Lind v. Ballard

• Decision Date: 08 April 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 2:14-cv-26284
• Parties: JONATHAN JOSEPH LIND, Petitioner, v. DAVID BALLARD, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia

JONATHAN JOSEPH LIND, Petitioner, v. DAVID BALLARD, Respondent.

Civil Action No. 2:14-cv-26284

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia, Charleston Division

April 8, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THOMAS E. JOHNSTON, CHIEF JUDGE

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Jonathan Lind's (“Petitioner”) pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, (ECF Nos 63, 107). By Standing Order, this matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Cheryl A. Eifert for submission of proposed findings and a recommendation for disposition (“PF&R”). (ECF No. 9.)

On October 31, 2018, Magistrate Judge Eifert filed a PF&R (“First PF&R”), recommending that this Court deny Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, as well as other pending motions, and dismiss this matter from the Court's docket. (ECF No. 99.) Petitioner filed objections to the First PF&R on December 4, 2018. (ECF No. 103.) Subsequently, this Court stayed the case to allow Petitioner to pursue state court remedies for his unexhausted claims. (ECF No. 105.) Then, on February 13, 2020, Petitioner filed a Supplement to his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 107), and the stay was lifted on April 1, 2020, (ECF No. 109). On December 2, 2020, Magistrate Judge Eifert filed another PF&R (“Second PF&R”), (ECF No 113), which, other than addressing Petitioner's supplemental claims, (ECF No. 107) was substantially the same as the First PF&R.^[1] Petitioner filed objections to the Second PF&R on December 17, 2020. (ECF No. 116.)

For the reasons discussed herein, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner's objections, (ECF Nos. 103, 116), ADOPTS the Second PF&R to the extent consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order, (ECF No. 113), DENIES Petitioner's Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, (ECF Nos. 63, 107), and DISMISSES this matter WITH PREJUDICE.

I. BACKGROUND

A detailed recitation of the extensive facts of this action can be found in Magistrate Judge Eifert's PF&R, (ECF No. 113), and therefore need not be repeated here. The Court will provide a discussion of any relevant facts as necessary throughout this opinion to resolve Petitioner's objections.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Review of Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations

The Court is required to “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). However, the Court is not required to review, under a de novo or any other standard, the factual or legal conclusions of the magistrate judge as to those portions of the findings or recommendation to which no objections are addressed. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). In addition, this Court need not conduct a de novo review when a plaintiff “makes general and conclusory objections that do not direct the Court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982).

In reviewing those portions of the PF&R to which Plaintiff has objected, this Court will consider the fact that Plaintiff is acting pro se, and his pleadings will be accorded liberal construction. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978).

B. Habeas Corpus Standard of Review

A federal court may grant habeas relief for a state prisoner “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). “Therefore, when a petitioner's claim rests solely upon an interpretation of state case law and statutes, it is not cognizable on federal habeas review.” Weeks v. Angelone, 176 F.3d 249, 262 (4th Cir. 1999), aff'd, 528 U.S. 225 (2000).

Section 2254(d), as modified by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), provides for a deferential standard of review to be applied to any claim that was “adjudicated on the merits” in state court proceedings. In such a case, a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the adjudication of the claim in state court

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Section 2254(d)(1) describes the standard of review to be applied to claims challenging how the state courts applied federal law. “A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the ‘contrary to' clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases, or if it decides a case differently than we have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). “The court may grant relief under the ‘unreasonable application' clause if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case.” Id. The latter inquiry focuses on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was “unreasonable, ” as distinguished from whether it was “correct.” See Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010); Bell, 535 U.S. at 694; Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000).

Section 2254(d)(2) describes the standard to be applied to claims challenging how the state courts determined the facts. “[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court [is] presumed to be correct, ” and the petitioner has “the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). “The phrase ‘adjudication on the merits' in section 2254(d) excludes only claims that were not raised in state court, and not claims that were decided in state court, albeit in a summary fashion.” Thomas v. Taylor, 170 F.3d 466, 475 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011) (recognizing that § 2254(d) applies even if the state court issued a summary decision unaccompanied by an explanation). The state court determination will be upheld so long as “fairminded jurists could disagree” on its correctness. Yarbrough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004).

III.DISCUSSION

Petitioner asserts fifteen objections to the PF&R. (See ECF Nos. 103, 116.) The objections are verbose and at times difficult to comprehend. Some of these objections are overlapping and have been consolidated for clarity. Each is discussed below.

A. Claim Characterization Objections Petitioner makes two separate objections to the PF&Rs' characterizations of his claims. First, Petitioner objects to language used in the Relevant Facts and Procedural History section of the First PF&R, (ECF No. 99 at 5 (“[Petitioner] filed a third state habeas petition on the basis that his state habeas counsel failed to assert additional grounds for relief”)), because he claims it implies that his third habeas petition was solely based on claims that his habeas counsel failed to raise certain claims, when his third habeas petition was based on his habeas counsel's failure to “fully develop and raise all constitutional issues, ” (ECF No. 103 at 1-2 (emphasis in original)). Second, Petitioner objects to the Second PF&R's classification of his McCoy v. Louisiana^[2] claim as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (See ECF No. 116 at 2.)

However, Petitioner fails to explain how these characterizations changed the substantive analyses in the PF&Rs.^[3] Rather, this Court finds that the Second PF&R fully analyzed all errors alleged in Petitioner's federal habeas petition, and the specific characterizations of the underlying claims did not alter the legal analyses or conclusions.^[4]

Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner's objections with respect to the characterization of his claims.

B. Objections for Not Addressing Arguments Next, Petitioner faults the PF&R for not addressing two of his arguments. First, he claims that the PF&R failed to discuss the argument that his indictment was defective because the grand jury was not presented with the essential element of animus furandi. (ECF No. 103 at 21; see also ECF No. 63 at 15-17 (reasoning that, although the word “unlawfully” was presented, it was insufficient).) Second, Petitioner claims that the PF&R failed to discuss his argument that the prosecution did not investigate “Steven Jones committing perjury regarding the McDonald's forgery.” (ECF No. 103 at 21-22.) However, the PF&R addressed both of these arguments.

As to his defective indictment argument, the PF&R explained:

The Fifth Amendment requirement of indictment by grand jury does not apply to the states, and thus variances and other deficiencies in state court indictments are not ordinarily a basis of federal habeas corpus relief unless the deficiency makes the trial so egregiously unfair as to amount to a deprivation of the petitioner's right to due process. The general rule is that the scope of review of a challenged indictment in federal courts upon habeas corpus proceedings is confined to the questions of whether the alleged defects go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or deprive the defendant of the right to be sufficiently informed of the charges against him.

(ECF Nos. 99 at 41; 113 at 42 (internal quotations and citations omitted).)

The PF&R also identified animus furandi as “the intent to steal or to feloniously deprive the owner permanently of his property, ” and recalled that the indictment alleged that Petitioner “feloniously and violently did steal, take[, ] and carry away' specified...