Linda W. v. Indiana Dept. of Educ.
Decision Date | 27 March 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 3:94-CV-268RM.,3:94-CV-268RM. |
Citation | 927 F. Supp. 303 |
Parties | LINDA W., et al., Plaintiffs, v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Margie Best, Chicago, IL, for Linda W., Erik W. and Steven V.D., plaintiffs.
Rebecca Bowman, Kathryn Symmes Kirk, Indiana Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for Kevin McDowell, Indiana Department of Education, Cynthia Dewes, Raymond Quist, William Hendrickson and Indiana Board of Special Education Appeals.
Robert T. Sanders, III, Matthew A. Yeakey, Daniels Sanders Pianowski, Elkhart, IN, Margaret Bannon Miller, Bose McKinney and Evans, Indianapolis, IN, Thomas E. Wheeler, II, Kightlinger and Gray, Indianapolis, IN, Peter D. Gordon, Los Angeles, CA, for Stella Batagiannis, Mishawaka-Penn-Harris-Madison Joint Services and Board of Education of School City of Mishawaka.
This cause comes before the court on the motion of all the defendants1 to either dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), or for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The plaintiffs have filed a motion to strike the defendants' opening brief, arguing that its exceeded the 25-page limit imposed by the local rules without first seeking leave of court. Since the brief otherwise complied with the local rules governing briefs in excess of 25 pages, and because the defendants filed a belated motion for leave, the court grants the defendants' belated motion for leave to file an oversize brief and denies the plaintiffs' motion to strike. For the reasons stated in this memorandum and order, the court denies the defendants' motion for either a dismissal or for summary judgment.
Linda W., Eric W. and Steven V.D. bring this suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (the "IDEA"), contending, among other things, that the individual education program provided for their son,2 Ryan V.D., is legally inadequate. Ryan has dyslexia. The plaintiffs seek review of several administrative decisions, and request compensation for their expenses incurred for Ryan's education and for attorneys' fees. Before bringing this suit, the parties engaged in an extensive administrative process, including two hearings and two appeals to the Indiana Board of Special Education Appeals. In this motion, the defendants contend, apparently for the first time, that this suit should not have been brought, either in this court or in the administrative proceedings, against defendants Mishawaka-Penn-Harris-Madison Joint Services ("MPHM Joint Services") and the Board of Education of School City of Mishawaka ("Mishawaka School City"), since Ryan's "legal settlement," as Indiana law defines that term, is not within the confines of Mishawaka School City. Because this is so, the defendants claim: (1) the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case; and/or (2) summary judgment is warranted.
The defendants' theory as to why the court should either dismiss the cause or award summary judgment relies solely upon the contention that the defendants owe no duty to Ryan under applicable Indiana law and therefore cannot be sued under the IDEA. Under the defendants' view of the facts, Ryan lives with his mother and stepfather 75% of the time, while living with his father only 25% of the time.3 Ryan's mother and stepfather reside within the boundaries of the South Bend School Corporation, while his father lives within the boundaries of Mishawaka School City. The IDEA requires school corporations to provide for the education of only those children "residing within the jurisdiction of the local educational agency of the intermediate educational unit." 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(A). Thus, the defendants claim that Ryan has sued the wrong party,
1. Motion to Dismiss
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), the court may dismiss claims that fail to bring a claim within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. "The party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of demonstrating that he has alleged a claim under federal law and that the claim is not frivolous." Operative Plasterers & Cement Masons v. Benjamin, 776 F.Supp. 1360, 1363 (N.D.Ind. 1991). The defendants contend that the court has no subject matter jurisdiction over this cause because the plaintiffs have sued the wrong school corporation; the defendants argue that since Ryan resides within the confines of the South Bend School Corporation, his suit should be brought against that school corporation instead of Mishawaka School City (or MPHM Joint Services).
The defendants' motion misses its mark. The plaintiffs brought this case under the authority of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) as a result of decisions made by the Indiana Board of Special Education Appeals, which in turn was reviewing the decisions of the independent hearing officers stemming from two hearings held under the authority of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b). Thus, subject matter jurisdiction exists in this court under the authority of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2), which explicitly creates jurisdiction in the federal district court over a claim brought by "any party aggrieved by the findings and decision under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)." The plaintiffs brought this claim under § 1415(e)(2) as "parties aggrieved by the findings and decisions" under the administrative proceedings, and thus, regardless of whether Ryan's legal settlement is within the confines of Mishawaka School City, the defendants have no valid objection to this court's subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the motion for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is denied.
2. Motion for Summary Judgment
Since the defendants contend that the plaintiffs have no colorable claim against them, their motion is more properly brought as a motion for summary judgment.
Conery v. Bath Assocs., 803 F.Supp. 1388, 1392-93 (N.D.Ind.1992) (citations omitted).
The defendants' theory supporting their summary judgment motion is the same as that used to support the dismissal motion: that the plaintiffs have no claim against the defendants since Ryan's legal settlement is not within Mishawaka School City.4 Even when accepting as true the defendants' own view of the facts, and thus assuming that Ryan lives with his father only 25% of the time, the defendants' theory does not support summary judgment.
The IDEA requires school corporations to provide for the education of only those children "residing within the jurisdiction of the local educational agency of the intermediate educational unit." 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(A). The parties agree that the IDEA leaves the determination of a student's residency to state law. At first blush, Indiana appears to mirror the simple residency language of the IDEA, because IND. CODE § 20-1-6-14(a), which designates which school corporations will be responsible for the education of children covered under the IDEA, provides that "the school corporation in which a child with a disability resides is primarily responsible for providing the child with a disability with an appropriate special education program." (emphasis added). Since IND.CODE § 20-8.1-6.1-1(e) provides that "for the purposes of calculating the amount of state distribution of money to any school corporation, a student is a resident of a school corporation if the student's legal settlement is in its attendance area," the parties appear to agree that the ultimate determination of where a student "resides" for purposes of the IDEA is governed in Indiana by where his "legal settlement" is.
IND.CODE § 20-8.1-6.1-1, which sets forth the applicable standards for determining a student's legal settlement, states in part:
Since this portion of the statute bases legal settlement on the residency of the parents, the statute defines the term as follows:
(b) The words "residence", "resides", or other comparable language when used in this chapter with respect to legal settlement ... means a permanent and principal habitation which a person uses for a home for a fixed or indefinite period, at which the...
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