Liming v. Holman

• Decision Date: 26 April 1932
• Citation: 160 A. 32
• Parties: LIMING v. HOLMAN, Sheriff, et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

160 A. 32

LIMING

v. HOLMAN, Sheriff, et al.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

April 26, 1932.

Action by William L Liming against Joseph Holman, in representative capacity as Sheriff of the County of Ocean, and others. On motion to strike the complaint.

Motion granted.

Wilfred H. Jayne, Jr., of Lakewood, for the motion.

Morton C. Steinberg, of New York City, opposed.

LAWRENCE, S. C. C.

This is a motion to strike an original and an amended complaint, as filed in this suit, on the general ground that in neither aspect does it set forth a cause of action. Since I conclude that this is so, it is not found necessary to consider the question also raised as to the improper designation of certain of the defendants as individuals rather than the corporate body sought to be involved by proper legal title, of which they are said to have been members at the time of the incident which gives rise to the action.

Briefly summarized, it may be said that the complaint alleges that the county of Ocean maintains a common jail for the confinement and care of prisoners; that on November 1, 1927, defendant Holman, as sheriff of the county, had the custody of the jail and the control of the prisoners confined therein, and, with the approval of the board of chosen freeholders, appointed plaintiff a keeper at a stated salary; that plaintiff assumed the duties usually performed by a warden or keeper of a jail, and, on September 1, 1929, as he locked a door to one of the corridors where prisoners were allowed to be during the daytime, one of them, in an attempt to escape, broke through the door, "rushed" plaintiff, forcibly threw him to the floor, and kicked, beat, and maltreated him, rendering him unconscious and injuring him. He accordingly seeks money damages upon the theory that the sheriff owed him the duty of providing additional assistance for his protection and safety and the board of chosen freeholders to provide a proper and "modern" lock upon the door which would have held it against such an attack as occurred, in both of which respects it is claimed defendants negligently failed, in that no proper assistance was furnished and the lock had been allowed to become worn and ineffective for the purpose intended, thus creating what is termed a common-law nuisance.

It is urged in support of the motion that the allegations of the complaint disclose no negligence on the part of the defendants which can reasonably be said to have been the proximate cause of the injury...