Lin Television Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Broad. Emps. & Technicians—Commc’ns Workers of Am.

• Decision Date: 06 November 2016
• Docket Number: 14–CV–1048S
• Citation: 219 F.Supp.3d 372
• Parties: LIN TELEVISION CORP. d/b/a WIVB–TV/WNLO–TV, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCAST EMPLOYEES AND TECHNICIANS—COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL–CIO, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

219 F.Supp.3d 372

LIN TELEVISION CORP. d/b/a WIVB–TV/WNLO–TV, Plaintiff,

v.NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCAST EMPLOYEES AND TECHNICIANS—COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL–CIO, et al., Defendants.

14–CV–1048S

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed November 6, 2016

Filed November 7, 2016

John Doran, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Providence, RI, Jacqueline Phipps Polito, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Fairport, NY, for Plaintiff.

Catherine Creighton, Creighton, Pearce, Johnsen & Giroux, Buffalo, NY, for Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

WILLIAM M. SKRETNY, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff LIN Television Corporation d/b/a WIVB–TV/WNLO–TV commenced this action against Defendants National Association of Broadcast Employees and Technicians—Communications Workers of America, AFL–CIO and National Association of Broadcast Employees and Technicians—Communications Workers of America, Local 25, seeking to vacate a labor arbitration award under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185. (Docket No. 1.) Defendants filed a counter-claim, seeking enforcement of the arbitration award and attorney's fees. (Docket No. 8.) Currently pending before this Court are the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. (Docket Nos. 26, 31.) For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is granted and Plaintiff's motion is denied.

II. BACKGROUND¹

Timothy Flynn was employed by the Plaintiff television station in Buffalo, NY, where he worked as a television technician for more than 21 years. During that period, Flynn's colleagues were aware that Flynn suffered from mental health issues, including a prior threat of suicide. However, Flynn had not been violent toward others and had no record of workplace discipline.

On July 23, 2013, Flynn was recorded making a number of threats to his immediate supervisor and the supervisor's family, including threats on his supervisor's life. The supervisor was not present during the threats. Employees who were either present or later heard the recording, including the supervisor, did not deem the threats to be serious, but instead thought Flynn was having a bad day. The following day, Flynn admitted to making the remarks and apologized. He was initially suspended from employment, and later terminated on the grounds that he posed a serious safety concern. Flynn now maintains that he was blacked out during this period and has no recollection of what occurred.

Defendants grieved the discharge pursuant to the parties' collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"). Article 8.0 of the CBA states that Plaintiff may "discipline or discharge an employee only for just cause." Article 8.0(d) states:

Any disciplinary action taken by the company against an Employee under Section 8.0 will be arbitrable and will be processed under Article 15. The parties agree that the arbitrator in such cases shall be empowered to determine an appropriate remedy if he sustains the disciplined employee's grievance.

The parties stipulated that there were two issues to be decided by the arbitrator: (1) "Was [Flynn] terminated for just cause?" and (2) "If not, what shall the remedy be?" The arbitrator issued his Opinion and Award on December 2, 2014. In it, the arbitrator carefully reviewed the testimony of witnesses who testified at the arbitration hearing regarding the events leading to Flynn's discharge, the arguments made by the parties, and relevant precedent.

The arbitrator found that, in light of the totality of the mitigating factors present in the case, Plaintiff was without just cause to discharge Flynn under the CBA. Specifically, the arbitrator relied on the facts that the target of the threats was not present during Flynn's remarks, Flynn had no weapons, the relative lack of gravity Flynn's colleagues attributed to the threat, Flynn's unblemished prior work record and lack of a propensity for violence, the minimal interference that Flynn's mental illness had previously had with his ability to do his job, and Flynn's length of service. The arbitrator found that the termination should be converted to a suspension without pay through the date of the award. The arbitrator did not order Flynn's immediate return to work. Instead, although Flynn could apply for Short–Term Disability Leave following the award, he could not return to work until he had received a positive evaluation from a psychiatrist mutually agreed by the parties. If the evaluation was not favorable, Flynn could be summarily discharged.

Defendants have moved for summary judgment confirming the award. Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, seeking to vacate the award on the grounds that it does not draw its essence from the CBA, and that it violates a public policy for workplace safety.

III. DISCUSSION

"A motion for summary judgment may properly be granted ... only where there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried, and the facts as to which there is no such issue warrant the entry of judgment for the moving party as a matter of law." Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp. , 609 F.3d 537, 545 (2d Cir. 2010). A court's function on a summary judgment motion "is not to resolve disputed questions of fact but only to determine whether, as to any material issue, a genuine factual dispute exists." Kaytor , 609 F.3d at 545 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). "A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ " Weinstock v. Columbia Univ. , 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000)cert. denied , 540 U.S. 811, 124 S.Ct. 53, 157 L.Ed.2d 24 (2003) (quoting Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). Where both parties move for summary judgment, "each party's motion must be examined on its own merits, and in each case all reasonable inferences must be drawn against the party whose motion is under consideration." Morales v. Quintel Entm't , 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001).

1. Special Deference Must Be Given to Labor Arbitration Awards

As the Second Circuit recently re-affirmed:

"[A] federal court's review of labor arbitration awards is narrowly circumscribed and highly deferential—indeed, among the most deferential in the law." Nat'l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n , 820 F.3d 527, 532 (2d Cir. 2016) ("NFL "). A court is "not authorized to review the arbitrator's decision on the merits"; its role is simply to determine "whether the arbitrator acted within the scope of his authority as defined by the collective bargaining agreement." Id. at 536. Thus, as long as "the arbitrator was even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority and did not ignore the plain language of the contract," the award should ordinarily be confirmed. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

N.Y. City & Vicinity Dist. Council of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Ass'n of Wall–Ceiling & Carpentry Indus. of N.Y., Inc. , 826 F.3d 611, 618 (2d Cir. 2016). Therefore, a court should vacate an award only where it "contradicts an express and unambiguous term of the contract or ... so far departs from the terms of the agreement that it is not even arguably derived from the contract." United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Tappan Zee Constructors, LLC , 804 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation omitted). Courts may not "reconsider the merits of an award even though the parties may allege that the award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract." United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL–CIO v. Misco, Inc. , 484 U.S. 29, 36, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987) ("Misco "). When a Court exceeds this limited role, "it usurps a function which ... is entrusted to the arbitration tribunal," Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey , 532 U.S. 504, 510, 121 S.Ct. 1724, 1728, 149 L.Ed.2d 740 (2001), and frustrates Congress's "preference for private settlement of labor disputes," Misco , 484 U.S. at 37, 108 S.Ct. 364 (quotations omitted).

In addition to the instances where an award does not "draw[ ] its essence from the collective bargaining agreement" but reflects instead "the arbitrator's own brand of industrial justice," NFL , 820 F.3d at 536 (internal quotation marks omitted), "[t]he Supreme Court has also recognized a second circumstance warranting vacatur of a labor arbitration award: ‘[i]f the contract as interpreted by [the arbitrator] violates some explicit public policy," such as "obedience to judicial orders.’ " N.Y. City & Vicinity Dist. Council of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. , 826 F.3d at 618 (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers , 461 U.S. 757, 766, 103 S.Ct. 2177, 76 L.Ed.2d 298 (1983) ). The Second Circuit has construed the public policy ground for vacatur to be "extremely limited." Local 97, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. , 196 F.3d 117, 125 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Niagara Mohawk II "). Accordingly, a court's task in applying that principle is limited to determining "whether the award itself, as contrasted with the reasoning that underlies the award, creates an explicit conflict with other laws and legal precedents and thus clearly violates an identifiable public policy." Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).

"The showing required to avoid summary confirmation of an arbitration award is high, and a party moving to vacate the award has the burden of proof." See Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp. , 103 F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal citations and punctuation omitted). Plaintiff does not meet this high burden.

a. The Award Draws its Essence from the CBA

Plaintiff contends that the award does not draw its essence from the CBA because the arbitrator did not make a just cause determination, and because the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority...