Lindblom v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corporation

• Decision Date: 05 December 1930
• Docket Number: 6706.
• Citation: 295 P. 1007,88 Mont. 488
• Parties: LINDBLOM v. EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ASSUR. CORPORATION, Limited, et al.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

295 P. 1007

88 Mont. 488

LINDBLOM v. EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ASSUR. CORPORATION, Limited, et al.

No. 6706.

Supreme Court of Montana

December 5, 1930

Rehearing Denied Feb. 12, 1931.

Appeal from District Court, Cascade County; H. H. Ewing, Judge.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Peter Lindblom claimant, against the Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Limited, insurer, and the Johnson Motor Company employer. From a judgment of the district court, vacating and annulling an award of compensation to claimant by the Industrial Accident Board, claimant appeals.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Molumby Busha & Greenan, of Great Falls, for appellant.

Freeman, Thelen & Freeman, of Great Falls, for respondents.

FORD J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court vacating and annulling an award of compensation to Peter Lindblom, made by the Industrial Accident Board.

On July 13, 1927, claimant was injured in the course of his employment while employed by Johnson Motor Company. Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Limited, is the insurance carrier. On February 15, 1928, Lindblom filed a claim for compensation with the Industrial Accident Board. The insurer answered, admitting claimant's employment, and that he was injured during the course of his employment, but alleged as an affirmative defense that the claim was barred by the provisions of section 2899, Revised Codes 1921, in that it was filed more than six months after the date of the accident. After hearing, the board awarded compensation to claimant. Thereafter the insurer's petition for a rehearing was denied, and it appealed to the district court. On the hearing on appeal additional testimony was introduced by the insurer, and thereafter the district court set aside and annulled the award made by the board, and held that claimant was not entitled to compensation, for the reason that the claim was not filed within six months from the date of the happening of the accident.

The determinative question is whether, under the circumstances disclosed, the insurer is estopped from asserting that the claim was not filed within the time specified in section 2899, Revised Codes 1921. This section provides: "In case of personal injury or death, all claims shall be forever barred unless presented in writing under oath to the employer, the insurer, or the board, as the case may be, within six months from the date of the happening of the accident."

It is contended by the insurer that a compliance by the claimant with the provisions of this section "is mandatory and jurisdictional to the very existence of his right to maintain this proceeding to compel payment of compensation," and, since it appears that the claim was not filed within the six-months period, that claimant cannot recover. On the other hand, claimant insists that the insurer by its conduct is estopped from asserting the limitation of section 2899, supra.

Upon this issue the board found the insurer "to be fully responsible for the delay in the filing of the claim because Mr. Lindblom's affairs, so far as this claim was concerned, were placed in the hands of the Moon Agency, the agents of the Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd. The set of circumstances surrounding the situation with respect to this claim and another claim made by Peter Lindblom support this view," and after a careful analysis of the evidence concluded, as a matter of law, that "every act of defendant insurance carrier tended to and did mislead the claimant, Lindblom. The claimant was made to feel secure and defendant at no time resisted his claim. On the contrary, defendant acknowledged it on claimant's numerous visits to the agent's office for settlement. Lindblom could not help but believe that he was to be paid the compensation due him by the Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation. The representations, admissions and actions of the agents of the company induced him to believe that his claim was accepted, and that it was only a matter of routine until he received his check. Estoppel surely arises in this case."

Assuming that the evidence sustains the findings of the board, we think the conclusion that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied in this case is unassailable. "Equitable estoppel is defined as the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise existed, either of property, or contract, or of remedy, as against another person who in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse, and who on his part acquires some corresponding right either of contract or of remedy. This estoppel arises when one by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. It consists in holding for truth a representation acted upon, when the person who made it, or his privies, seek to deny its truth, and to deprive the party who has acted upon it of the benefit obtained. When a party unjustly contrives to put another in a dilemma and to subject him to necessity and distress and he acts one way, it is not for the wrongdoer to insist that he should have acted another way." 21 C.J., § 116, p. 1113.

Subdivision 3 of section 10605, Revised Codes 1921, which says that, "whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, be cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it," is but a crystallization into statutory form of the rule above stated, and forms the basic principle of equitable estoppel. Waddell v. School District, 74 Mont. 91, 238 P. 884.

"Equitable estoppels operate as effectually as technical estoppels. They cannot in the nature of things be subjected to fixed and settled rules of universal application, like legal estoppels, nor hampered by the narrow confines of technical formula. So, while the attempted definitions of such an estoppel are numerous, few of them can be considered satisfactory, for the reason that an equitable estoppel rests largely on the facts and circumstances of the particular case." 10 R. C. L. 689.

Generally speaking, the following are the essential elements which must enter into and form a part of an equitable estoppel in all of its applications: "1. There must be conduct--acts, language, or silence,--amounting to a representation or a concealment of material facts. 2. These facts must be known to the party estopped at the time of his said conduct, or at least the circumstances must be such that knowledge of them is necessarily imputed to him. 3. The truth concerning these facts must be unknown to the other party claiming the benefit of the estoppel, at the time when it was acted upon by him. 4. The conduct must be done with the intention, or at least with the expectation, that it will be acted upon by the other party, or under such circumstances that it is both natural and probable that it will be so acted upon. *** 5. The conduct must be relied upon by the other party, and, thus relying, he must be led to act upon it. 6. He must in fact act upon it in such a manner as to change his position for the worse; in other words, he must so act that he would suffer a loss if he were compelled to surrender or forego or alter what he has done by reason of the first party being permitted to repudiate his conduct and to assert rights inconsistent with it. It will be seen that fraud is not given as an essential requisite in the foregoing statement. It is not absolutely necessary that the conduct mentioned in the first subdivision should be done with a fraudulent purpose or intent, or with an actual and fraudulent intention of deceiving the other party; nor is this meaning implied by any of the language which I have used. The adoption of such an element as always essential would at once strike out some of the most familiar and best established instances of equitable estoppel. Undoubtedly a fraudulent design to mislead is often present as an ingredient of the conduct working an estoppel; but this only renders the result more clearly just, and, if I may use the expression, more conclusive." 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (4th Ed.) 1644. This language does not conflict in any way with what was said by this court in Waddell v. School District, supra.

Does the evidence bring the instant case within this rule? We think it does. It appears that, subsequent to the injury here involved, claimant received another injury; he went to the office of the Moon Agency, where a claim was prepared by the agency, and left there. Later a check in settlement for that injury was forwarded by insurer to the Moon Agency and delivered to claimant by Mr. Comings, one of the owners and the representative of the agency. The injury of July 13th did not immediately impair the vision of the eye, but soon after the accident claimant began to take treatment from Dr Butler, who was paid by the insurer. He continued treatment until the loss of vision was determined. When Comings delivered the check in settlement of the subsequent injury, claimant asked for settlement for the injury to his eye; Comings told him, "We will take care of it. There is a man coming to take...