Lindenmuth v. Holden

• Decision Date: 17 December 1996
• Citation: 296 N.J.Super. 42,685 A.2d 1351
• Parties: Irene LINDENMUTH and William Lindenmuth, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Robert HOLDEN, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 42

296 N.J.Super. 42

685 A.2d 1351

Irene LINDENMUTH and William Lindenmuth, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Robert HOLDEN, Defendant-Respondent.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division.

Argued Oct. 29, 1996.

Decided Dec. 17, 1996.

Robert J. Kelly, Jr., for appellants.

Robert G. Harbeson, Haddonfield, for respondent (Archer & Greiner, attorneys; John C. Connell, of counsel and on the brief).

Before Judges MICHELS, KLEINER and COBURN.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

MICHELS, P.J.A.D.

Plaintiff Irene Lindenmuth and her husband, plaintiff William Lindenmuth, appeal from an order of the Law Division that denied their motion for a new trial in this personal injury automobile action which resulted in a judgment in favor of defendant Robert Holden.

Plaintiff suffered personal injuries when an automobile in which she allegedly was riding as a passenger was struck in the rear while stopped at a traffic light by an automobile driven by defendant. Prior to trial, defendant stipulated as to liability in favor of plaintiffs and the matter was to proceed to trial on damages only. In preparation for trial, a videotaped deposition of plaintiffs' medical expert, Dr. Barry S. Gleimer, D.O., was taken on January 19, 1995. On cross-examination, Dr. Gleimer admitted that the only history that he had recorded regarding plaintiff's involvement in this accident was from plaintiff herself and from the reports of other physicians who had seen her previously. Defendant was attempting to show that plaintiff was not in the automobile at the time of the accident. Plaintiffs' counsel objected to this line of questioning, stating:

I am going to object. There will be a motion made in limine, pretrial, as to the issue of whether or not Mrs. Lindenmuth was in the vehicle. Liability has been stipulated in this case. The issue would have been litigated at the liability level as to whether she was in the car or not, because Mr. Holden could not be conceivably at fault for any injuries if she were not in the vehicle.

So, it's an issue that I'll be seeking to exclude any reference to pretrial whether she told the doctors that she was--that someone alleged that she wasn't in the car or not....

Plaintiffs filed a motion in limine in which they sought among other relief (1) a ruling on their objections during Dr. Gleimer's deposition; (2) the exclusion of any reference to the accident report, defendant's observations of the number of persons in the vehicle, and any other issue with regard to whether plaintiff was a passenger at the time of the accident; and alternatively, (3) bifurcating the trial of liability from damages. Plaintiffs' attorney's certification in support of the motion, in pertinent part stated:

The basis of liability has already been stipulated and defendants should be collaterally estopped from now re-litigating the issue of whether plaintiff was a passenger, as said issue was absolutely necessary to support a judgment for liability against [defendant] by [plaintiff].

Following argument, the trial court denied the motion and held that the issue of whether plaintiff was a passenger as well as damages would be decided at the same trial. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court reasoned:

Negligence is the act or omission; liability is the causation of that act or admission. Clearly, there has been an admission of negligence but its just as clear to me that there has not been an admission of liability; that is, proximate causation.

Having said that, however, it is not my desire nor my intent to limit Mr. Kelley in his presentation of his case. And, in order to strike a balance, if you will, or do what I feel is procedurally appropriate, while we normally have a bifurcated trial....

* * * * * *

... So that the negligence certainly is admitted ... and I would find is the operative factor in causing the accident since there is nothing else--that is, the collision, there is nothing else in dispute in that regard between the parties.

The one remaining issue with respect to liability is proximate causation. So that within my discretion, while it is our custom in Camden County to try cases in a bifurcated manner, that is pure liability in its truest sense in one action and depending on the outcome, the damage portion in a second procedure.

The admission of negligent operation permits me, and I so find, to bring together the issues as follows: There will be a determination by the jury whether the plaintiff Irene Lindenmuth was a passenger in the vehicle because that is and has been, from what I read from those portions of the transcript submitted to me, in dispute.

That will be the first interrogatory for the jury to answer. And, then the jury will be asked to respond in the normal fashion to the issue of damages; that is, causation of damages, as the--was the action--was the plaintiff injured? And, if she was injured, were the injuries proximately caused by the accident? And if the answers to 1, 2, and 3 are yes, then how much do they award to the plaintiff for her injuries?

At trial, defendant sought to introduce evidence that plaintiff was not at the accident scene through testimony of the investigating police officer as well as testimony and reports of ambulance officials. According to plaintiffs, on the first day of trial, defendant's counsel, for the first time, named personnel from the Stratford Ambulance Association and a "representative" of the Lindenwold Ambulance Squad as witnesses he intended to call at trial. Plaintiffs objected, claiming that "[t]hese witnesses had never been named in prior answers to interrogatories, or any amendments up to the day of trial or had the documents or reports of the Stratford Ambulance Personnel ever been produced." The trial court ruled that defendant's counsel could not refer to this issue in his opening and that it would provide a final determination on the issue prior to the arrival of defendant's witnesses. The trial court subsequently found that this information was not intentionally withheld by defense counsel in an effort to mislead, and allowed such evidence conditioned on plaintiffs' counsel having the opportunity to depose the witnesses during a four-day trial recess.

At the conclusion of the proofs, the trial court submitted special interrogatories to the jury, the first of which read: "Was the plaintiff Irene Lindenmuth an occupant of a car owned by Anna Marie Chepress at the time of the accident?" The jury answered "No," and, therefore, the trial court entered a verdict of no cause for action. Judgment was entered accordingly in favor of defendant. Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial was denied and this appeal followed.

Plaintiffs seek a reversal of the order and a remand for a new trial, contending that (1) the stipulation of liability necessarily implied that plaintiff was a passenger in the automobile and a miscarriage of justice resulted by submitting that issue to the jury; (2) defendant violated court rules by failing to name certain witnesses in answers to interrogatories prior to trial; (3) the jury question regarding liability was misleading; and (4) there was little opportunity to voir dire the jury.

I.

Plaintiffs' contend that their motion for a new trial should have been granted and a new trial ordered because defendant's stipulation of liability necessarily implied that plaintiff was a passenger and, thus, the verdict in favor of defendant was a miscarriage of justice under the law. We agree and reverse.

Preliminarily, it warrants mention that R. 4:49-1(a), which deals with motions for a new trial, provides:

A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and as to all or part of the issues on motion made to the trial judge. On a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the trial judge may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment. The trial judge shall grant the motion if, having given due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law.

In ruling on such a motion, the trial court's obligation is to determine whether

such verdict amounts, manifestly, to a miscarriage of justice. The resolution of this ... question is reposed in the courts. Respect for our constitutional system requires that this obligation be approached, in all contingencies, with utmost circumspection, lest the courts intrude upon responsibilities which have traditionally, intentionally and constitutionally been vested in a jury of citizens.

[Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co., 74 N.J. 588, 598, 379 A.2d 225 (1977).]

The legal standard of a "miscarriage of justice" has been described as

[a] pervading sense of "wrongness" needed to justify [an] appellate or trial judge undoing of a jury verdict ... "[which] can arise ... from manifest lack of inherently credible evidence to support the finding, obvious overlooking or underevaluation of crucial evidence, [or] a clearly unjust result...."

[Id. at 599, 379 A.2d 225 (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162, 199 A.2d 809 (1964)).]

Generally, a motion for a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Baumann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380, 389, 471 A.2d 395 (1984). However, such discretionary power cannot be exercised according to whim or caprice so as to be arbitrary, vague or fanciful, but must be governed by established principles of law and reason concerning whether justice requires that relief be given under the particular facts established in order to obtain a just result. State v. Bunk, 4 N.J. 482, 485, 73 A.2d 245 (1950); Brendel v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 28 N.J.Super. 500, 514, 101 A.2d 56 (App.Div.1953).

In Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 6, 258 A.2d 706 (1969), our Supreme...