Limmer v. Country Belle Co-op. Farmers

• Decision Date: 13 December 1971
• Citation: 286 A.2d 669,220 Pa.Super. 171
• Parties: Richard L. LIMMER, Jr. v. COUNTRY BELLE COOPERATIVE FARMERS, a corporation, and Carl Bayer, Appellants.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 669

286 A.2d 669

220 Pa.Super. 171

Richard L. LIMMER, Jr. v. COUNTRY BELLE COOPERATIVE FARMERS, a corporation, and Carl Bayer, Appellants.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Dec. 13, 1971.

C. Donald Gates, Jr., Pittsburgh, for appellants.

Theodore M. Tracy, Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Before WRIGHT, P.J. and WATKINS, MONTGOMERY, JACOBS, HOFFMAN and CERCONE, JJ.

CERCONE, Judge:

This is an appeal from the lower court's entry of judgment against defendants in the amount of $25,000, the lower court stating such was the amount of an offer of settlement made by defendants and accepted by plaintiff.

Defendants have appealed from said judgment, contending that they made no such offer of settlement. They contend further that even if such offer of settlement had been made shortly after the March 25, 1971 pre-trial, as stated by the lower court, plaintiff's acceptance thereof after the choosing of a jury on April 7 was not within a reasonable time, the offer at that time having lapsed by virtue of its non-acceptance within a reasonable time or by virtue of plaintiff's rejection by reason of his proceeding with the selection of a jury thereafter.

Unfortunately, we cannot decide the issues thus presented to us on this appeal as no record was made in the court below on the factual issues involved. No evidentiary hearing was held in the matter by the court below wherein the facts relied upon by both sides were placed in evidence by testimony of the parties and their witnesses. The lower court's order, though revealing personal knowledge of the defendants' offer, contains no specific findings as to the date on which the offer was made to plaintiff, the exact content of the offer, the manner in which it was presented to plaintiff, and the circumstances surrounding the presentation. Though the order also reveals the lower court's personal knowledge of plaintiff's acceptance, the order merely states that counsel for plaintiff 'subsequently advised' he had accepted 'said offer of settlement and prescribed the apportionment hereinafter set forth.' No reference, however, is made to the time, manner of, or circumstances surrounding that acceptance by plaintiff. The court in its order merely makes passing reference to the defendant's refutation of the offer of settlement with the statement '. . . defense counsel advised that the insurance carrier has taken the position that it made no offer of settlement, it is hereby ordered that the settlement is specifically enforced . . .'. No record was made by the court below as to the statements and actions of counsel relevant to the matter of offer and acceptance of compromise. Though the lower court stated in its order that the offer of settlement had been transmitted by defendants to him, yet in view of the defendants' denial thereof and their contention that the acceptance came too late, a hearing into the matter should have been held to establish of record the facts and circumstances concerning the alleged offer and acceptance. As much as this court, as well as the court below, favors the settlement of pending litigation. we must nevertheless be careful that in our offorts to clear the court calendar we do not omit the appropriate judicial procedures which not only safeguard the rights and interests of all the parties involved but which protect the court below and prepare the case for intelligent review by the appellate court.

That an evidentiary hearing into the existence and binding effect of the settlement agreement is the appropriate procedure to be followed in matters of contested settlement agreements has been clearly estabnlished by the courts. One of the most recent cases in which we reversed and remanded because of failure to follow such procedure was that of Carter v. Carter, 212 Pa.Super. 238, 243 A.2d 223 (1968), in which we stated that the court below had entered an order which in its opinion was 'entered by agreement of the parties. The appellant, however, denies that such an agreement was ever concluded.' We stated that, 'If, in fact, there was such an agreement and appellant's counsel approved it, then the agreement is enforceable', but we noted that, 'No hearing was ever held to determine whether or not this order represents the agreement of the parties, and was apparently entered without notice to the appellant.' We, therefore, reversed and remanded the case to the lower court for a hearing into the matter, saying: 'To avoid any possible injustice and infringement of the constitutional rights of the parties involved this Court makes the following order.

'The order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County entered November 6, 1967, is hereby reversed, and the record in this case is remanded to the court below for a prompt hearing to determine whether the order as entered represented the agreement of the parties. All counsel of record at that time and parties of interest shall be present and heard, after which, the court below shall enter an appropriate order.'

The result reached in the Carter case was not a novel one. As early as 1907 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reached the same result in Good v. Grit Publishing Co., 214 Pa. 614, 63 A. 1039, a case cited by the lower court to sustain its authority to enforce a settlement reached in a case pending before it. In the Good case, upon motion made by thr defendant, the lower court ordered that the plaintiff's libel action be marked discontinued and settled by agreement of the parties. An appeal was taken by the plaintiff who had filed an answer to the defendant's motion denying that any agreement of settlement had been made. ¹ The Supreme Court distinguished the case of Wilkins v. Burr, 6 Binn 389 and Bach v. Burke, 141 Pa. 649, 21 A. 779, on the basis that 'in the case at bar the appellant in his answer denied that the made any agreement to settle or discontinue the action, or that he ever authorized any person to make such agreement for him.' The court thereupon reversed the lower court's action and ordered 'that the action be reinstated in the court below, so that appellant may proceed to have the matters in controversy determined by due process of law.'

The other cases cited and relied upon by the court as precedent for its authority to enforce an agreement of settlement equally reveal that in the case of a contested settlement, such as here presented, the proper procedure for the lower court to follow is to have a hearing in the matter and thereafter make findings of fact to support its conclusions. In Woodbridge, et ux. v. Hall, 366 Pa. 46, 76 A.2d 205 (1950), counsel for both parties went before the court and announced to the chancellor that the case had been amicably settled. The settlement was not carried out, however, and plaintiff petitioned the court to enforce the alleged oral agreement of settlement as theretofore entered into by the parties. A hearing was held in the matter, followed by the chancellor's findings of fact and conclusions of law in favor of a binding contract of settlement. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, emphasizing the procedure followed by the court below in its determination of the matter (pages 48--49, 76 A.2d page 206):

'The court, after hearing testimony of both sides relating to what had transpired at the time of the alleged settlement, thereafter filed an adjudication and decree nisi, which later was made final, awarding specific performance of the oral...