Lincks v. United States

• Decision Date: 27 August 2021
• Docket Number: 3:20-cv-01603-B-BT,3:17-cr-00017-B (18)
• Parties: LARRY RAY LINCKS, Movant, v. UNITED STATES of AMERICA, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

LARRY RAY LINCKS, Movant, v. UNITED STATES of AMERICA, Respondent.

Nos. 3:20-cv-01603-B-BT, 3:17-cr-00017-B (18)

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

August 27, 2021

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

REBECCA RUTHERFORD, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

Movant Larry Ray Lincks, presently held in state prison, filed a pro se motion to vacate, set-aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The District Court referred the resulting civil action to the United States magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. For the following reasons, the Court should deny Lincks's § 2255 motion.

Background

Lincks pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). On June 19, 2018, the District Court sentenced him to 188 months' imprisonment. He appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, but on February 12, 2019, the Court dismissed the appeal based on his appeal waiver. See United States v. Lincks, No. 18-10760 (5th Cir. Feb. 12 2019) (per curiam). On June 17, 2019, the Supreme Court denied Lincks's petition for writ of certiorari. See Lincks v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2731 (2019).

Lincks then filed this § 2255 motion (CV ECF No. 2), which was received in the Clerk's Office on June 15 2020.^[1] In his motion, Lincks argues:

(1) his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel when he:

(a) failed to file a motion to suppress and dismiss the evidence,

(b) failed to accurately calculate the federal sentencing guidelines,

(c) argued an inappropriate defense,

(d) had an “grandious perhaps even delusional belief in his own abilitys [sic], ”

(e) advised him that he would receive a sentence of 63 to 78 months' imprisonment if he pleaded guilty,

(f) failed to look at discovery materials,

(g) failed to investigate and prepare for trial,

(h) failed to object to the prosecutor comparing him to Tanya Lynn Scroggins,

(i) failed to file a motion for post-offense rehabilitation efforts, and

(j) failed to object to the Court's statement that he had pending cases in the state court system;

(2) his guilty plea was “unknowing and involuntary”;

(3) there was a procedural error in the calculation of his base offense level;

(4) the Court failed to consider the “mitigated role factors”; and

(5) the Court erred by applying the importation enhancement.

In its response, the Government argues that Lincks's claim that his guilty plea was “unknowing and involuntary” is belied by the record. Resp. 9-10 (ECF No. 9.) The Government further argues the record demonstrates no ineffective assistance of counsel; Lincks's ineffective assistance of counsel claims are fatally conclusory Lincks's attorney was not ineffective at the plea stage; and Lincks has not shown that his attorney was ineffective at sentencing. Id. 11-22. Last, the Government argues Lincks's claims challenging his sentence are waived, non-cognizable, and in any event, meritless. Lincks filed a reply. Id. 22-23. The § 2255 motion is now ripe for determination.

Legal Standards and Analysis

1. Lincks's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.

In his second claim, Lincks argues that his guilty plea was “unknowing and involuntary” because his attorney failed to explain the Presentence Report (PSR) to him. Mot. 7 (ECF No. 2).

For a guilty plea to be valid, it must be both knowing and voluntary. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Hernandez, 234 F.3d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 2000) (“A guilty plea will be upheld on habeas review if entered into knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted)); United States v. Lord, 915 F.3d 1009, 1016 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Because a guilty plea involves the waiver of constitutional rights, it must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.”) (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). A knowing and voluntary guilty plea means that “a defendant must have full knowledge of what the plea connoted and of its consequences.” Lord, 915 F.3d at 1016 (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969)). A plea is knowingly made when the defendant has “real notice of the true nature of the charge against him.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998). A plea is voluntary if it does not result from force, threats, improper promises, misrepresentations, or coercion. See United States v. Amaya, 111 F.3d 386, 389 (5th Cir. 1997). “A guilty plea is invalid if the defendant does not understand the nature of the constitutional protection that he is waiving or if he has such an incomplete understanding of the charges against him that his plea cannot stand as an admission of guilty. Lord, 915 F.3d at 1016. The consequences of sentencing, as they relate to a guilty plea, mean that the defendant must be aware of the maximum prison term and fine for the offense he is charged. United States v. Herrod, 595 Fed.Appx. 402, 412 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Rivera, 898 F.2d 442, 447 (5th Cir. 1990)); see also United States v. Scott, 857 F.3d 241, 245 (5th Cir. 2017) (“If the defendant is aware of the potential maximum prison term and fine for the offense charged, but nevertheless pleads guilty, his plea is knowingly and intelligently entered.”); United States v. Rosales, 281 Fed.Appx. 424, 425 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“[B]ecause [the defendant] was aware of his minimum and maximum potential sentences and understood the elements of the offense as charged, he also has not established that his guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary.”) (citing United States v. Brown, 328 F.3d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 2003)).

The record belies Lincks's assertion that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. First, Lincks signed a written plea agreement which summarized his rights, stated the charge against him, and outlined the consequences of pleading guilty to that charge. (CR ECF No. 303.) Specifically, the plea agreement advised that, by pleading guilty, Lincks would waive his right to a trial and the other constitutional rights that are associated with a trial, and be adjudged guilty. (CR ECF No. 303 at 1-3.) The plea agreement also advised Lincks of the maximum penalties the Court could impose for conviction of the offense to which he was pleading guilty. (CR ECF No. 303 at 2). As part of the written plea agreement, Lincks represented that his plea “is freely and voluntarily made and is not the result of force or threats, or of promises apart from those set forth in this plea agreement.” (CR ECF No. 303 5.) Also, at his rearraignment hearing, held on June 20, 2017, Lincks admitted under oath that (1) he understood the charge against him; (2) he understood the consequences of pleading guilty; and (3) his guilty plea was freely and voluntary made. (CR ECF No. 819 at 18, 20-21, 27, 30-31.) These formal declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of truth, which form a “formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). And “a defendant ordinarily will not be heard to refute [his] testimony given at a plea hearing while under oath.” United States v. Cervantes, 132 F.3d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Fuller, 769 F.2d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir. 1985)); see also United States v. Palmer, 456 F.3d 484, 491 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that plea colloquies are considered “solemn declarations in open court which carry a strong presumption of verity”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Contrary to his assertion, the record demonstrates that Lincks's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.

To the extent Lincks contends that his guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary because he received ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show that his counsel's advice to plead guilty fell below the range of competence required of an attorney in a criminal case. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (holding that the two-pronged Strickland standard applies to challenges to cases involving a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel); see also Armstead v. Scott, 37 F.3d 202, 206 (5th Cir. 1994) (same). Lincks also must show prejudice by establishing “but for his counsel's alleged erroneous advice, he would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted upon going to trial.” Armstead, 37 F.3d at 206. Lincks has not attempted to show-much less demonstrated-prejudice. Therefore, Lincks's second claim should be denied.

2. Lincks did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.

In his first claim, Lincks contends that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by: (a) failing to file a motion to suppress and dismiss the evidence, including Lincks's “uncounseled unvoluntary” statements following his arrest; (b) failing to accurately calculate the federal sentencing guidelines; (c) arguing an inappropriate defense; (d) having a “grandious perhaps even delusional belief in his own abilitys [sic];” (e) advising Lincks that he would receive a sentence of 63 to 78 months' imprisonment if he pleaded guilty; (f) failing to look at discovery materials; (g) failing to investigate and prepare for trial; (h) failing to object to the prosecutor comparing Lincks to Tanya Lynn Scroggins, a defendant in an unrelated criminal action; (i) failing to file a motion for post-offense rehabilitation efforts; and (j) failing to object to the Court's statement that Lincks had pending cases in the state court system. Mot. 7, 9-10 (ECF No. 2).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must show: (1) his counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) the...