Lincoln Park Traps v. Chicago Park Dist.

• Decision Date: 02 May 1944
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 41519.
• Citation: 323 Ill.App. 107,55 N.E.2d 173
• Parties: LINCOLN PARK TRAPS v. CHICAGO PARK DIST. ET AL.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

323 Ill.App. 107

55 N.E.2d 173

LINCOLN PARK TRAPS

v.CHICAGO PARK DIST. ET AL.

Gen. No. 41519.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Second Division.

May 2, 1944.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; C. J. Harrington, Judge.

Action by Lincoln Park Traps, a corporation, against Chicago Park District and others to restrain defendants from interfering with the rights and privileges allegedly acquired by plaintiff under written lease entered into between plaintiff and defendant. From an adverse decree, defendants appeal.

Reversed and remanded with directions. John O. Rees and Kirkland, Fleming, Green, Martin & Ellis, all of Chicago (Joseph B. Fleming, Philip A. Lozowick, and John M. O'Connor, Jr., all of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.

Zimmerman & Norman, of Chicago (Edward A. Zimmerman and Donald R. Kerr, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

SULLIVAN, Justice.

This proceeding was instituted by plaintiff, Lincoln Park Traps, to restrain defendants Chicago Park District, and the Commissioners thereof (sometimes hereinafter for convenience referred to collectively as the Chicago Park District), from “molesting or in any way interfering with the rights and privileges acquired by Lincoln Park Traps” under a written lease entered into between said plaintiff and the Commissioners of Lincoln Park on November 26, 1920. Defendants' motion to strike and dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint was denied and a temporary injunction issued. Defendants thereupon filed an answer, to which plaintiff filed a reply. This answer was later withdrawn by leave of court and defendants stood upon their motion to strike and dismiss. A decree was then entered which found in part that “the agreement between the plaintiff, Lincoln Park Traps and the Commissioners of Lincoln Park as set out in the said Amended Bill of Complaint, under and by virtue of which the said plaintiff became possessed of and is now in possession of the premises described in the said complaint, is in full force and effect and is binding upon the defendants as successors to the Commissioners of Lincoln Park, and that subject to the provisions of the said agreement it shall so remain until terminated in accordance with the said provisions;” and ordered that a permanent writ of injunction issue restraining the Chicago Park District and the Commissioners thereof from “molesting or in any way interfering with the rights and privileges acquired” by plaintiff under the aforesaid agreement. Defendants appeal from the foregoing portions of the decree.

The amended complaint, which is rather voluminous, alleged substantially that the Commissioners of Lincoln Park, pursuant to an act of the Legislature of 1895, p. 272, Ill.Rev.Stat.1943, c. 105, § 256 et seq., had reclaimed certain land from the bed of Lake Michigan and devoted a portion thereof to trap-shooting; that plaintiff, Lincoln Park Traps (a corporation not for profit), was organized to promote the sport of shooting and to conduct and maintain a shooting club; that on November 26, 1920, plaintiff entered into an agreement with the Commissioners of Lincoln Park whereby the latter leased to it a portion of the aforesaid reclaimed land, which was a part of Lincoln Park, for a period of twenty-six years at an annual rental of $50.

The complaint further alleged that pursuant to and in accordance with the terms of the lease and according to plans and specifications approved by the Commissioners of Lincoln Park plaintiff erected on the leased premises a club house at a cost of over $40,000 and constructed on said premises various skeet houses, traps, pits, barricades, fences and sidewalks at a cost of approximately $10,000; that ever since plaintiff took possession of the leased premises and constructed said club house and trap shooting facilities, “members of the general public” have not only been permitted but they have been invited to use same on a “basis of full equality with the members of the plaintiff club;” that adequate supplies of ammunition and targets have been maintained and furnished to “members of the general public” who desired to make use of the trap shooting facilities, “at a price not sufficient to cover the cost of shells and targets plus the addition of a reasonable charge for overhead expenses;” and that “many thousand members of the public” have taken advantage of the facilities so provided.

It was then alleged that on September 27, 1938, an order was entered at a meeting of the Commissioners of the Chicago Park District, successors of the Commissioners of Lincoln Park, which declared plaintiff's lease forfeited because of its failure to pay the rental stipulated in said lease for the years 1935, 1936, 1937 and 1938 and which directed Lincoln Park Traps to surrender possession of the demised premises to the Chicago Park District and to remove its effects therefrom within thirty days; that on the day of its entry notice of this order was served on plaintiff; that plaintiff immediately tendered payment of the rent then in arrears, which tender was refused; that the Chicago Park District refused to reinstate plaintiff's lease and to waive the forfeiture and continues to demand possession; that plaintiff is informed and believes that the Chicago Park District through its police officers will “close the property” and prevent plaintiff's employees and members from using same; and that plaintiff will thereby suffer irreparable damage.

The complaint concluded with the prayer that a temporary injunction be issued restraining defendants from interfering with the rights and privileges acquired by plaintiff under its lease and that upon final disposition of the cause a permanent writ of injunction issue to like effect or that as alternative relief defendants be required to account and pay to plaintiff all moneys expended by it for making the improvements and installing the facilities on the demised premises.

Defendants' motion to strike and dismiss challenged the validity of the lease, asserting that it was illegal and void because it was beyond the power and authority of the Commissioners of Lincoln Park and its officers to execute the same, that the lease was against public policy and that therefore plaintiff was not entitled to the relief sought.

The decree appealed from refers to the lease as an “agreement.” Plaintiff seems to prefer to designate it as an “agreement” and asserts that in any event “it was not a lease in the ordinary sense but more in the nature of a concession.” There can be no question but that the instrument involved herein was intended to be a lease when it was executed by the parties thereto. However, we fail to perceive any difference in its legal effect whether it is designated as a lease, a contract, an agreement or a concession.

The land demised to plaintiff was within the confines of Lincoln Park and the only purpose for which the legislature authorized it to be used was as a public park. Park districts are created for the purpose of establishing, maintaining and governing public parks for the recreation, health and benefit of the general public. The law is well settled that a park board cannot lease a portion of its lands to a private individual, club or corporation, when by the terms of such lease the demised land and the facilities located thereon are not available equally to all the people of the State of Illinois. In Quinn v. Irving Park District, 207 Ill.App. 449, where the Commissioners of the Irving Park District sought to restrict the use of the swimming pool and gymnasium in one of its parks to the residents of such park district, it was held that the park and the swimming pool and gymnasium located therein “are held for the use of the citizens of the State generally.” In LePitre v. Chicago Park District, 374 Ill. 184, at page 188, 29 N.E.2d 81, at page 82, in discussing the purpose of the creation of the South Park Commissioners, also now superceded by the Chicago Park District, the court said:

“The language used in the act of 1869 directing that the lands when acquired should be held, managed and controlled by the public park for the recreation, health and benefit of the public free to all persons forever, leaves no doubt as to the legislative intent to create a corporation for the primary purpose of rendering a governmental service to the general public. The promotion of health, comfort and recreation for the general public is, as was said in Gebhardt v. Village of LaGrange Park, 354 Ill. 234, 188 N.E. 372, 374, ‘among the aims of government. * * * To attain such an object is one of the primary purposes of government.’ The powers given the commissioners to construct and maintain drives and to have general control and management of the parks were granted in the interests of establishing and maintaining a park for public use and not in the promotion of a purely corporate purpose. The direction in the statute that the park shall be used by the public, generally, forever, definitely fixes the ones in whose interest the park was created.” (Italics ours.)

In McPike v. Illinois Terminal Railroad Co., 305 Ill. 298, 137 N.E. 235, 236, the owner of a parcel of land in the City of Alton dedicated it as “public grounds of the city, never to be owned as individual or private property” and subsequently the City of Alton leased a portion of the dedicated land to a private individual. There, in holding that the lease was void, the court said, at pages 300 and 301 of 305 Ill., at pages 236 of 137 N.E.:

“The first question arising in this case is whether...