Lincoln v. BNSF Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 15 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 15-4936-DDC-ADM |
| Parties | LARRY D. LINCOLN and BRAD C. MOSBRUCKER, Plaintiffs, v. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
This case is before the court on remand from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals after it held that "a plaintiff's failure to file an EEOC charge regarding a discrete employment incident merely permits the employer to raise an affirmative defense of failure to exhaust but does not bar a federal court from assuming jurisdiction over a claim." Lincoln v. BNSF Ry. Co., 900 F.3d 1166, 1185 (10th Cir. 2018) ().
Based on that holding, the Circuit reversed this court's earlier "jurisdictional ruling," id. at 1177, and remanded the case for the court to determine whether the parties' stipulation about exhaustion waived defendant's exhaustion defense. Id. at 1188. The Circuit also directed the court to permit defendant to reassert arguments raised in its earlier summary judgment briefing, as they applied to certain claims. Id. at 1200, 1207, 1208.
This matter is before the court on defendant BNSF Railway Company's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 119). Plaintiffs Larry Lincoln and Brad Mosbrucker have filed a Memorandum in Opposition (Doc. 122) and defendant has filed a Reply (Doc. 123). For the reasons explained below, the court grants BNSF's motion in part and denies it in part.
Plaintiffs are two former employees of defendant BNSF Railway Company ("BNSF"). After a BNSF tank car leaked a substance near where plaintiffs were working in 2007, they sustained injuries that required medical leave and accommodations. Plaintiffs returned to work and applied for several positions with BNSF that did not require significant outdoor exposure. BNSF did not hire either plaintiff for any of these positions. Plaintiffs then filed this lawsuit on September 21, 2015. Doc. 1. They asserted employment discrimination and retaliation claims against BNSF. Specifically, plaintiffs made four claims: "(1) discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act ('ADA'); (2) failure to accommodate under the ADA; (3) retaliation under the ADA; and (4) retaliation under the Federal Railroad Safety Act ('FRSA')." Lincoln, 900 F.3d at 1176.
BNSF moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction, arguing plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies for some of their employment claims. Docs. 8 & 9. The parties resolved this jurisdictional dispute via stipulation. Doc. 13. In the stipulation, the parties agreed plaintiffs had "exhausted their administrative remedies for employment actions occurring on or after April 16, 2012." Id. at 3. After discovery closed, BNSF moved for summary judgment against each plaintiff's claims. Docs. 58 & 60. The court concluded the parties' stipulation could not "manufacture jurisdiction where none exists." Doc. 86 at 19. The court thus granted summary judgment because, among other things, plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies for certain claims. Id. at 19-22.
Plaintiffs appealed. Doc. 90. The Tenth Circuit reversed the court's jurisdictional ruling. Electing to bring its "precedent in line with the overwhelming majority of [its] sibling circuits," the Circuit held that exhausting administrative remedies is not a jurisdictional prerequisite tofiling suit in federal court. Lincoln, 900 F.3d at 1185-86, 1185 n.10. The Circuit adopted a new rule. This new rule holds that "a plaintiff's failure to file an EEOC charge regarding a discrete employment incident merely permits the employer to raise an affirmative defense of failure to exhaust but does not bar a federal court from assuming jurisdiction over a claim." Id. at 1185.
In the first phase of proceedings before this court, the plaintiffs, relying on four distinct legal theories, complained about adverse decisions involving 21 job applications by Mr. Lincoln and 22 job applications by Mr. Mosbrucker. While the Circuit reversed the court's application of jurisdictional precedent, it nonetheless affirmed summary judgment—on substantive grounds—for the vast majority of plaintiffs' applications. All in, the Circuit reversed the court's summary judgment Order as it applied to five positions. The Circuit remanded plaintiffs' ADA discrimination claims for: (a) Mr. Lincoln's Boilermaker application dated March 28, 2013; and (b) Mr. Mosbrucker's Boilermaker application of the same date. On the failure to accommodate claims, the Circuit remanded claims for: (a) Mr. Lincoln's Carman-Railcar Repair application dated November 1, 2012; (b) Mr. Lincoln's Boilermaker application dated March 28, 2013; and (c) Mr. Mosbrucker's Boilermaker application of the same date. The Tenth Circuit did not disturb the court's grant of summary judgment against all of plaintiffs' ADA retaliation claims and their claims under the Federal Railroad Safety Act.
Also, the Circuit vacated the court's conclusion that "Mr. Mosbrucker's second EEOC charge did not relate back to the date of his first EEOC charge" so that, "if necessary," the court "may consider additional arguments on the issue." Id. But the Circuit noted BNSF only could "reassert arguments for summary judgment it raised in the initial summary judgment proceedings but that the district court did not reach."1 Id. at 1208. The Circuit also directed the court to"consider what force to give the stipulation and conduct further summary judgment proceedings consistent with [its] opinion." Id. at 1214.
On remand, the court directed the parties to file briefs addressing enforcement of the parties' stipulation about exhaustion. Doc. 103. BNSF moved for relief from the stipulation, Doc. 104, which the court granted. Doc. 115. The court reasoned it was not bound to enforce a stipulation about a legal conclusion, and "good cause" existed to relieve BNSF from the stipulation. Id. at 6-8. On December 5, 2019, BNSF filed a Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment on the remanded claims. Doc. 119.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates that there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact" and that it is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also In re Aluminum Phosphide Antitrust Litig., 905 F. Supp. 1457, 1460 (D. Kan. 1995). When it applies this standard, the court "view[s] the evidence and make[s] inferences in the light most favorable to the non-movant." Nahno-Lopez v. Houser, 625 F.3d 1279, 1283 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Oldenkamp v. United Am. Ins. Co., 619 F.3d 1243, 1245-46 (10th Cir. 2010)).
"An issue of fact is 'genuine' 'if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party' on the issue." Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)); see also In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 913 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1150 (D. Kan. 2012) . "An issue of fact is 'material' 'if under the substantive law it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim' or defense." Nahno-Lopez, 625 F.3d at1283 (quoting Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248)).
The moving party bears "'both the initial burden of production on a motion for summary judgment and the burden of establishing that summary judgment is appropriate as a matter of law.'" Kannady v. City of Kiowa, 590 F.3d 1161, 1169 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Trainor v. Apollo Metal Specialties, Inc., 318 F.3d 976, 979 (10th Cir. 2002)). To meet this burden, the moving party "'need not negate the non-movant's claim, but need only point to an absence of evidence to support the non-movant's claim.'" Id. (quoting Sigmon v. CommunityCare HMO, Inc., 234 F.3d 1121, 1125 (10th Cir. 2000)); see also In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 913 F. Supp. 2d at 1150 .
If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the non-moving party "'may not rest on its pleadings, but must bring forward specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial as to those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof.'" Kannady, 590 F.3d at 1169 (quoting Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 990 (10th Cir. 1996)); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. "To accomplish this, the facts must be identified by reference to affidavits, deposition transcripts, or specific exhibits incorporated" in them. Adler, 144 F.3d at 671 (citing Thomas v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir. 1992)).
Finally, in federal court, summary judgment isn't a "disfavored procedural shortcut." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327. Instead, it is an important procedure "designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1).
The court previously outlined some uncontroverted facts in its first summary judgment Order. Doc. 86 at 3-18. The Circuit did not reverse the court's earlier decision about uncontroverted facts. The court thus incorporates those facts by this reference. Specifically, the court adopts all of the uncontroverted facts recited on pages 3 to 18 of Doc. 86.
But, because the court had concluded it lacked jurisdiction over some of plaintiffs' claims, it did not determine whether facts about some of the positions which plaintiffs had sought were uncontroverted. Id. at 15, 16. Here, the court finds...
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