Lindquist v. City of Pasadena, Tex.

Decision Date10 September 2009
Docket NumberCivil Action No. H-06-1975.
Citation656 F.Supp.2d 662
PartiesJames and Sandra LINDQUIST, Plaintiffs, v. The CITY OF PASADENA, TEXAS, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

David Alfred Kahne, Attorney at Law, Houston, TX, for Plaintiffs.

William Scott Helfand, Charles T. Jeremiah, Chamberlain Hrdlicka et. al., Houston, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION

LEE H. ROSENTHAL, District Judge.

James and Sandra Lindquist sued the City of Pasadena, Texas, challenging the City Council's denial of their appeal from the City's refusal of their application for a license to operate a used-car sales lot on property they owned. The City Council denied the appeal under a municipal ordinance requiring used-car lot operators to have a license. The ordinance required each newly licensed lot to be located a certain distance away from an existing licensed lot and from residential areas or subdivisions. The Lindquists alleged that the denial of their license-application appeal violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Texas Constitutions. The alleged equal protection violation was based on their claim that they were a "class of one" and that the City had intentionally and arbitrarily treated them differently from other, similarly situated appellants. The City moved to dismiss the Lindquists' original complaint for failure to state a claim. (Docket Entry No. 9). This court granted the City's motion, holding that the Lindquists failed to state a class-of-one equal protection claim in the absence of any allegation that the City's actions were motivated by "illegitimate animus or ill will." (Docket Entry No. 22). The Lindquists acknowledged that their lot did not meet the ordinance distance requirements and did not qualify for a license. They alleged that while the City enforced the ordinance's distance requirements against them, the City did not enforce the requirements against other used-car lot license applicants whose property also failed to comply. This court dismissed the equal protection claim, relying on Fifth Circuit precedent requiring a plaintiff making selective-enforcement allegations to plead that "an illegitimate animus or ill will motivated [its] intentionally different treatment from others similarly situated and that no rational basis existed for such treatment." See Shipp v. McMahon, 234 F.3d 907, 916 (5th Cir.2000), overruled on other grounds by McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 328-29 (5th Cir.2002) (per curiam). This court dismissed the due process claim because it simply recast the equal protection claim in substantive due process terms. (Docket Entry No. 22). Finally, this court dismissed the "unbridled discretion" claim because the ordinance set out the criteria for City officials to use in deciding whether an applicant is entitled to a license and for City Council to use in deciding an appeal. (Id.).

The Fifth Circuit upheld the dismissal of all the Lindquists' claims except the class-of-one equal protection claim. See Lindquist v. City of Pasadena, 525 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir.2008). Citing a case distinguishing between a claim arising from "the denial of zoning permits" and a claim arising from selective enforcement of ordinances or other laws in the class-of-one context, Mikeska v. City of Galveston, 451 F.3d 376 (5th Cir.2006), the Fifth Circuit held that the Lindquists' equal protection claim did not sound in selective enforcement but rather challenged an adverse zoning decision. Lindquist, 525 F.3d at 387. Under Mikeska, a class-of-one plaintiff challenging the denial of a zoning permit need not allege ill will or impermissible animus, but must show a lack of a rational basis. A class-of-one plaintiff challenging a license denial on the basis of a selectively enforced ordinance must allege ill will or animus as well as the lack of a rational basis to state a claim. Mikeska, 451 F.3d at 381. The Fifth Circuit cautioned that although dismissal for failure to allege ill will or animus was not warranted, on remand, to "prevail on the [class-of-one] claim, the Lindquists must carry the heavy burden of `negativing any reasonably conceivable set of facts that could provide a rational basis' for their differential treatment." Lindquist, 525 F.3d at 387.

Following remand, the parties engaged in discovery. After discovery ended, the Lindquists moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the City has a policy or custom of using unbridled discretion in deciding appeals from license denials, making the ordinance unconstitutional because the City does not consistently apply the licensing requirements and "mal-administers" licensing appeals. The Lindquists seek damages and an injunction directing the City to issue them an unrestricted license to sell used cars at the lot they own. (Docket Entry No. 55). The City responded, (Docket Entry No. 65), and the Lindquists replied, (Docket Entry No. 68). The City argues that the dismissal of the Lindquists' unbridled-discretion claim was affirmed on appeal; that only the class-of-one equal protection claim remains for this court to consider; and that as a matter of law, the City is entitled to summary judgment dismissing that claim. The City moved for summary judgment, asserting that based on the undisputed facts in the record, the Lindquists have failed to meet their "heavy burden" to show no rational basis for the denial of their appeal from the City's refusal to issue a license while other appeals were granted. (Docket Entry No. 59). The Lindquists responded, (Docket Entry No. 67), the City replied, (Docket Entry No. 69), and filed a supplemental reply, (Docket Entry No. 71).

Based on a careful review of the motions, responses, and replies, the record, and the applicable law, this court denies the Lindquists' partial summary judgment motion and grants the City's summary judgment motion. Final judgment is issued by separate order. The reasons for these rulings are explained in detail below.

I. Background

The Lindquists are residents of Pasadena, Texas. They have a dealer's license to sell used cars. For the last fifteen years, they have operated a dealership known as "Professional Auto" at 2602 Preston Road in Pasadena. Their business experience was not a factor in the license denial at issue in this case. The City's former Planning Director, Tim Tietjens, testified in his deposition that he was not aware of any "issue with the Lindquists that would taint their image or reputation in the community." (Docket Entry No. 55, Ex. B, Deposition of Tim Tietjens, at 18-19).

By 2003, the City of Pasadena had more than eighty licensed used-car dealerships. (Docket Entry No. 59, Ex. A). The City's Motor Vehicle Dealers Ordinance was amended in 2003 to require used-car dealers to obtain a license for each location at which they sell cars. The amended ordinance was intended to curb the growth of new used-car dealerships. PASADENA, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 22, art. II, § 22-1 et seq. (2003). The preamble to the amendment states that it was passed "to implement standards to govern and promote the conservation and stabilization of property values, provide adequate open space for natural light and air, lessen congestion on streets and highways, serve the needs of the motoring public and minimize impacts on lesser intensity uses." (Docket Entry No. 59, Ex. B). The preamble explains the City's desire to "avoid and mitigate the secondary effects" associated with car dealerships that are "detrimental to the public health, safety, and welfare." (Id.). These effects include "nighttime glare and light pollution impacting adjacent residential communities; thermal heat gain due to expansive parking and display area needs; production of point and nonpoint source pollution which flows into storm water systems of the City, and eventually discharges in the natural waterways; [and] the need for protection of motor vehicle dealers and the public from undesirable criminal elements trafficking in the dismantling and conveying of stolen vehicles and/or parts thereof." (Id.). The City Council concluded that the licensing of each used-car dealership location would enable the City to further the purposes and goals of the ordinance.

The amended ordinance requires a newly licensed used-car lot location to be a minimum distance from any currently licensed car dealership and from any residential area or subdivision. The relevant ordinance provisions are as follows:

Each new license location is required to be a minimum of one thousand (1,000) feet from any existing license location as measured from nearest property line to nearest property line.

PASADENA, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 22, art. II, § 22-22(c) (16) (2003) (the "1,000-foot rule").

There shall not be issued a new license for the operation of a used car lot within one hundred fifty (150) feet of the lot lines of a residential area or subdivision.

Id. § 22-22(c)(4) (the "150-foot rule"). A grandfather clause permits a license to issue even if the 1,000-foot or the 150-foot rules are not met if certain conditions are shown, including that the dealership has been operating at the same location and continuously licensed for a minimum period, with no more than a sixty-day interruption of sales activity. The 1,000-foot rule provision also allows licenses for selling "classic" cars on a lot that falls under the rule, even if the applicant's lot does not meet the ordinance distance criteria.

Under the ordinance, a used-car dealership license application is first reviewed by a City building official. If that official denies the application, the applicant may appeal to the City Council. Id. § 22-29. The appeal provision states:

The hearing before the council shall be de novo and the applicant shall have the burden of proving that he is...

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