Lindenmuth v. Lab. Corp.
| Decision Date | 19 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:15-cv-13368 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | JEFFREY T. LINDENMUTH Plaintiff, v. LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA, Defendant. |
Plaintiff Jeffrey Lindenmuth brings this action against Defendant Laboratory Corporation of America ("LabCorp") alleging wrongful discharge in violation of the West Virginia Human Rights Act ("WVHRA"). Before the Court is LabCorp's Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 40.) For the reasons discussed below, the motion is GRANTED.
This action arises out of a complaint brought by Plaintiff Lindenmuth in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia. (ECF No. 1-1.) According to the complaint, Mr. Lindenmuth worked as an employee for LabCorp from 1983 to August 22, 2013. (Id. at 5, ¶ 5.) On June 10, 2013, Mr. Lindenmuth underwent surgery to remove a tumor from his kidney. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 10.) He returned to work on July 13, 2013, and worked "on light duty" for approximately two weeks before resuming his employment at full capacity. (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.) Plaintiff contends that his termination from LabCorp on August 22, 2013, was based upon, in whole or in part, either "[his] disability, perceived disability, and/or being regarded as disabled" or his age, both in violation of the WVHRA and its accompanying regulations. (Id. at 6, ¶¶ 18-19.) See W. Va. Code §§ 5-11-1, 5-11-3, 5-11-9.
After Plaintiff filed his complaint in Kanawha County Circuit Court on August 19, 2015, (see ECF No. 1-1 at 4), LabCorp removed the case to this Court on September 22, 2015, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. (See ECF No. 1-6.) LabCorp filed this motion for summary judgment and memorandum in support of its motion on May 25, 2016. (See ECF No. 41.) Plaintiff responded to LabCorp's motion for summary judgment on June 8, 2016, (see ECF No. 42), and LabCorp filed its reply memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment on June 15, 2016. (ECF No. 44 at 1-2.) The motion is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits in the record show that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). If there exist factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a trier of fact because they may reasonably be determined in favor of either party, summary judgment is inappropriate. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). See also Pulliam Inv. Co., Inc. v. Cameo Props., 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23. Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmoving party has the burden of proof on an essential element of her case and does not make, after adequate time for discovery, a showing sufficient to establish that element. Id. Thenonmoving party may not avoid summary judgment "by submitting an affidavit that conflicts with earlier deposition testimony." Alba v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 198 Fed. App'x 288, 300 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 960 (4th Cir. 1984)). When determining whether there is an issue for trial, the Court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Mellen v. Brunting, 327 F.3d 355, 363 (4th Cir. 2003). The nonmoving party may not rest on the pleadings alone and must show that specific material facts exist by offering more than a mere "scintilla of evidence" in support of his position. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
The claims put forth in Plaintiff's complaint arise under the WVHRA. Under the WVHRA, no employer may "discriminate against an individual with respect to compensation, hire, tenure, terms, conditions or privileges of employment if the individual is able and competent to perform the services required even if such individual is blind or disabled." W Va. Code § 5-11-9(1). It is unlawful "to exclude from, or fail or refuse to extend to, a person equal opportunities," based on several protected classes, including disability and age.1 § 5-11-3(h). "Disability" is defined within the Act as "[a] mental or physical impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities," including "caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working," or "[b]eing regarded as having such an impairment." § 5-11-3(m)(1), (3).
The WVHRA, like other state laws, is often analyzed under its federal equivalents—the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act("ADEA"), among others. See, e.g., Hosaflook v. Consolidation Coal Co., 497 S.E.2d 174, 181 n.10 (W. Va. 1997) (). This state statute "often correspond[s] with—but sometimes stray[s] from" the federal counterparts. Calef v. FedEx Ground Packaging Sys., Inc., 343 F. App'x 891, 897 (4th Cir. 2009). While federal cases interpreting the ADA may be helpful in understanding the WVHRA,2 see Andrew O. v. Racing Corp. of W. Va., No. 12-1255, 2013 WL 3184641, at *6 (W. Va. June 24, 2013), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has noted that the WVHRA "represents an independent approach to the law of disability discrimination that is not mechanically tied to federal disability discrimination jurisprudence." Stone v. St. Joseph's Hosp. of Parkersburg, 538 S.E.2d 389, 404 (W. Va. 2000). But see id. at 408-10 (Scott, J., concurring) ().
The Court will begin with an analysis of Plaintiff's claim that he was wrongfully discharged because of his disability. Then, it will consider the Plaintiff's claim of age discrimination. Lastly, it will address the remaining argument within the parties' pleadings that the employer's stated reason for terminating Plaintiff is simply a pretext for either disability and/orage discrimination. To survive summary judgment on his claims, Plaintiff must produce more than a "mere scintilla of evidence" to support a finding that he was wrongfully discharged due to disability or age discrimination.
Plaintiff's first claim rests on the assertion that his termination "was based upon, in whole or in part, on [his] disability, perceived disability, and/or being regarded as disabled in violation of the WVHRA and its accompanying regulations." (ECF No. 1-1 at 3, ¶ 18.) To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the WVHRA, Plaintiff must show that (1) he meets the definition of "disabled" within the law's meaning; (2) he is a "qualified disabled person"; and (3) he was discharged from his job. See, e.g., Hosaflook, 497 S.E.2d at 178-79.
As noted above, the WVHRA provides a three-prong definition of "disability." The Plaintiff must establish either that he suffered from "[a] mental or physical impairment" substantially limiting one or more of his major life activities, including working; that a record of such an impairment exists; or that he was "regarded as having such an impairment" by his employer. See § 5-11-3(m)(1)-(3). This Court has previously distilled the three-part definition down to its essence: (1) the plaintiff "has a physical or mental impairment substantially limiting one or more major life activities (disabled in fact); or (2) is either correctly or incorrectly regarded as having an impairment and/or substantial limitation (regarded as disabled)." Ruckel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 652, 655 (S.D.W. Va. 2003) (quoting Stone, 538 S.E.2d at 392) (emphasis added). In this case, however, Mr. Lindenmuth concedes that he did not have a disability in fact. (See ECF No. 40-1 at 70 ().) His claim rests on the argument that LabCorp regarded him as disabled. (See ECF No. 42 at 3-7 (
Even if a plaintiff does not claim a disability in fact, he or she may proceed under the premise that the defendant employer regarded him or her as being disabled, whether or not the employer's belief was correct. See Ruckel, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 655. For purposes of the WVHRA, an employee is "regarded as disabled" if the employer treats him or her "as a person who should not be entrusted with the duties of his [or her] regular job." See Garvin v. World Color Printing (USA) II Corp., No. 3:10-CV-74, 2011 WL 1485998, at *9 (N.D.W. Va. Apr. 19, 2011) (citing Stone, 538 S.E.2d at 406; Calef, 343 Fed. App'x at 897). Because the WVHRA protects employees "who are discriminatorily treated as having" the disability, id. (quoting Stone, 538 S.E.2d at 407 n.25) (emphasis in original), this "regarded as" prong relies on an objective test that focuses on the employer's behavior rather than the subjective motivation behind the behavior. See id.
A "qualified disabled person" is one who is able "to perform essential functions of the job" whether or not he requires reasonable accommodation. Skaggs v. Elk Run Coal Co., Inc., 479 S.E.2d 561, 573-74 (W. Va. 1996). See also W. Va. Code § 5-11-9. An employee with a totally disabling condition rendering him or her temporarily unable to fulfill...
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