Lincoln-Sudbury Reg'l Sch. Dist. v. Mrs. W.
| Decision Date | 25 January 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 16-10724-FDS |
| Parties | LINCOLN-SUDBURY REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Plaintiff and Counterclaim-Defendant, v. MR. and MRS. W., Defendants and Counterclaim-Plaintiffs, and WALLIS W., Counterclaim-Plaintiff, v. BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS, Counterclaim-Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS
This lawsuit arises out of an administrative decision by the Massachusetts Bureau of Special Education Appeals ("BSEA") in a dispute between Lincoln-Sudbury Regional School District and Mr. and Mrs. W., parents of a minor child, Wallis.1
In September 2012, Wallis was a sophomore at Lincoln-Sudbury High School. The school is regarded by many as one of the best public high schools in Massachusetts, and serves two relatively affluent towns.
On September 30, 2012, Wallis was injured during a field-hockey practice and suffered a concussion. She was seen by her doctor a few days later, and at a follow-up appointment not long after that. She missed about two weeks of school, and on her doctor's orders, her activities were limited for another two weeks or so after that. The school was aware of the doctor's orders, and complied with them in all respects; she was permitted to make up her schoolwork, and received a variety of other accommodations to help her catch up.
Wallis was, before and after the concussion, a good student. Her grades were largely unchanged after the concussion, and she was almost entirely symptom-free after she returned.
Wallis was taking a rigorous schedule of classes, including the most rigorous and intensive mathematics class offered by the school. In her sophomore year, she struggled somewhat in that class. Eventually—in May 2013, eight months after the concussion—her math teacher recommended that she take an advanced, but less-rigorous, course her junior year.
That recommendation precipitated a lengthy dispute between Lincoln-Sudbury and Wallis's parents, culminating in this lawsuit. Her parents began to claim that Wallis was a disabled child, and accused the school of failing to comply with their legal obligations to provide her with a special education. In September 2013, they removed her from the Lincoln-Sudbury schools and enrolled her at Lawrence Academy, a private school. Wallis is now an honors student at George Washington University.
The parents brought a proceeding before the BSEA seeking, among other things, reimbursement for the costs of Wallis's private education and tutoring. The hearing wascontentious; among other things, the parents accused the school of making false statements and engaging in intimidating and coercive behavior. The BSEA Hearing Officer, however, found that Lincoln-Sudbury had in fact complied with the requirements of the law and that the parents were not entitled to reimbursement. She further found that the parents' claim was "patently frivolous" and brought for "an improper purpose."
After the decision, Lincoln-Sudbury filed suit to recover its attorneys' fees and costs, and the parents counterclaimed to reverse the hearing officer's decision. The parties have cross-moved for summary judgment on the issue of attorneys' fees. In addition, defendants have moved for summary judgment on their counterclaim appealing the BSEA's decision.
For the reasons stated below, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment will be granted, and defendants' motions for summary judgment will be denied.
A. Statutory Background
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") conditions the provision of federal funds to public schools on compliance with a requirement to provide all disabled children with a "free appropriate public education" ("FAPE"). Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 987 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(c), 1414(b)(2)(A), 1416). "Substantively, the 'free appropriate public education' ordained by the Act requires participating states to provide, at public expense, instruction and support services sufficient 'to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction.'" Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203 (1982)).
"All determinations regarding eligibility for special education are . . . governed . . . by the definition of a 'child with a disability.'" Doe v. Cape Elizabeth Sch. Dist., 832 F.3d 69, 73 (1st Cir. 2016) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)). A disabled child is one (1) with intellectual, physical, or specific learning disabilities (2) who needs special education services. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A). Determination of eligibility for special education thus follows a two-step approach. "The first prong determines the existence of a disorder . . . [and t]he second prong identifies whether the child with a qualifying disorder 'needs' special education and related services as a result of that disorder." Doe, 832 F.3d at 73. Only after a disability is determined to exist does "the eligibility inquiry ask[ ] whether the child also 'needs special education and related services' 'by reason [of]' her disability." Id. at 74 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(ii)).
Regulations promulgated by the U.S. Department of Education have enumerated certain qualifying disabilities. As relevant here, included among that list of disabilities is "traumatic brain injury," which is defined as follows:
[A]n acquired injury to the brain caused by an external physical force, resulting in total or partial functional disability or psychosocial impairment, or both, that adversely affects a child's educational performance. Traumatic brain injury applies to open or closed head injuries resulting in impairments in one or more areas, such as cognition; language; memory; attention; reasoning; abstract thinking; judgment; problem-solving; sensory, perceptual, and motor abilities; psychosocial behavior; physical functions; information processing; and speech. Traumatic brain injury does not apply to brain injuries that are congenital or degenerative, or to brain injuries induced by birth trauma.
Under the IDEA's "Child Find" provision, states are required to "have in effect policies and procedures" to ensure that students with disabilities who need special education services are identified and evaluated. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A); 34 C.F.R. 300.111. Once a disabled child needing special education is identified, her school district must "evaluate the child's specific needs and develop an 'individualized educational program.'" Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481, 486 (7th Cir. 2012). The Massachusetts version of the Child Find law is set forth in its special-education statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71B, and the accompanying regulations.
The individualized education program ("IEP") is the IDEA's primary means for assuring the provision of a FAPE to disabled children. "Under the IDEA, parents and educators must jointly develop and sign an IEP." CBDE Pub. Schools v. Mass. Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals, 2012 WL 4482296, at *5 (D. Mass. Sept. 27, 2012). IEPs are written statements detailing an individualized plan for disabled children. At a minimum, "[e]ach IEP must include an assessment of the child's current educational performance, must articulate measurable educational goals, and must specify the nature of the special services that the school will provide." Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005); see also Roland M., 910 F.2d at 987.
If a school fails to provide a FAPE in a timely manner, the parents of a disabled child have the right to seek reimbursement, where appropriate, for private-school tuition. See Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985); C.G. v. Five Town Cmty. Sch. Dist., 513 F.3d 279, 284-85 (1st Cir. 2008). However, parents who unilaterally change their child'splacement without the consent of state or local school officials "do so at their own financial risk." Id. at 374. Such parents are entitled to reimbursement "only if a federal court concludes both that the public placement violated IDEA and that the private school placement was proper under the Act." Florence Cty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993) (emphasis in original).
Mass. Gen. Laws. Ch. 71B, § 2A(a). The BSEA's administrative decision is reviewable in either state or federal court. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), (i)(2)(C)(iii); see also Roland M., 910 F.2d at 988. However, before such an action may be brought, the party seeking review must exhaust all administrative procedures under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act requires that "no . . . individual with a disability in the United States . . ....
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