Lindley v. Groff

• Decision Date: 30 July 1887
• Citation: Lindley v. Groff, 37 Minn. 338, 34 N. W. 26 (Minn. 1887)
• Parties: LINDLEY v GROFF AND OTHERS.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

37 Minn. 338

34 N.W. 26

LINDLEYvGROFF AND OTHERS.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 30, 1887.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Where a deed as made runs to two grantees jointly, and one only enters into actual possession, such possession is not to be deemed adverse to the other joint owner or his heirs, until an ouster or the assertion of some hostile claim denoting an intention to hold adversely.¹

The statute does not run against the rights of reversioners pending an intervening life-estate.

In construing a contract, the intention of the parties as gathered from the whole instrument must control. And though in one part formal and apt words of conveyance be used, yet if, from other parts of the writing, taken and compared together, it appears that a mere agreement for a conveyance is all that was intended, this intent must prevail.

Where, in pursuance of the terms of an executory contract for the sale of land, a deed is executed by the vendor, and deposited in escrow with a third person, to be delivered to the vendee on the performance by the latter of certain conditions, as specified in such contract, the general rule is that the title does not pass to the grantee, until after the performance of the condition. But in some cases justice or necessity may require the application of a different rule to prevent the operation of the deed from being defeated. And so, if either of the parties die before the condition is performed, and such condition is nevertheless subsequently performed as stipulated, the deed is good and will take effect from the first delivery.²

Appeal from district court, Hennepin county.

Action to determine the adverse claims of defendants to certain real property in said county. The facts appear in the opinion. The cause was tried before YOUNG, J., without a jury, and judgment directed to be entered for plaintiff. From an order denying a new trial, defendants Charles R. Groff, Maria Groff, and Emily Lane appeal. Smith & Reed, for Groff and others, appellants.

Gillfillan, Belden & Willard, for Lindley, respondent.

VANDERBURGH, J.

The plaintiff alleges actual possession of the real estate described, and asks that the adverse claim of defendants be determined. The defendants' answer admits plaintiff's possession and sets up title in fee to an undivided interest therein, derived from their ancestor, A. G. Groff, deceased. The evidence shows that the plaintiff claims title under E. A. Groff, also deceased. Before the decease of A. G. Groff, he and E. A. Groff entered into a contract with one Decker, who then owned the property, for the purchase thereof, for the sum of $400. This contract, which was dated March 27, 1863, and duly recorded, provided for the execution of a deed of the premises, and the delivery thereof within 12 months from the date of the contract, and that the vendor should cause a certain mortgage thereon to be canceled of record within that time; and the vendees on their part covenanted to pay $25, at the date of the contract, and the balance of the purchase price on the cancellation of the mortgage and the delivery of the deed, and were to have immediate possession. Within the year, A. G. Groff died intestate. Previous to his death, however, Decker, who was a non-resident, had executed a deed of the premises which bore date March 28, 1863, and ran to both A. G. Groff and E. A. Groff, as grantees, and was by him forwarded to one S. D. Snell, who was the agent and attorney in fact of Decker in the matter of the sale. It was received by the latter more than six months before the death of A. G. Groff. The evidence tends to show that it was sent to him by Decker to be delivered to the vendees named in the contract, and in pursuance thereof, and upon fulfillment of the conditions therein, and that the delivery thereof to them by him was delayed solely by the fact that the mortgage referred to in the contract was not sooner canceled of record, though it had been paid long before. Upon its cancellation, subsequent to A. G. Groff's death, and the payment of the purchase money, which was advanced by E. A. Groff, the deed was delivered to him, in fulfillment of the contract. A. G. Groff left him surviving his widow, Catharine C. Groff, his mother, and other heirs. E. A. Groff purchased and procured an assignment of the interest of Catharine C. Groff in the contract, and lands therein mentioned, as a representative and heir at law of A. G. Groff, and went into possession of the premises, which he continued to occupy until his death in 1871. And thereafter they were sold as his property, under direction of the probate court, by his executor, and subsequently purchased by the plaintiff, who received a deed therefor in 1873, and has since been in the actual possession.

1. Under the deed in question, E. A. Groff acquired title to an undivided half of the premises, and was entitled to the possession thereof as tenant in common. His possession was not, therefore, adverse to the owners of the remaining interest. There is no evidence tending to show an ouster and adverse possession until the sale and purchase under which plaintiff claims. Lowry v. Tilleny, 31 Minn. 302, 18 N. W. Rep. 452. If by virtue of the contract, and the delivery of the deed thereunder, the legal title to the other undivided half, by fiction of law, became vested in the heirs of A. G. Groff, then Catharine C. Groff, under the existing statutes, was entitled to a life-estate, and the transfer of her interest in the contract and premises, as heir at law, simply passed such life-estate in the premises, and there was and could be no adverse possession as to the remaining heirs. 1 Washb. Real Prop. *97; 7 Wait, Act. & Def. 258, and cases. The statute of limitations cannot, therefore, be invoked in this action as a bar to the defendants' legal rights in the property, if any they have.

2. It is contended by the defendant's counsel that the contract was by itself operative and effectual to pass the title to the Groffs, because by its terms it purports to grant and sell the same in prœsenti. But the intention of the parties must be gathered from the whole instrument, and though it may in one part...