1985) § 415.1. Before that amendment, the regulations continuously had provided that no races could be conducted "except during such hours as are permitted by [s]tatute." See Salisbury Zoning Regs. (1959) § 8.1.17.1; Salisbury Zoning Regs. (1974) § 415.1. In 1975, the commission again amended the regulations to provide that the operation of a commercial racetrack was a special permit use.⁴ See Salisbury Zoning Regs. (1985) § 412.

In 1988, the parties to the Vaill case⁵ entered into a stipulation to prohibit motorcycle racing on the property and to allow some unmufflered racing in recognition of the legislature's amendment to General Statutes (Supp. 1969) § 14-80 (c) in 1969 to provide an exception to the prohibition on using a motor vehicle without a muffler when the vehicle is operated in a race. See Adams v. Vaill , Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. 15,459 (March 21, 1988) (Vaill IV ) (stipulation between parties); see also Public Acts 1969, No. 17, § 1. The judgment was modified accordingly.⁶ In 2013, the commission amended the regulations to provide that "[n]o races shall be conducted on any such track except during such hours as permitted by [c]ourt [o]rder dated [May 12, 1959] and subsequent related [c]ourt [o]rders on file in the Planning and Zoning Office, or the Town Clerk's Office." Salisbury Zoning Regs. (2013) § 221.2 (a).

The amendments to the town's zoning regulations that are the subject of the present appeals were adopted on November 16, 2015 (2015 amendments).⁷ In its ruling approving the amendments, the commission stated that the amendments were intended to maintain the status quo by codifying the restrictions on racing activities that were already part of the town's zoning scheme by virtue of the previous regulations incorporating the terms of the stipulated judgment in Vaill IV and the ZBA judgments. The plaintiff appealed from the commission's adoption of the amendments pursuant to General Statutes §§ 8-8 and 8-9 on the ground that the commission had "acted illegally, arbitrarily, capriciously and in abuse of its discretion" when it adopted them. Specifically, the plaintiff contended that the amendments violated the requirement of General Statutes § 8-2⁸ that zoning regulations be in conformity with the comprehensive plan; § 8-2 does not...