Lindstrom v. International Nav. Co.

• Decision Date: 17 July 1902
• Citation: 117 F. 170
• Parties: LINDSTROM v. INTERNATIONAL NAV. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

117 F. 170

LINDSTROM v. INTERNATIONAL NAV. CO.

United States Circuit Court, E.D. New York.

July 17, 1902

Franklin Pierce, for plaintiff.

Robinson Biddle & Ward, for defendant.

THOMAS District Judge.

This action was tried before the court and a jury, and verdict for $5,000 rendered. The defendant now moves for a new trial. The plaintiff is the father and administrator of a young woman who, after several years of domestic service in this country was returning to her home in Europe, on the steamer St. Paul for the purpose of a visit. During the voyage the vessel shipped a large wave, which violently swept the steerage passengers backwards and forwards on the deck, and some of them in and out of the companionway leading to the cabin. The complaint charges, and the jury found, that by the defendant's negligence the plaintiff's intestate was carried overboard, and drowned in the sea. The St. Paul is an American vessel, registered at the port of New York, and when she was on the high seas was a part of the territory of the state of New York. Hence all civil rights of action for matters occurring aboard of her at sea were determined by the laws of that state. McDonald v. Mallory, 77 N.Y. 546, 33 Am.Rep. 664; The Lamington (D.C.) 87 F. 752, and cases there cited; St. Clair v. U.S., 154 U.S. 152, 14 Sup.Ct. 1002, 38 L.Ed. 936. Therefore the steamship and all persons aboard here, and all duties owing by such persons one to another, are governed by the laws of New York.

The ultimate question is whether the defendant's negligent act or omission on shipboard was the proximate cause of the death, or whether such cause was the drowning in the ocean. If the proximate cause was the negligent act, which took place on the ship, then her death is related to the act or omission in such way that the death must be deemed to have been caused within the territory of the state of New York. The defendant's naked contention is that, whatever the carrier's negligence, and however inevitably it must result in such destruction of a passenger, yet if in fact it bring the passenger into such a status that his life is extinguished by drowning, the tortious act was committed on the ocean, and the statute of the state having dominion of the vessel is inoperative. Hence, if the carrier leave open a port in the bulwark of a vessel under such circumstances of gross negligence that it inevitably results in a passenger walking overboard, yet there is no liability, provided death result from drowning. Should the captain of a vessel deliberately throw a passenger into the sea, still his act, although wrongfully causing death, is not actionable, nor, it would seem, punishable, because the passenger was drowned in the high seas, over which the state has no dominion. This rule would relieve carriers by water from civil liability for all negligence or trespass upon persons on a ship, however gross or violent the same, provided it were so contrived, or did so happen, that the offended person was finally drowned as a result of the tort.

Before proceeding, certain judicial holdings should be stated. In The Harrisburg, 7 Sup.Ct. 140, 30 L.Ed. 358, 119 U.S. 199, it was held that, in the absence of an act of congress or a statute of a state giving a right of action therefor, a suit in admiralty could not be maintained in the courts of the United States to recover damages for negligently causing the death of a human being on the high seas; and that the enabling statute of a state, if applicable (which is not determined, did not authorize the action to be maintained on account of the expiration of the time limited for the same. In The Alaska, 9 Sup.Ct. 461, 130 U.S. 201, 32 L.Ed. 923, it appeared that an account of the collision between the British steamship Alaska and the pilotboat Columbia on the high seas, all members of the crew of the pilotboat were drowned, and it was held that there could be no recovery in admiralty against the steamship on account of the death of such persons. In the opinion it is said:

'It is admitted by the counsel for the libelants that the statute of New York (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 1902) on the subject of actions for death by negligence does not apply to the present case, because the deaths did not occur within the state of New York, or in waters subject to its jurisdiction.'

In that case a foreign vessel collided with a vessel from the port of New York, with the result of casting the members of the crew of the latter vessel into the ocean, where they drowned; and the judgment proceeds upon the ground that the admiralty had no jurisdiction independently of the statute of the state giving the cause of action, and that the statute did not cover the locus in quo of the accident,-- that is, the state of New York could not make laws for the place, nor for both the parties. In Rundell v. La Compagnie Generale Transatlantique (D.C.) 94 F. 366, affirmed 40 C.C.A. 625, 100 F. 655, 49 L.R.A. 92 (followed by Judge Townsend in the matter of the petition of La Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, owner of the steamship La Bourgogne, to limit its liability), the circuit court of appeals for the Seventh circuit determined that there could be no recovery for loss of life, where a passenger on the Bourgogne was killed by being drowned, as the result of a collision occurring wholly through the fault of the carrying vessel, which authorized an action for death by wrongful act upon a French ship. The court placed its decision upon two grounds:

'The first is that it does not appear from the libel that the death of the deceased occurred upon the steamship La Bourgogne, the averments being merely that he lost his life by drowning, as a result of a collision, and consequent sinking of the vessel; second, that in cases arising in tort upon the high seas the United States district court, sitting in admiralty, cannot enforce the local law of France, even if in terms it applied to the case, which does not appear, but that such cases must be adjudged and governed by the general maritime and admiralty law as understood and administered by the United States courts.'

It is considered that the decisions in The Alaska and similar cases do not touch the action at bar, and that pursuant to usual and easily stated legal principles the defendant is clearly liable.

The New York statute (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 1902) provides that:

'The executor or administrator of a decedent, who has left him or her surviving a husband, wife, or next of kin, may maintain an action to recover damages for a wrongful act, neglect or default, by which the decedent's death was caused, against a natural person who, or a corporation which, would have been liable to an action in favor of the decedent, by reason thereof, if death had not ensued.' This statute means that if A., by act of omission, be guilty of a breach of duty owing to B., whereby B. is injured and killed, B.'s representative in behalf of husband, wife, or next of kin, pecuniarily damaged by such death, may maintain an action therefor, provided B., had he not been killed, but injured, could have maintained an action for such injury. The intention of the law in New York is that the injured person shall recover for his injuries if he live, and, if he die, his representative shall recover certain damages. Littlewood v. Mayor, 89 N.Y. 24, 42 Am.Rep. 271. Two vital provisions of the statute must be observed: (1) Wrongful act or omission must cause the death; (2) the representative may recover for such death when the injured man could have recovered

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