Lindsey v. Minnehaha County
| Citation | 281 N.W.2d 808 |
| Decision Date | 25 July 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 12299,12299 |
| Parties | 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2043 Linda LINDSEY, Petitioner and Appellee, v. MINNEHAHA COUNTY, South Dakota and Marvin Noteboom, Register of Deeds, Appellants. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Ina Anderberg Litke, Vermillion, for petitioner and appellee.
Gene Paul Kean, State's Atty., Minnehaha County, Sioux Falls, for appellants.
The Division of Labor and Management Relations, South Dakota Department of Labor, after hearing, concluded that the Register of Deeds of Minnehaha County had violated SDCL 3-18-2, 3-18-3.1(1), (3), and (6) when he discharged a deputy in the title department on the pretext of a personality clash when in fact his motivation for discharge was his intent to interfere with public employee union activity authorized by SDCL 3-18.
The Division ordered the deputy reinstated with back pay mitigated by any interim earnings, with no loss of seniority and no reduction in wage level. The circuit court, on appeal under the Administrative Procedure Act, SDCL 1-26, affirmed. On this appeal from the circuit court judgment we reverse and uphold the termination.
Linda Lindsey (Lindsey) was employed by Marvin Noteboom (Noteboom), the Minnehaha County Register of Deeds, from May, 1971, until her termination on July 15, 1976.
During the summer months of 1975 the South Dakota Employees Council, No. 59, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) began an organizational campaign in Minnehaha County to unionize the employees at the Minnehaha County Courthouse. A formal petition for certification was filed in September, 1975. An election was held on December 15, 1975, in which the AFSCME won the right to represent the Courthouse employees. This election was set aside and a second election was held on February 17, 1976. AFSCME lost this second election.
In early June of 1976, Lindsey was asked to leave her employment by Noteboom on the basis that he could no longer work effectively with her because of a personality conflict. After Lindsey refused to terminate her employment upon Noteboom's request, Noteboom issued a formal written notice of termination in late June to become effective July 15, 1976.
On August 16, 1976, Lindsey filed a notice of an unfair labor practice complaint with the South Dakota Department of Labor, Division of Labor and Management Relations. After hearing, the Director of the Division entered a decision on December 15, 1976, holding that Lindsey's discharge constituted an unfair labor practice under SDCL 3-18-2, 3-18-3.1(1), (3) and (6). On appeal by Minnehaha County the circuit court affirmed, and the County appeals from the judgment of the circuit court.
This appeal presents the issue of whether there is substantial evidence on the record made before the Division from which the hearing officer could reasonably conclude that Lindsey was discharged in violation of the Public Employee Union Law, SDCL 3-18-3.1.
The scope of judicial review in this appeal is defined by SDCL 1-26-36. 1
Our review under the Administrative Procedures Act of the decision by the Director of the Division of Labor and Management must be the same as the review by the circuit court. The determination by this court whether the Director's decision can be sustained is to be unaided by a presumption that the circuit court decision is correct. Piper v. Neighborhood Youth Corps, 241 N.W.2d 868 (S.D.1976); State v. Brosz, 81 S.D. 64, 131 N.W.2d 69 (1964).
Professor Davis in his discussion concerning scope of review of administrative decisions referred to the case of NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 85 S.Ct. 980, 13 L.Ed.2d 839 (1965), where the Supreme Court reached the following conclusion:
It is argued, finally, that the Board's decision is within the area of its expert judgment and that, in setting it aside, the Court of Appeals exceeded the authorized scope of judicial review. This proposition rests upon our statement in Buffalo Linen that in reconciling the conflicting interests of labor and management the Board's determination is to be subjected to 'limited judicial review.' (citation omitted) When we use the phrase 'limited judicial review' we did not mean that the balance struck by the Board is immune from judicial examination and reversal in proper cases (footnote omitted) . . . Courts should be 'slow to overturn an administrative decision,' (citation omitted) but they are not left 'to "sheer acceptance" of the Board's conclusion,' (citation omitted). Reviewing Courts are not obligated to stand aside and rubber-stamp their affirmance of administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute. Such review is always properly within the judicial province, and Courts would abdicate their responsibility if they did not fully review such administrative decisions. Of course due deference is to be rendered to agency determinations of fact, so long as there is substantial evidence to be found in the record as a whole. But where, as here, the review is not of a question of fact, but of a judgment as to the proper balance to be struck between conflicting interests, '(t)he deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia which results in the unauthorized assumption by an agency of major policy decisions properly made by congress.' (380 U.S. at 290-292, 85 S.Ct. at 987-988, 13 L.Ed.2d at 848-849.)
K. Davis, Administrative Law Text 526-27 (3rd ed. 1972).
SDCL 1-26-1(8) defines "substantial evidence" required by SDCL 1-26-36(5) as being "such relevant and competent evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as being sufficiently adequate to support a conclusion."
This is a codification of the definition of "substantial evidence" which we applied in McKinnon v. State Banking Co., 78 S.D. 407, 103 N.W.2d 179 (1960). See also Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938), and Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966).
The import of the related phrase, "on the whole record," in SDCL 1-26-36(5) is explained in City of Brookings v. Dept. of Environ. Prot., 274 N.W.2d 887 (S.D.1979), wherein we cited Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Rel. Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951). In interpreting the same wording in federal statutes, the United States Supreme Court said:
Whether or not it was ever permissible for courts to determine the substantiality of evidence . . . merely on the basis of evidence which in and of itself justified it, without taking into account contradictory evidence or evidence from which conflicting inferences could be drawn, the new legislation definitely precludes such a theory of review and bars its practice. The substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. This is clearly the significance of the requirement . . . that courts consider the whole record.
340 U.S. at 487-488, 71 S.Ct. at 464-465, 95 L.Ed. at 467.
As we concluded in City of Brookings, supra, 274 N.W.2d at 890.
We recognize the statutory right of the Minnehaha County Register of Deeds to remove deputies from his office at his pleasure. SDCL 7-7-21. 2 His right to discharge deputies in his office is limited, however, by our statute giving public employees the right to form and join labor or employee organizations. SDCL 3-18-2. 3
In General Drivers & Helpers Union v. Brown County, 269 N.W.2d 795 (S.D.1978), we quoted with approval from N.L.R.B. v. Ace Comb Company, 342 F.2d 841, 847 (8th Cir. 1965), as follows:
It has long been established that for the purpose of determining whether or not a discharge is discriminatory in an action such as this, it is necessary that the true, underlying reason for the discharge be established. That is, the fact that a lawful cause for the discharge is available is no defense where the employee is Actually discharged because of his Union activities. A Fortiori, if the discharge is Actually motivated by a lawful reason, the fact that the employee is engaged in Union activities at the time will not tie the employer's hands and prevent him from the exercise of his business judgment to discharge an employee for cause.
The mere fact of discharge in and of itself warrants no inference that it was improperly motivated. National Labor Relations Board v. McGahey, 233 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1956).
In the General Drivers & Helpers Decision, supra, we established the following guidelines for examining the question of employer motivation:
(1) Whether the employee had been criticized or specifically warned of his shortcomings;
(2) Whether the employee was given any advance notice of his discharge;
(3) Whether the employer offered economic benefits if the employee would refrain from union activity;
(4) Whether the employer was opposed to unionization;
(5) Whether the employee was competent (6) Whether the employee was a known leader of the unionization drive and the employer knew of the employee's activity in the union at the time of discharge;
(7) Whether the discharge plan was promulgated with speed;
(8) Whether the employer gave an implausible explanation for its action;
(9) Whether the discharged employee was singled out for special treatment;
(10) Whether the reasons for discharge given at the hearing were the same as those given to the employee at the time of the discharge.
Using these guidelines, we must determine whether the Division's conclusion in this case is supported by...
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State, Div. of Human Rights ex rel. Miller v. Miller, 14305
...review of an agency decision is whether there is "substantial evidence" to be found in the record as a whole, citing Lindsey v. Minnehaha County, 281 N.W.2d 808 (S.D.1979). That standard of review was changed by the 1978 legislature to "clearly erroneous in light of the entire evidence in t......