Lindsay v. Lindsay

Citation303 So.3d 770
Decision Date07 April 2020
Docket NumberNO. 2018-CA-00370-COA,2018-CA-00370-COA
Parties Bruce D. LINDSAY, Appellant v. Paula E. LINDSAY and Christy Pickering, CPA, Appellees
CourtMississippi Court of Appeals

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: REED STANTON BENNETT, Gulfport

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: TIMOTHY LEE MURR, Gulfport, THOMAS WRIGHT TEEL, RUSSELL SCOTT MANNING, Biloxi, NICHOLAS VAN WISER

BEFORE J. WILSON, P.J., GREENLEE AND LAWRENCE, JJ.

LAWRENCE, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. This acrimonious divorce case involves Bruce Lindsay and Paula Lindsay. In 2014, Paula filed her complaint for divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, and Bruce filed an answer along with a motion for temporary relief. On June 13, 2014, the court held a temporary-relief hearing, where the chancellor issued a bench ruling ordering both parties to "keep everything status quo." But a written order was not entered until October 3, 2016. It was that ruling that later resulted in Bruce being held in contempt on October 19, 2017, and ordered to be incarcerated until he "purged" himself of that contempt.

¶2. On November 1, 2017, the court held a hearing on Bruce's contempt, and Bruce was transported from jail to the hearing. During that hearing, Bruce agreed to the terms of a property settlement agreement as part of the divorce. Paula also testified as to Bruce's habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. At the close of the hearing, the court granted Paula's request for a divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and incorporated the parties' stipulated property settlement agreement. The court further ordered Bruce to pay all of Paula's attorney's fees and the court-appointed certified public accountant (CPA) Christy Pickering's expert fees and her attorney fees.1

¶3. On appeal, Bruce raises six issues. Because we find four of those issues to be dispositive, we limit our discussion to the following: (1) whether the contempt order was too vague to enforce; (2) whether there was sufficient proof for the chancellor to grant a divorce judgment on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment; (3) whether the court erred in ordering Bruce to pay Pickering's full expert fees and her attorney's fees; and (4) whether the court erred in ordering Bruce to pay Paula's attorney's fees. After review, we reverse the chancery court's contempt order and divorce judgment, set aside the property settlement agreement, reverse the chancery court's order that Bruce pay all the court-appointed expert's fees and attorney's fees and Paula's attorney's fees, and remand this case to the chancery court further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶4. Bruce and Paula married in 2000. They have one child together, who was born in 2001. On January 3, 2014, Bruce and Paula separated. Paula filed her complaint for divorce on January 22, 2014, on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment or, in the alternative, irreconcilable differences. Shortly thereafter, Bruce filed his answer to the complaint for divorce and at the same time filed a motion for temporary relief. On April 25, 2014, Bruce propounded numerous requests for admissions to Paula. Paula did not respond to those requests until October 4, 2016, and only then in an effort to defeat a motion for summary judgment that Bruce had filed.

¶5. On June 13, 2014, Judge Sandy Steckler presided over a hearing on the issue of temporary relief.2 Both parties sought both the use and possession of the marital home and custody of the minor child.3 Numerous exhibits were introduced at the hearing, including Paula's Rule 8.05 financial statement,4 Paula's tax information from 2010, 2011, and 2012, and Bruce's Rule 8.05 financial statement. Paula's Rule 8.05 financial statement disclosed that her total monthly income was $0.5 She testified that she was wholly dependent on Bruce for financial support. Paula also testified that she was the child's primary care giver. Bruce's Rule 8.05 financial statement disclosed that his total gross monthly income was $12,563.09. But his net income was $10,260. Further, Bruce's Rule 8.05 financial statement showed that he was responsible for nearly all of the couple's expenses, namely the mortgage, home maintenance, utility bills, groceries, household expenses, and child expenses. Bruce listed his total monthly expenses as $14,783.82. Bruce testified that he served as the president of Coast Management Systems LLC, a management company for various trucking companies. At the close of the hearing, Judge Steckler issued a bench ruling, ordering that Paula have temporary sole custody of the minor child and temporary use and possession of the marital home.6 Judge Steckler further stated that Bruce was "to continue paying everything that he's paying now. I want him to keep everything status quo." Despite the bench ruling, no written temporary order was ever entered. A new judge took over the case, and, on October 3, 2016, he entered a written temporary order.

¶6. On October 9, 2014, the court entered an order appointing CPA Christy Pickering as the court's expert. The court appointed Pickering to investigate "the various companies and trust that the husband has some interest in and also the soap company and the film company that the wife has some interest in [and] determine the value of the companies and the parties' interest in those companies for court purposes in a divorce." The court explained that "both parties believe the other party is making more money than reported; therefore, the Court directs that both parties' financial information about the companies should be transparent and forthright through discovery and through the work of the forensic expert."

¶7. On January 26, 2015, Pickering sent letters to Bruce's attorney requesting documentation from twelve companies in which he held an alleged financial interest. Between May 11, 2015 and May 21, 2015, twenty-four subpoenas duces tecum were issued to the respective companies, requesting specific financial documents. On May 29, 2015, attorney Michael Holleman filed a special appearance, motion to quash and for a protective order, and other relief on behalf of all twelve companies. The companies denied that Bruce held any financial interest in two of the companies and also claimed that Pickering had exhibited bias against Bruce and the companies and that her investigation had been tainted by the use of "illegally obtained data" from Paula's attorney. On June 10, 2015, Pickering sent a letter to Judge Steckler denying the allegations set forth in the companies' motion. Pickering also hired an attorney to defend her against those allegations.

¶8. On July 15 and July 16, 2015, the court held a hearing on the motion to quash and heard partial testimony from both sides. Thereafter, the court determined that Bruce "serve[d] as president of the nineteen to twenty businesses, both limited liability companies (LLCs) and corporations." The court further determined that Bruce has a financial interest in several of the LLCs or corporations individually and that all the businesses function in a group. Ultimately, the court held in abeyance its decision on the motion to quash pending final testimony from both sides. In the meantime, the court ordered Pickering, Holleman, Bruce's attorney, and Paula's attorney to go to each business, download any and all electronic data, make copies of any physical records requested by Pickering, and take the information to the chancery clerk's office for safe storage.

¶9. On August 17, 2015, Bruce and Holleman, on behalf of the companies, filed a joint motion for recusal of Judge Steckler as a result of comments the judge made at the previous hearing. On September 10, 2015, Judge Steckler entered a sealed order and recused himself from the case and was later replaced by Judge Michael Ward. On November 16, 2015, Judge Ward held a hearing on the oral temporary order by Judge Steckler from the original temporary hearing date of June 13, 2014. Bruce's attorney sought clarification on what Bruce needed to pay to "maintain the status quo" since a temporary order had never been entered and the oral order was vague. Judge Ward questioned both attorneys as to why no order had been entered, and Paula's attorney stated that "there were objections to various things when an order was presented." The court held four other hearings between March 18, 2016, and August 23, 2016, to determine what the June 13, 2014 ruling encompassed. At the April 22, 2016 hearing, Paula testified that Bruce had stopped making payments to her the month prior.

¶10. Finally, more than two years after the hearing on October 3, 2016, the court entered a nunc pro tunc temporary order requiring Bruce to "continue to pay an[y] and all debts, obligations and expenses he was paying prior to June 13, 2014." Similar to Judge Steckler's bench ruling, Judge Ward's ruling did not specify any exact amounts or any of the exact obligations that Bruce was expected to pay.

¶11. The following day, October 4, 2016, Paula filed a motion for contempt against Bruce. Paula's motion for contempt alleged that Bruce violated the "temporary matter as of October 3, 2016 and made nunc pro tunc to June 13, 2014." Specifically, the motion alleged that Bruce was in arrears for $2,500 per month in child support (a total amount of $20,000) and the other expenses Bruce had stopped paying. The contempt motion alleged Bruce was in contempt for failure to pay all of the expenses listed in his Rule 8.05 financial statement at the June 13, 2014 hearing. Yet, Bruce's Rule 8.05 financial statement never listed $2,500 in monthly child support, and the court never ordered that support obligation. The words "child support" are not mentioned in the oral ruling on June 13, 2014, or the written order on October 3, 2016. This becomes vitally important in addressing the contempt order and the incarceration of Bruce for failure to pay that support.

¶12. On September...

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