Lindsey v. Miami Development Corp.

• Decision Date: 06 May 1985
• Citation: 689 S.W.2d 856
• Parties: William LINDSEY, Administrator of the Estate of Vickie Jean Lindsey, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MIAMI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee, and Troy Lee Castile, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 856

689 S.W.2d 856

William LINDSEY, Administrator of the Estate of Vickie Jean

Lindsey, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MIAMI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee, and Troy Lee Castile, Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Knoxville.

May 6, 1985.

Darryl G. Lowe, Kennerly, Montgomery & Finley, Knoxville, for defendant-appellant.

Robert S. Olive, Olive & Olive, P.C., Knoxville, for plaintiff-appellee.

DROWOTA, Justice.

Plaintiff brought this action against the Defendants Miami Development Corporation and Troy Lee Castile for the wrongful death of his daughter upon the theories of (1) negligent maintenance of the premises and (2) negligent failure to take immediate steps to get proper medical aid and assistance for his daughter when the Defendant Castile knew, or should have known, by the exercise of due care, that medical attention was needed immediately. The trial court granted the Defendants a summary judgment as to both of the Plaintiff's contentions.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling on premises liability but reversed as to the Defendant Castile in the "failure to render aid" issue. Specifically, the Court of Appeals determined that Castile owed the decedent a duty to exercise reasonable care to render her aid in her helpless condition and found that there was a genuine issue concerning material facts in regard to Castile's conduct after Ms. Lindsey was injured. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the trial court for trial as to the Defendant Castile.

On July 23, 1980, Castile hosted a political fund raiser in a building owned by the Miami Development Corporation. Castile leased part of the building for living quarters. The decedent, Vickie Lindsey, attended the political fund raiser. She was observed sitting on the edge of a balcony which overlooked a stone foyer and steps with her feet dangling, yelling in a loud voice for Castile. When Castile appeared, she told him that she wanted to come down. Castile told her to go back the way she came and to come down the stairs. The decedent refused. She told Castile, "I'm coming down," and allegedly jumped, striking her head on the stone steps below the balcony. A blood sample later taken from Ms. Lindsey revealed that she had a blood alcohol content of 0.23%.

The record does not clearly establish the time when the decedent allegedly jumped. Castile testified that someone called an ambulance immediately. Shelia Julian testified that five minutes after Ms. Lindsey was injured she called Baptist Hospital and was told by a nurse to check the decedent's pulse and breathing and to call back if she did not regain consciousness in thirty minutes. There is a factual dispute as to the amount of time which elapsed before an ambulance arrived and medical assistance was rendered to the decedent. There is evidence in the record which indicates that Castile told the people around Ms. Lindsey after she was injured to "wait a while before you call an ambulance."

The ambulance service records establish that an ambulance was called at 2:19 a.m. and arrived at the scene at 2:28 a.m. The ambulance attendants were in contact by radio with Dr. Roy Parsons who was working in the Baptist Hospital emergency room that evening. When the attendants arrived, Ms. Lindsey was unconscious and her left pupil was dilated. At 2:32 a.m. Ms. Lindsey stopped breathing and the paramedics intravasated her. At 2:58 a.m. Ms. Lindsey arrived at the emergency room and was examined by Dr. Parsons. Both of her pupils were dilated and the cardiac monitor indicated that she had no cardiac activity. Dr. Parsons determined that Ms. Lindsey had sustained a basilar skull fracture and pronounced her dead at 3:00 a.m. An autopsy was never performed on Ms. Lindsey. Dr. Parsons testified that without the information that an autopsy would have provided in regard to the brain injury sustained by Ms. Lindsey, any opinion as to whether the decedent would have survived if she had received immediate medical care would be speculative.

Castile has appealed to this Court asserting that: (1) he owed no duty to render aid to Ms. Lindsey when she was unconscious and helpless; (2) that if he had such a duty, he satisfied that obligation by aiding the decedent; and (3) if there had been a breach of duty, it was not the proximate cause of Ms. Lindsey's death.

Summary judgment is to be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." T.R.C.P. 56.03. "The court's role in ruling on the motion is similar to its role in ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, and it must view the ... evidence before it in the light most favorable to the opponent of the motion." Stone v. Hinds, 541 S.W.2d 598 (Tenn.App.1976).

It is axiomatic that three elements are necessary for the existence of a cause of action for negligence: (1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty by the defendant; and (3) an injury to the plaintiff which was proximately caused by the defendant's breach of a duty. Ruth v. Ruth, 213 Tenn. 82, 372 S.W.2d 285 (1963). "A duty, in negligence cases, may be defined as an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another." Prosser and Keeton, Torts, § 53, p. 356 (5th ed., 1984) ("Prosser"). The court's role in determining whether a duty exists has been defined as follows:

"The Existence of a Duty. In other words, whether, upon the facts in evidence, such a relation exists between the parties that the community will impose a legal obligation upon one for the benefit of others--or, more simply, whether the interest of the plaintiff which has suffered invasion was entitled to legal protection at the hands of the defendant. This is entirely a question of law, to be determined by reference to the body of statutes, rules, principles and precedents which make up the law; and it must be determined only by the court ... A decision by the court that, upon any version of the facts, there is no duty, must necessarily result in judgment for the defendant. A decision that if certain facts are found to be true, a duty exists, leaves open the other questions now under consideration [concerning the existence of negligence]. Prosser, § 37, p. 236.

The Defendant Castile asserts that the common law recognizes no general duty to aid a person in peril. See Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301 (1928). It cannot be denied that courts have been slow to recognize a duty to render aid to a person in peril. Farwell v. Keaton, 396 Mich. 281, 240 N.W.2d 217 (1976); see Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959). This reluctance to recognize such a duty in situations in which aid can be rendered without exposure to danger and with little, if any, effort, has been subjected to extensive criticism by legal commentators. Prosser has noted that "[s]ome of the decisions have been shocking in the extreme" and that "[t]he remedy in such cases is left to the 'higher law' and the 'voice of conscience' which, in a wicked world, would seem to be singularly ineffective either to prevent harm or to compensate the victim." Prosser, § 56 at p. 375.

While paying lip-service to the common law rule that a stranger owes no duty to render aid to another in peril, courts have recognized that such a duty exists where some special relationship between the parties has afforded a justification for the creation of such a duty. "Thus, a carrier has been required to take reasonable affirmative steps to aid a passenger in peril and an innkeeper to aid his guest ... [T]here is now quite a general tendency to extend the same duty to any employer when his employee is injured or endangered in the course of his employment." Prosser § 56, p. 376. Moreover, courts have determined that the relationship between an invitee on premises open to the public and the possessor of the premises justifies the creation of such a duty. ¹ Personal Representative of the Estate of John Starling & Fisherman's Pier, Inc., 401 So.2d 1136 (Fla.App.1981); Depue v. Flateau, 100 Minn. 299, 111 N.W. 1 (1907); Hovermale v. Berkeley Springs Moose Lodge No. 1483, 271 S.E.2d 335 (W.Va.1980). Other courts have determined that a social guest-host relationship creates a duty to render aid. ² Grimes v. Hettinger, 566 S.W.2d 769 (Ky.App.1978); see Hutchinson v. Dickie, 162 F.2d 103 (6th Cir.1947).

It is important to note that the duty to render aid as created by such relationships is a duty to use reasonable care under the circumstances. "He [the defendant] is not required to give aid to one whom he has no reason to know to be ill. He will seldom be required to do more than give such first aid as he reasonably can, and take reasonable steps to turn the sick person over to a doctor or to those who will look after him until one can be brought." Prosser, § 56 at p. 377; see Coccarello v Round Table of Coral Gables, Inc., 421 So.2d 194 (Fla.App.1982).

The evidence in the record establishes that the decedent was a guest at the party hosted by the Defendant. We find that there was a social guest-host relationship between Ms. Lindsey and the defendant which created a duty on his part to exercise reasonable care to render aid to her when Castile knew or should have known that Ms. Lindsey was seriously injured.

We note that even if no relationship had existed between Ms. Lindsey and the Defendant, the Defendant assumed control of the situation which placed him under the obligation to exercise reasonable care to render aid to Ms. Lindsey. There is proof in the record that Castile instructed people at the party after Ms. Lindsey had been seriously injured "to wait a while before you call an ambulance." Such conduct on the part of...