Lindquist v. Friedman's, Inc.

• Decision Date: 02 June 1937
• Docket Number: No. 23914.,23914.
• Citation: 366 Ill. 232,8 N.E.2d 625
• Parties: LINDQUIST et al. v. FRIEDMAN'S, Inc., et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

366 Ill. 232

8 N.E.2d 625

LINDQUIST et al.

v.FRIEDMAN'S, Inc., et al.

No. 23914.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 16, 1937.

Rehearing Denied June 2, 1937.

Action by Edith C. Lindquist and another against Friedman's, Inc., and another. From a judgment of the Appellate Court (285 Ill.App. 71, 1 N.E. (2d) 529), affirming judgments for the plaintiffs, the defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

WILSON and JONES, JJ., dissenting.Appeal from First Division, Appellate Court, First District, on appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; E. I. Frankhauser, Judge.

Max M. & Samuel Grossman, of Chicago (Sid Mogul, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.

Schofield & Wood, of Chicago (Frank Schofield and David H. Kraft, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.

FARTHING, Justice.

Edith C. Lindquist and Agnes Lindstrom, the appellees, sued the appellants in the superior court of Cook county for damages for false arrest and imprisonment. Each of them obtained a verdict for $1,000. Each of them remitted $250, and two judgments were rendered, each for $750. The Appellate Court for the First District affirmed the judgments and issued a certificate of importance which is the basis of this appeal.

Edith C. Lindquist had been employed by the United States government in the internal revenue office in Chicago, but was not working at the time of the alleged imprisonment. She, her brother, and their niece, Agnes Lindstrom, a stenographer employed by the Fleishman Transportation Company, lived five or six blocks from the appellants' store in Chicago. Agnes Lindstrom had been a customer of this company for about 14 years and had a nodding acquaintance with the appellant Maurice Friedman, the president of the Friedman's, Inc. Appellees went to the store on March 24, 1934, shortly after 3 o'clock in the afternoon. They paid $2 for some silk at one counter and had made a $3.74 purchase at another, whereupon Agnes Lindstrom tendered a $5 bill which, upon examination, the clerk pronounced a counterfeit. The clerk took this bill to the cashier and to Maurice Friedman, who came over to where appellees were. He told them the bill was counterfeit, that he had notified the police, and that appellees would have to wait there until the officers came. Two officers in uniform arrived 10 or 15 minutes later and were conducted to the counter where appellees were still standing. Meantime Agnes Lindstrom had paid the $3.74 to the clerk. After a few questions the officers took appellees to Friedman's office in the rear of the store, where appellees were questioned further and were told that they would have to go to the police station. The officers then took them to the police station in a squad car. Friedman went to the station in his own automobile. At the station the officers interrogated appellees further and notified the federal office in charge of investigating counterfeiting. They also informed Miss Lindstrom's employer that she was being held at the police station charged with passing a counterfeit bill. Shortly after two federal investigators came and, after talking with appellees, released them.

Agnes Lindstrom testified that about 10 days earlier she had deposited part of her salary in the Harris Trust & Savings Bank, and that she had about $20 in her purse when she went to appellants' store on March 24, 1934. After telling the facts, above related, concerning the two purchases, she said appellant Maurice Friedman came over to her, with the $5 bill in his hand and said, ‘I have called the police. You will have to wait here.’ She said Friedman stood near the appellees until the two officers came and that there were several customers in the store during this time. She told of their all going back to Friedman's office, of being questioned by the officers as to where she and her aunt lived and where they were employed, and that Friedman said they would have to go with the officers to the police station. The officers also said appellees must go to the stationand talk to the lieutenant. Appellee Lindstrom asked Friedman if they would go in his car or with the officers and he replied that they would have to go with the officers. She told of being questioned at the station by the police lieutenant, the calling of the federal officers and her employer, and of being finally permitted to go home. The testimony of Edith C. Lindquist was similar to that of Miss Lindstrom. Both testified that they were greatly embarrassed at the time and were made nervous for a considerable time thereafter.

Appellants' witness Irene Gutch testified that she was the clerk who waited on Miss Lindstrom. She stated that Mr. Friedman came over to the counter and said to Miss Lindstrom, ‘I am sorry, madam, but we cannot accept this bill, because it is a counterfeit. The only thing we can do is turn it over to the authorities.’ He then told another employee to call the police and walked away from appellees. Appellees stood at the counter until the police came about 10 minutes later. Mr. Friedman then suggested that they all go into his office. This witness stated that she was not employed by defendants at the time of the trial, and was not acquainted with appellees, although she had worked in the store for about 3 years.

Appellants' witness Thomas Cleary, one of the police officers, recounted the circumstances already set out surrounding the arrest and detention of appellees and stated that one of the appellees told him she got the bill at the Continental Bank, but that she could have received it at a millinery store where she had bought a hat. He said they took appellees into Friedman's private office because customers in the store wanted to listen to the conversation.

The testimony of other witnesses is substantially the same as that detailed above. Appellees are conceded to be law-abiding citizens and no wrongful intent is imputed to them in connection with the passing of the spurious bill.

We cannot agree with appellants in their contention that appellees were not falsely arrested and imprisoned by or at the instigation of appellants. In our state a citizen is not permitted to take the law into his own hands and to arrest another upon suspicion or even upon probable cause. Where a citizen has knowledge that a crime had been committed it is his duty to make a complaint before a magistrate and in his complaint the should state that the particular crime has been committed and he may state, on information and belief, that the person named is the offender. The magistrate thereupon issues his warrant for the arrest of the accused. That course affords protection to the person making complaint, the arresting officer, and the person arrested. To permit a private citizen, without observing the formal requirements enumerated, to become a self-constituted officer and jailer upon mere suspicion of the guilt of the accused person, or even upon probable cause to believe such person guilty, would result in more and greater evils than the possible escape of the few guilty persons occasioned by delay in obtaining warrants and officers to serve them. Enright v. Gibson, 219 Ill. 550, 554, 76 N.E 689;Dodds v. Board, 43 Ill. 95. It is not necessary in a false imprisonment case to prove that the defendant used physical violence or laid hands on the plaintiff, but it is sufficient to show that at any time or place the defendant in any manner restrained the plaintiff of his liberty without sufficient legal authority. People v. McGurn, 341 Ill. 632, 173 N.E. 754;People v. Scalisi, 324 Ill. 131, 154 N.E. 715;Hawk v. Ridgway, 33 Ill. 473; 1 Cooley on Torts (4th Ed.) § 109. Although there is some contrariety in the testimony as to the details of...