Lindl v. Ozanne

Decision Date01 September 1978
Docket NumberNo. 77-502,77-502
Citation270 N.W.2d 249,85 Wis.2d 424
PartiesRichard J. LINDL and Helen B. Lindl, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Ward OZANNE, Jr., and Elizabeth Ozanne, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtWisconsin Court of Appeals

Vaudreuil & Vaudreuil, Kenosha, for appellants.

Donald J. Bauhs, Kenosha, for respondents.

Before VOSS, P. J., and BROWN and BODE, JJ.

VOSS, Presiding Judge.

This is a suit in adverse possession between the owners of adjacent farm land. Judgment was entered granting title through adverse possession in the disputed parcel to Richard and Helen Lindl (Lindls). Ward and Elizabeth Ozanne (Ozannes) appeal.

The Lindls brought suit to establish title through adverse possession for more than twenty years not founded upon a written instrument under sec. 893.10(2), Stats. The parcel in dispute is located on the western edge of the Lindls' property. The Ozannes have record title to the parcel as part of their farm which is to the north of west of the Lindl property.

The parties stipulated to their respective chains of title. In 1937 both farms were owned by Charles and Cinda Dorey. The land which is now the Ozanne farm, including the disputed parcel, was transferred in 1937 to Minnie Ozanne in satisfaction of a mortgage held by her on the entire Dorey farm. Shortly thereafter, she erected a fence around her property but failed to include the disputed 0.45 acre parcel within it. The disputed parcel thus remained attached to the Doreys' property. Minnie transferred her land to Donald and Eldora Ozanne in 1947. The current owners, Ward and Elizabeth Ozanne, acquired the farm from Donald and Eldora in 1957. The Lindls acquired their farm in 1972 from the Doreys' heirs who had acquired it six months earlier from the estate. The fence remained in place throughout these transfers, but the Lindls' deed specifically excluded the land transferred to Minnie Ozanne in 1937. At all relevant times, the disputed parcel was rented and farmed by Leverett Leet (Leet) along with the land to which the Doreys retained title.

Sec. 893.08, Stats., provides:

Extent of possession not founded on writing, judgment etc. When there has been an actual continued occupation of any premises under a claim of title, exclusive of any other right, but not founded upon any written instrument or any judgment or decree, the premises so actually occupied, and no other, shall be deemed to be held adversely.

Sec. 893.09, Stats., provides:

Adverse possession, what is. For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by a person claiming title, not founded upon some written instrument or some judgment or decree, land shall be deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases only:

(1) When it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.

(2) When it has been usually cultivated or improved.

The trial court found that the disputed parcel had been protected by a substantial inclosure and that it had been cultivated for more than twenty years by the Doreys' and the Lindls' tenant. The court concluded that the Lindls had thereby established their title in the parcel pursuant to sec. 893.10(2), Stats., which provides:

(2) Any person who in connection with his predecessor in title has been in the uninterrupted adverse possession of any land for 10 years under a conveyance recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the county where land lies, or who has been in such possession for 20 years, otherwise than under such conveyance, may commence and maintain an action to establish his title against any defects claimed to exist. . . .

The issues raised are 1) whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings and 2) whether it was proper to tack the Doreys' possession onto that of the Lindls to establish the requisite twenty years of adverse possession.

The first issue is readily disposed of. The Ozannes offered no testimony and introduced only the deed to Minnie Ozanne and the final judgment of the Dorey estate. The Lindls readily conceded that these established record title to the parcel in the Ozannes. The testimony of Leet and Lindl established that the fence had been erected in 1937 and was not removed until November 1975, and that Leet had rented and cultivated the parcel throughout this period. No adverse claim was made by the Ozannes or their predecessors until November 1975.

Where adjacent landowners have openly used land up to a fence which has been regarded as the true line between their properties for at least twenty years, the general rule is that title to any land between the fence and the true line is established by adverse possession. Northwoods Development Corp. v. Klement, 24 Wis.2d 387, 392, 129 N.W.2d 121, 123 (1964); Weise v. Swersinske, 265 Wis. 258, 261, 61 N.W.2d 312, 313 (1953); Menzner v. Tracy, 247 Wis. 245, 251-52, 19 N.W.2d 257, 260 (1945). Adverse possession is found where the beneficiary of the discrepancy only intended to claim up to the true line as long as he claimed up to the fence and did not condition his claim on the correspondence of the fence with the true line. Northwoods Development, 24 Wis.2d at 395-96, 129 N.W.2d at 124-25. The testimony of both Leet and Lindl indicates that they were ignorant of the discrepancy between the fence and the true line but that they regarded the fence as the true line and that rent was paid accordingly. Therefore, these facts are sufficient to establish continuous, open, notorious and adverse use within the meaning of sec. 893.08 and 893.09, Stats.

The remaining question concerns the propriety of tacking the Doreys' possession onto that of the Lindls' in order to satisfy sec. 893.10(2), Stats. The acts of possession of Leet, as tenant, are deemed to be those of the Doreys and the Lindls, as landlords, for purposes of establishing adverse possession. Sec. 893.11, Stats.; Polanski v. Town of Eagle Point, 30 Wis.2d 507, 514, 141 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1966). The adverse possession of predecessors in title may be tacked on to satisfy the twenty year requirement even though the disputed parcel was not included in the metes and bounds description of the deed if Possession of the parcel was transferred. Mielke v. Dodge, 135 Wis. 388, 115 N.W. 1099 (1908); Illinois Steel Co. v. Budzisz, 106 Wis. 499, 81 N.W. 1027, 82 N.W. 534 (1900). The continued occupation of the parcel by Leet and the payment of rent to the Lindls following their purchase from the Dorey heirs is sufficient evidence of a transfer of that possession.

None of the above cases, however, involved a situation like that presented here where the adverse possession to be tacked onto the Lindls' possession is that of the grantor of the Ozannes' predecessor in title. The trial court concluded that a grantor can assert adverse possession against his grantee. Although adverse possession by a grantor has not been found by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, we confirm the trial court's conclusion.

The general rule was stated a century ago in Brinkman v. Jones, 44 Wis. 498 (1878) where the court stated:

There would seem to be no good reason why the possession of a grantor may not be hostile to his deed, provided it be such as to give his grantee notice that he claims in hostility to his grant; nor why such hostile possession may not ripen into an adverse and perfect title, and bar the grantee from recovering the possession under the statute of limitations. The cases last above cited decide that a grantor may hold so adversely against his grantee. We have no doubt of the justice of the rule as stated by the counsel for the respondent, when the occupation has continued but a short time after the date of the deed, or when, though continued for a longer time, it is not inconsistent with the title purporting...

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9 cases
  • Torgerson v. Rose
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • October 3, 1983
    ...(Ala.1978); Steele v. Steele, 214 Ark. 500, 216 S.W.2d 875 (1949); Hood v. Denny, 555 S.W.2d 337 (Mo.Ct.App.1977); Lindl v. Ozanne, 85 Wis.2d 424, 270 N.W.2d 249 (1978); Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 353 (1955); 3 Am.Jur.2d, Adverse Possession, Sec. 163 (1962); 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession Sec. 133(a)......
  • Keller v. Morfeld, 97-3443
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Court of Appeals
    • October 15, 1998
    ...period, the adverse possession of predecessors in title may be "tacked on" to that of the present claimant. Lindl v. Ozanne, 85 Wis.2d 424, 428, 270 N.W.2d 249, 251 (Ct.App.1978). The Morfelds do not dispute the fact that the Kellers adversely possessed the disputed area after 1987. The onl......
  • Manthei v. Achille, 92-1665
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Court of Appeals
    • April 20, 1993
    ...their properties for at least twenty years, the party using the property has established adverse possession. Lindl v. Ozanne, 85 Wis.2d 424, 427, 270 N.W.2d 249, 250 (Ct.App.1978). This rule applies even when the fence is dilapidated. Klinefelter v. Dutch, 161 Wis.2d 28, 35-36, 467 N.W.2d 1......
  • Gregor v. Paugels Jr.
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    • Wisconsin Court of Appeals
    • December 22, 1999
    ...that pass over property to which Paugels held record title. See id. at 701, 580 N.W.2d at 358; see also Lindl v. Ozanne, 85 Wis.2d 424, 428, 270 N.W.2d 249, 251 (Ct. App. 1978) (tenant's period of possession accrues to the landlord for adverse possession purposes);Perpignani v. Vonasek, 139......
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