Lincoln, Matter of, SB-89-0067-D

Decision Date18 September 1990
Docket NumberNo. SB-89-0067-D,No. 87-1142,SB-89-0067-D,87-1142
Citation798 P.2d 371,165 Ariz. 233
PartiesIn re Kenneth Johnston LINCOLN, a Member of the State Bar of Arizona, Respondent. Disc. Comm.
CourtArizona Supreme Court
OPINION

CORCORAN, Justice.

The Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Arizona (Commission) recommends that Kenneth Johnston Lincoln (respondent) be suspended from the practice of law for 9 months. Because respondent failed to appeal from the Commission's recommendation, this matter was submitted for review on the record. See rule 53(e), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. 3.

Facts and Procedural Background

On July 29, 1988, the State Bar filed a formal complaint against respondent, charging him with violating the Rules of Professional Conduct, contained in rule 42, Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court. In Count I, respondent was charged with abandoning his representation of his clients, Judith and Jerold Bender, who had retained him to defend them in a lawsuit involving a business lease and with refusing to communicate with them, in violation of Ethical Rules 1.3 and 1.4. Count II alleged that respondent had failed to advise the Benders that their deposition had been noticed, in violation of ER 1.4. Count III alleged that respondent had failed to cooperate with the State Bar's disciplinary investigation by failing to file a timely response to the charges in Counts I and II, in violation of ER 8.1(b) and rule 51(h) and (i).

On August 29, 1988, respondent was personally served with the complaint. When he failed to timely answer, the State Bar requested that the hearing committee deem the complaint admitted, pursuant to rule 53(c)(1). On September 30, 1988, the Commission received respondent's letter contending that his clients were "unmitigated liars," alleging they had discharged his services, and detailing various health problems that he and his family were experiencing. The letter was subsequently ruled an untimely answer.

On October 25, 1988, at the time set for the hearing before the committee, respondent appeared and requested that one of the committee members be excused because of a conflict of interest. He also requested a continuance because of ill health. The committee rescheduled the hearing to reconstitute the members of the committee because of the apparent conflict.

After granting several continuances because of health problems in respondent's family, the committee reconvened on February 23, 1989. Respondent did not appear. As a courtesy, the court reporter telephoned him, and respondent advised her he had not opened his mail for more than 4 weeks and had not read the notice of hearing. Although the committee offered respondent a short delay to allow him time to appear, he declined to do so.

Based on the testimony of respondent's client, Judith Bender, and the evidence introduced by bar counsel, the committee issued its report on March 31, 1989. The committee found, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent had committed the ethical violations alleged in the complaint, and that respondent had previously been suspended from the practice of law as a result of similar complaints against him in 1981. The committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for 6 months and one day, 1 and be ordered to pay costs. The committee gave the following reasons for its recommendations:

1. Although respondent may have experienced poor health and personal tragedy during his representation of the complainants, this was not sufficient excuse to prevent him from effectively communicating with his clients and informing them of the status of their lawsuits.

2. The present record contains insufficient justification for respondent's failure to promptly respond to bar counsel's and the hearing committee's requests for his cooperation in this matter.

3. Respondent's prior discipline history, when reviewed against the background of the present complaint, demonstrates that respondent periodically disregards his professional obligations, the interests of justice and those of his clients.

Respondent did not object to the committee's report. The matter was originally set to be heard before the Commission on July 15, 1989, but upon respondent's request, was postponed until September 16, 1989. Respondent appeared before the Commission and disputed the committee's findings and recommendation, although he admitted he did not file a timely answer to the complaint and admitted his prior discipline.

On October 24, 1989, the Commission filed its report, unanimously adopting the findings and conclusions of the committee, but recommending by a vote of 6-2 that respondent be suspended for a period of 9 months rather than 6 months and one day, as the committee had recommended. In determining that a longer suspension was warranted, the Commission considered the following 3 aggravating factors: (1) respondent's history of prior disciplinary offenses presented similar instances of misconduct; (2) respondent's substantial experience in the practice of law, having practiced in Arizona since 1966; and (3) respondent's failure to cooperate with the State Bar's investigation indicated a failure to appreciate the significance of his actions, as well as a general disregard for matters of professional responsibility. One minority vote favored filing a disability petition because of evidence that respondent may be suffering from mental illness; the other minority vote favored disbarment because of respondent's apparent recidivist behavior in neglecting clients.

When respondent failed to appeal from the Commission's report, this matter was submitted to this court on the record pursuant to rule 53(e).

Discussion
1. Standard of Review

In disciplinary proceedings, this court acts as an independent "trier of both fact and law in the exercise of our supervisory responsibility over the State Bar." In re Neville, 147 Ariz. 106, 108, 708 P.2d 1297, 1299 (1985). We do, however, give deference and serious consideration to the reports of the committee and Commission. In re Pappas, 159 Ariz. 516, 518, 768 P.2d 1161, 1163 (1988). In this case, respondent consented to the discipline imposed by filing no objections to the Commission's recommendation. See rule 53(c)(5). However, before we impose discipline, we must be persuaded by clear and convincing evidence that respondent committed the alleged violations. Rule 54(c); Pappas, 159 Ariz. at 518, 768 P.2d at 1163.

2. Respondent's Violations

We agree with both the committee and the Commission that the record before us establishes by clear and convincing evidence that respondent committed the violations charged in the complaint. The Benders retained respondent in July 1986 to defend them in a civil lawsuit. After October 1986, he did not contact them, respond to their letters, or return their phone calls. They had to hire another attorney and pay another retainer to resolve the matter that respondent neglected. This was a clear violation of the duties to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client, ER 1.3, and to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and comply with reasonable requests for information, ER 1.4, alleged in Count I of the complaint.

The record further supports the allegation...

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17 cases
  • Shannon, Matter of
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • June 21, 1994
    ...147 Ariz. at 115, 708 P.2d at 1306. Yet, this court is ultimately responsible for determining the appropriate sanction. Lincoln, 165 Ariz. at 236, 798 P.2d at 374. 2. Count The Committee heard testimony concerning Count One and made its Findings of Fact in its report filed June 4, 1991. The......
  • Levine, Matter of
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • February 18, 1993
    ...and convincing evidence; and third, we have the ultimate responsibility for imposing the appropriate sanctions. In re Lincoln, 165 Ariz. 233, 235-36, 798 P.2d 371, 373-74 (1990). II. History of The testimony and evidence in this matter, in the words of the committee, "recounted a near decad......
  • Wolfram, Matter of
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • February 11, 1993
    ...In re Rantz, 169 Ariz. 56, 57, 817 P.2d 1, 2 (1991); In re Henry, 168 Ariz. 141, 143, 811 P.2d 1078, 1080 (1991); In re Lincoln, 165 Ariz. 233, 235, 798 P.2d 371, 373 (1990). Nevertheless, we give deference and serious consideration to the reports of the committee and the Commission. In re ......
  • Piatt, Matter of
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • December 24, 1997
    ...those situations. Under the applicable version of Rule 53(e), 1 this court is the ultimate trier of fact and law. In re Lincoln, 165 Ariz. 233, 235, 798 P.2d 371, 373 (1990). We have both final authority and responsibility to decide on the appropriate sanction in every bar discipline case. ......
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