Linde v. State

• Decision Date: 31 October 2013
• Docket Number: No. 2012–125–Appeal.,2012–125–Appeal.
• Citation: 78 A.3d 738
• Parties: Eddie M. LINDE v. STATE of Rhode Island.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

78 A.3d 738

Eddie M. LINDE

v.STATE of Rhode Island.

No. 2012–125–Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Oct. 31, 2013.

C. Daniel Schrock, Esq., for applicant.

Christopher R. Bush, Department of Attorney General, for state.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION

Justice GOLDBERG, for the Court.

This case came before the Supreme Court on September 25, 2013, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. This application for postconviction relief is Eddie M. Linde's (Linde or applicant) third attempt to persuade this Court to either vacate his convictions for second-degree murder and related firearms offenses or vacate the mandatory consecutive life sentence that was imposed for the use of a firearm in the commission of a homicide. In this postconviction relief appeal, the applicant contends that (1) the mandatory consecutive life sentence imposed under G.L.1956 § 11–47–3.2 for discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence resulting in death violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 8 of the Rhode Island Constitution; (2) the conviction and sentence for second-degree murder and discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence resulting in death violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution and article 1, section 7 of the Rhode Island Constitution; (3) trial counsel was ineffective because (a) when moving to suppress statements made to the police, he failed to argue that the applicant was so intoxicated that he was incapable of knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily waiving his right to remain silent; and (b) he failed to present a manslaughter defense based on diminished capacity at the plea bargaining stage and, again, at trial. After reviewing the memoranda submitted by the parties and considering the arguments of counsel, we are satisfied that cause has not been shown, and the appeal may be decided at this time. We affirm the trial justice's denial of postconviction relief.

Facts and Travel

The facts of this case were set forth in significant detail in this Court's decision denying defendant's direct appeal. See State v. Linde, 876 A.2d 1115 (R.I.2005)( Linde I );see also State v. Linde, 965 A.2d 415 (R.I.2009)( Linde II ) (holding that defendant's constitutional claims could not be brought under a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure). We therefore only briefly describe the events leading to this senseless killing.

In 2002, applicant was convicted of nine felony counts, including second-degree murder, for killing his co-worker with a handgun in the parking lot of a motel. Linde I, 876 A.2d at 1118. Although there was evidence that applicant had consumed a significant amount of alcohol on the night of the shooting, the defense raised at trial was accident. Id. at 1120–21, 1129. The applicant was sentenced to forty years imprisonment, twenty years to serve, for second-degree murder and to a mandatory term of life imprisonment for discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence resulting in death, consecutive to the sentence for second-degree murder. Id. at 1118 n. 1. In 2006, applicant successfully moved to reduce the prison time for second-degree murder to ten years to serve. Next, he sought to challenge his sentence on constitutional grounds under Rule 35. Linde II, 965 A.2d at 416. This Court, however, held that constitutional claims were not cognizable under Rule 35. Linde II, 965 A.2d at 417.

In this application for postconviction relief, applicant again asserted his constitutional claims and also raised ineffective assistance of counsel as grounds for vacating his conviction. An evidentiary hearing was held in January 2012 before a justice of the Superior Court, who also had been the trial justice. In addition to documentary evidence, Alan Feinstein (Feinstein), a forensic mental health consultant, offered expert testimony on applicant's behalf. The applicant's trial counsel was called to testify by the state. Feinstein reviewed trial transcripts, witness statements, police reports, and a psychological evaluation of applicant that was prepared a few months after trial. Based on his review of those materials and multiple interviews with applicant, Feinstein concluded that applicant's level of intoxication before, during, and after the events that resulted in the death of his co-worker completely paralyzed applicant's will and deprived him of the power to withstand evil impulses, rendering his mind incapable of forming any sane design. Feinstein also opined that at the time he was interrogated, applicant was so intoxicated that he was unable to provide a police statement with rational intellect and free will. Additionally, Feinstein concluded that applicant does not have “any real recollection” of the events culminating in the death of his co-worker.

The applicant's trial counsel testified that Linde's drug and alcohol use on the night of the murder was a serious issue that he carefully considered in formulating a defense. However, his client insisted repeatedly that he was not so drunk that he could not remember what happened and consistently maintained that the shooting was an accident. Trial counsel also testified that he advised applicant about a potential defense of diminished capacity, but applicant rejected his advice. Additionally, trial counsel advised applicant to refrain from testifying unless he had a good memory of the events. Furthermore, trial counsel testified that he did not receive a plea offer from the state nor did he solicit an offer because applicant “wanted to go home and wanted complete exoneration.” ¹

With respect to the motion to suppress his police statements, trial counsel testified that he did not think he could establish that applicant was so intoxicated as to suffer diminished capacity. It also was his belief that suppression would have been futile because Linde testified at trial, and the statements would be available to impeach his credibility if he gave inconsistent testimony. Finally, the trial justice asked trial counsel if, even in hindsight, he could “in any way have presented a defense of diminished capacity contemporaneously with the defense of accident that your client insisted on?” Trial counsel answered “no.”

The trial justice issued a bench decision and denied all relief. First, he disposed of applicant's constitutional challenges to the statute premised on the separation of powers, due process, the Eighth Amendment, and double jeopardy by stating that those issues previously had been decided by this Court. Next, the trial justice found that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to obtain a plea offer from the state in order to dispose of the case without a trial-first, because the state made no such offer and, second, because applicant sought complete exoneration.

Finally, the trial justice addressed the defense of diminished capacity. As to the suppression issue, he found that the statements applicant made to the police were voluntary and reflected a “deliberateness and cunning” through which Linde “tried to shift blame or extricate himself.” The trial justice also declared that the suppression ruling was of no consequence because applicant testified at trial and the state presented eyewitness testimony against him. Addressing trial counsel's failure to present a defense of diminished capacity, the trial justice found that “[n]ot presenting a diminished capacity defense was a very sensible tactical decision by experienced trial counsel,” noting the logical incompatibility of the defense of accident juxtaposed with a plea of diminished capacity.

Standard of Review

“The statutory remedy of postconviction relief set forth in G.L.1956 § 10–9.1–1 is ‘available to any person who has been convicted of a crime and who thereafter alleges either that the conviction violated the applicant's constitutional rights or that the existence of newly discovered material facts requires vacation of the conviction in the interest of justice.’ ” Hall v. State, 60 A.3d 928, 931 (R.I.2013) (quoting Sosa v. State, 949 A.2d 1014, 1016 (R.I.2008)). “When reviewing the grant or denial of postconviction relief, the trial justice's factual findings and credibility determinations will be upheld ‘absent clear error or a determination that the hearing justice misconceived or overlooked material evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Lynch v. State, 13 A.3d 603, 605 (R.I.2011)). “When a postconviction relief decision involves ‘questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact pertaining to an alleged violation of an applicant's constitutional rights[,]’ we review those issues de novo.” Neufville v. State, 13 A.3d 607, 610 (R.I.2011) (quoting Hazard v. State, 968 A.2d 886, 891 (R.I.2009)).

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

The applicant contends that the mandatory life sentence imposed under § 11–47–3.2 violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 8 of the Rhode Island Constitution.² This Court has previously declared that a mandatory consecutive life sentence imposed under § 11–47–3.2 survives a constitutional challenge. See State v. Monteiro, 924 A.2d 784, 795–96 (R.I.2007) (rejecting the defendant's contention that consecutive life sentences imposed for first-degree murder and discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence resulting in death constitute cruel and unusual punishment). The applicant's argument that Monteiro is distinguishable because the defendant in Monteiro was convicted of first-degree murder—whereas applicant was convicted of second-degree murder—is unavailing. The holding in Monteiro did not rise and fall with the classification of murder, but rather with the fact that the defendant was convicted of murder and used a...