Lindell v. Stone

• Decision Date: 26 June 1915
• Citation: 94 A. 963,77 N.H. 582
• Parties: LINDELL v. STONE et al. (two cases).
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

94 A. 963

77 N.H. 582

LINDELL

v. STONE et al. (two cases).

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Cheshire.

June 26, 1915.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Cheshire County; Branch, Judge.

Actions by Svante Lindell and by JOHN Lindell against Robert W. Stone and another. Verdicts were found for defendant named, and were directed for the other defendant, and the plaintiffs bring exceptions. Exceptions overruled.

The plaintiff in the first action is a minor who was injured while at work in the mill of the defendant Robert W. Stone. The plaintiff in the second action is the father of Svante, and seeks to recover for the loss of his son's services, caused by the same negligence which is alleged in the first suit.

Joseph Madden, of Keene, and John G. Annala, of Fitchburg, Mass., for plaintiff. Leonard Wellington and Benton & Pickard, all of Keene, for defendant.

WALKER, J. As the plaintiff does not insist upon his exception to the ruling of the court directing a verdict in favor of Edward L. Stone in both actions, which exception seems to be without merit, the question sought to be raised thereby is not considered. The cases stand as though they had been brought against the other defendant, Robert W. Stone, who will be referred to as the defendant.

The plaintiff, a minor under 16 years of age, received his injuries while he was engaged in the mill of the defendant under a contract of employment, and the ground upon which he claims to recover is the negligence of his employer. Upon this issue he offered to prove that the defendant had not complied with the provisions of chapter 162, Laws 1911, relating to child labor. Section 1 prohibits the employment of children under 12 years of age in certain designated places, including mills and factories, and also the employment of children under 14 years of age in such places while the public schools are in session in the districts where they reside. Section 2 provides that no child under the age of 16 shall be employed in such establishments while the public schools are in session unless he can read and write simple sentences in the English language, or unless it shall be determined by the school authorities that he is mentally incapable of learning to read and write, in which event the superintendent of public instruction may issue a permit of employment of such child. By section 7 it is made the duty of the employer of children under 16 years of age to procure and keep on file, and accessible to any truant officer or other authorized inspector, an employment certificate issued by the superintendent of schools, showing the school record of such child, the date of birth, and his physical condition. Section 20 provides a penalty for violations of the statute by employers. The exception to the rejection of the evidence that the defendant had violated the statutory provisions in his contract of employment of the plaintiff presents the question whether the evidence had any legitimate bearing upon the issue of the defendant's negligence.

The evident purpose of the Legislature in the enactment of these provisions, so far as they apply to children between the ages of 14 and 16, was to compel the attendance of such children upon, the public schools and to promote public education. As applied to a boy like the plaintiff, who was more than 15 years of age, the legislative purpose was not to protect him from the hazards of working around machinery in a mill or factory. It was not to guard his physical safety in a mill or factory, but to develop his mental powers in a school—to protect him from ignorance rather than from physical injury. There is, in fact, little room for discussion upon this point. The legislative language leads to but one conclusion. The prohibition applies only when the public schools are in session. In vacation time, a boy of 15 is allowed to work in the designated places; and that fact shows that his protection from physical harm was not the purpose of the statute, as well as the further fact that if it appears he is so mentally deficient as not to be able to learn to read and write the English language, he may be employed as a laborer at all times.

The statute therefore did not impose any special duty upon the defendant in relation to the plaintiff's safety. Nor did it make the defendant an insurer against injuries the plaintiff might receive while in his employment. If it is conceded that the defendant was thoughtless or negligent to employing the plaintiff in violation of the statutes referred to, or that he was guilty of a misdemeanor in so employing him, the act of employment was not in any proper sense the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. If he bad been employed when the public schools wore not in session, no one would claim...