Line Drivers Local No. 961 v. WJ Digby, Inc., Civ. A. No. 7328.

• Decision Date: 12 June 1963
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 7328.
• Citation: 218 F. Supp. 519
• Parties: LINE DRIVERS LOCAL NO. 961 OF the INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. W. J. DIGBY, INC., a corporation, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

218 F. Supp. 519

LINE DRIVERS LOCAL NO. 961 OF the INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. W. J. DIGBY, INC., a corporation, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 7328.

United States District Court D. Colorado.

June 12, 1963.

Myrick, Smith & Criswell, John A. Criswell, Englewood, Colo., for plaintiff.

Albert B. Dawkins, Robert H. Kiley and Paul M. Hupp, Denver, Colo., for defendant.

DOYLE, District Judge.

This matter was tried to the Court on March 11 and 12, 1963; thereafter, briefs were filed and the matter was finally submitted on June 10, 1963. The court's findings are incorporated in this memorandum and formal findings are unnecessary.

The action seeks specific performance of an agreement between the plaintiff union and the defendant employer, which agreement was signed on June 30, 1961. The terms of this memorandum agreement were such that the defendant employer agreed to be bound by the terms and provisions of the Western States Area Master Freight Agreement which was then being negotiated. The defendant also agreed to execute a contract which contained all the terms and conditions of the Western States Area Master Freight Agreement, together with supplements thereto.

The defendant's position is that Exhibit 1, the memorandum referred to, is unenforceable for vagueness, because of duress and for other reasons which will be discussed in detail herein.

In addition to Exhibit 1, which is primarily in issue here, there are several other contracts between these parties which are related to the present controversy and which, for purposes of clarity, may be described as follows:

Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 — Western States Area Master Freight Agreement for period of July 1, 1961 to June 30, 1964;

Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 — Western States Area Over the Road Single Man and Sleeper Cab Supplemental Agreement to Plaintiff's Exhibit 2;

Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 — Over-the-Road Motor Freight Agreement, Sleeper Cab Operations for period of May 1, 1959 to July 1, 1961;

Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 — "The Old Perishable Foods Contract", admittedly in effect between the parties, dated March 1, 1957 to November 1, 1958;

Defendant's Exhibit A — "Master Perishable Foods Agreement" dated November 1, 1958 to April 1, 1962, signed by defendant June 2, 1959;

Defendant's Exhibit B — Letter of Understanding between the parties, dated March 27, 1959, purporting to bind defendant to pay for "dry freight" transportation the rates prescribed in plaintiff's Exhibit 4.

In order to further clarify the present problem it is necessary to relate the collective bargaining history as between the plaintiff and the defendant.

Prior to January, 1958, defendant, a trucking concern, was primarily engaged in hauling "exempt" commodities, that is, those not requiring an I.C.C. permit. At this time defendant acted as an agent of another carrier, Wells Truckway, in the transportation of meat from Denver to California. In December, 1957, however, defendant obtained an I.C.C. permit from another company, which permit authorized defendant to carry "general commodities" from any point within fifty miles of Boulder, Colorado, to destinations within the State. At the time of the issuance of this permit, plaintiff union represented the over-the-road drivers of the defendant and plaintiff's Exhibit 5, described above, was in force and was due to expire in November, 1958.

There was then in existence between plaintiff union and certain other carriers, a so-called "dry freight" agreement. In the course of negotiations between these other carriers and the unions, a "lock-out" took place during August, 1958. In the course of this lockout, most common carriers west of Denver ceased operations. During this period W. J. Digby, who was then President of defendant, called Harry Bath, who was president of plaintiff, and inquired whether or not the defendant would be struck if it commenced "dry freight" operations. Bath replied that a strike would not occur and defendant thereupon obtained a temporary I.C.C. permit allowing it to take dry freight during the "lock-out." Digby at this time agreed to pay the rates prescribed by the "dry freight" agreement.

As noted above, plaintiff's Exhibit 5, which was the so-called Old Perishable Foods Contract between these parties, expired in November, 1958. All of the employers who were parties to that agreement with exception of defendant, negotiated through the Mountain States Employers' Council. When agreement was reached following these negotiations and the resulting contract, Exhibit "A", was presented to the defendant, defendant informed plaintiff that it had no employees but rather was a company consisting of forty partners. At that time plaintiff struck for approximately six days and during this period defendant executed a "dry freight" agreement with another union. Plaintiff's position was that this agreement was illegal inasmuch as the union was not a local one and no employees of defendant belonged to it. The further agreement (defendant's Exhibit "B") was executed on March 27, 1959, whereby defendant's operations were to be governed by rates in the new "dry freight" agreement (Exhibit "A"). The parties have been in continuous disagreement as to commodities covered by this agreement.

Coming now to the events which preceded the execution of Exhibit 1, it would appear that in June, 1961, Bath, on behalf of plaintiff, delivered several copies of Exhibit 1 to defendant, one of which was finally signed on the last day of the month. As stated above, this required execution of the Western States contract which was then being negotiated; however, defendant refused to sign these when the same were presented.

There is dispute in the evidence as to what occurred in connection with the signing of Exhibit 1. According to plaintiff, Mr. Bath took the memorandum to defendant's place of business some time during the latter part of June, 1961. He testified that he explained to Mr. James Digby and to Mr. W. J. Digby that the old "dry freight" agreement was expiring and that there could possibly be a strike if the multi-union multi-employer negotiations failed to produce a contract. He stated that those companies which did not want to be struck could sign an agreement to be bound by the results of the "dry freight" negotiations. W. J. Digby asked whether, if there was a strike, the defendant would not be involved, and Bath replied that was correct. Digby was also to have then said that if it worked out like it had in 1958, it would be favorable for the company and that he would consider it and notify Bath. Bath further testified that he did not hear from the company, so on June 30, he placed a telephone call to James Digby at which time he said that the union was contacting the companies which were not participating in the trade association negotiations and that he wondered what position defendant was going to take on the submitted agreement 1. Digby agreed to call him back. Late on June 30, Digby called and said that agreement 1 was executed and delivered to his office. The signed document was received at about 4:50 o'clock that afternoon. Bath denied threatening to strike on any of the occasions of the talks with the Digbys. He admits, however, that he told the company that if the memorandum agreement was not signed it could result in defendant's becoming involved in an industry-wide strike.

Defendant's version of this is somewhat different — he maintains that he signed Exhibit 1 as a result of coercion and duress. He states that Bath threatened to call a strike; that he, Digby, did not have the benefit of the advice of counsel and that he was threatened with a shutdown during a period of heavy perishable food traffic. He admits, however, that when Exhibits 2 and 3 were presented, he refused to sign them notwithstanding that he was then threatened with a strike (according to his testimony).

It is important to observe that the testimony of James Digby, together with the other facts and circumstances, are not persuasive with respect to coercion or duress. First of all, the contention of Digby that he was upset by the swearing of Bath, is impossible to believe. Digby's further testimony that there was effective economic duress applied is also unacceptable. There were remedies available against an unlawful strike; in other words, if plaintiff had attempted a work stoppage notwithstanding a subsisting collective bargaining agreement, the defendant could have applied for and obtained relief at once. It is much more logical to conclude that defendant signed this contract in the belief that dry freight association negotiations would break down whereby defendant would enjoy extensive dry freight business such as he had experienced on the prior occasion. Furthermore, the history of negotiations between these parties fails to disclose defendant's susceptibility to signing agreements which he did not wish or did not have to sign. Therefore, unless the agreement can be considered insufficient in law due to its vagueness or lack of mutuality, or because of peculiarities of the law applicable to collective bargaining agreements, the defendant's position must fail. We turn, therefore, to a consideration of the applicable law.

First, it must be recognized that we are dealing here with collective bargaining agreements within the framework of the Labor Management Relations Act, and the action is brought under Title 29 U.S.C. § 185 to enforce...