Lines v. Wargo

Decision Date10 January 2003
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 99-379.
Citation271 F.Supp.2d 649
PartiesOrville LINES, Plaintiff, v. David WARGO, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

Witold J. Walczak, ACLF of PA, Pittsburgh, PA, for plaintiff.

Seth A. Mendelsohn, Office of Attorney General, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Harrisburg, PA, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

McLAUGHLIN, District Judge.

On December 6, 1999, Plaintiff Orville Lines, acting pro se, filed the instant action. This matter was assigned to United States District Judge Sean J. McLaughlin and was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter for report and recommendation in accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Rules 72.1.3 and 72.1.4 of the Local Rules for Magistrates.

Plaintiff is an out-of-state sexual offender who transferred his parole to Pennsylvania. Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging his subjection to the community notification provisions of Pennsylvania's Megan's Law and alleging that his rights to due process and equal protection have been violated by the statute. As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. [Doc. No. 7, p. 4.]

Defendant Wargo moved for summary judgment claiming that Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights were not violated and that, alternatively, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Through newly obtained counsel, Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, raising for the first time the applicability of Pennsylvania's Interstate Compact Concerning Parole (the "Parole Compact"), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 321 (West 1999), and Doe v. Ward, 124 F.Supp.2d 900 (W.D.Pa.2000) (holding that the community notification provisions of Pennsylvania's Megan's Law as applied to out-of-state offenders violate the Parole Compact). On August 5, 2002, Magistrate Judge Baxter heard oral argument from the parties on the pending summary judgment motion.

On August 30, 2002, Magistrate Judge Baxter issued a Report and Recommendation finding, in part, that the disparate treatment of out-of-state offenders under Pennsylvania's Megan's Law violated the Parole Compact. Nevertheless, though the subject of the Parole Compact had been briefed by Plaintiff and addressed by both parties at the oral argument, the issue of whether there was an implied cause of action (and therefore, an implied remedy) under the Compact had not been briefed or argued and was brought up by the Court sua sponte in the Report and Recommendation. Magistrate Judge Baxter concluded that, despite the apparent conflict between Pennsylvania's Megan's Law and the Parole Compact, Plaintiff could not maintain a private cause of action to enforce the Compact's provisions.

Further, the Report and Recommendation found that Plaintiff's rights to equal protection and procedural due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment were violated. The Report concluded by finding that Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity because he acted in accordance with an apparently valid statute.

Plaintiff's counsel has filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation, asserting that (1) the Court erred in concluding that the Interstate Compact of Probation and Parole does not create a federal right enforceable through § 1983, and (2) the Court erred in concluding that Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity. Additionally, the Objections note that Plaintiff's original prayer for injunctive and declaratory relief remains pending as it was not addressed in the Report and Recommendation. [Doc. No. 31.]

Defendant filed no Objections to the Report and Recommendation, but has filed a Reply to Plaintiff's Objections. Defendant responds to Plaintiff's arguments on the implied cause of action and qualified immunity. He also disputes the contention that the declaratory and injunctive relief components of the original prayer for relief remain pending in this case. Defendant argues that such relief is now moot because "there is no basis to assume that Plaintiff will again be subjected to community notification by this trooper." [Doc. No. 32.]

We now consider these matters de novo. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). Initially, however, we digress briefly to clarify the relevant statutory provisions which are presently at issue.

Factual and Legal Background1

Plaintiff is a convicted sex offender who received a sentence of 20 years imprisonment by a Maryland Court following his conviction on a charge of second degree rape. After serving approximately 10 and ½ years of his jail sentence, he was paroled. The terms of his parole in Maryland did not require him to be subjected to community notification. Pursuant to the Parole Compact, Plaintiff's parole was transferred to Pennsylvania so that Plaintiff could reside near his mother in Oil City, Pennsylvania.

In the meantime, Pennsylvania's Megan's Law was signed into law on October 24, 1995. In general the statute, as amended in 1996, see Pub.L. 300, No. 46, § 2 (May 22, 1996) (hereinafter referred to as "Megan's Law I"), required (1) registration with the Pennsylvania State Police by individuals convicted of certain enumerated sexual offenses, and (2) community notification for those sexual offenders who were deemed to be "sexually violent predators" within the meaning of the Act. See generally 42 PA.C.S.A. §§ 9791-9799.6 (West 1998). With regard to those individuals convicted of sexually violent offenses under Pennsylvania law, the statute provided for specific procedures whereby a sexual offender would be evaluated for the purpose of determining, prior to sentencing, whether he/she was considered a "sexually violent predator." See id. at § 9794. These procedures included an initial mandatory assessment by a state board, followed by a hearing before the original trial court, at which time the court would consider the board's assessment and the defendant would have the right to be represented by legal counsel and the opportunity to present evidence and/or cross-examine any witnesses produced by the Commonwealth. Id. at § 9794(c)-(e). If the defendant had been convicted of certain enumerated offenses, then he/she was presumed by both the board and the court to be a sexually violent predator; the defendant faced the burden of rebutting this presumption by presenting clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Id. at § 9794(b). Once assessed as a "sexually violent predator," a defendant would be subject to community notification, meaning that the local law enforcement agency would advise certain persons and agencies within the community of defendant's presence in the community, including the defendant's identity, photograph, residence, the nature of his offense, and a statement that he had been designated by court order as a sexually violent predator. Id. at § 9798(a)-(b). In addition to the community notification requirements, persons designated "sexually violent predators" under Megan's Law I faced a mandatory maximum penalty of life imprisonment for their predicate offenses and a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment if convicted of a subsequent sexually violent offense. Id. at §§ 9799.4(a) and (c)-(d).

At the time of Plaintiff's transfer to this Commonwealth, Pennsylvania's Megan's Law I also contained the following provision concerning out-of-state sexual offenders:

(c) Offenders from other states. — As a condition of obtaining residency in Pennsylvania under the interstate compact for the supervision of parolees and probations, sexual offenders from other states shall be required to register and abide by the requirements of this subchapter and, where the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole determines it is necessary to protect the public, shall submit to public notification as provided in section 9798 (relating to other notification).

42 PA.C.S.A. § 9795(c) (West 1998). The Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole had adopted a policy at that time requiring community notification in all out-of-state parole supervision cases involving sex offenders such as Plaintiff, though it did not officially require that such persons be specifically identified as sexually violent predators.

Plaintiff was ultimately released from custody on or about November 28, 1996. The day after his release Plaintiff complied with the registration requirements of Pennsylvania's Megan's Law, 42 PA.C.S.A. § 9793 (West 1998), and reported his then current address and telephone number to law enforcement authorities.

By letter dated December 4, 1997, Captain Ernest R. Spittler, Director of Records and Identification Division of the Pennsylvania State Police Headquarters in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania advised the State Police Barracks in Seneca, Pennsylvania that Plaintiff was an individual residing within that jurisdiction and met the criteria of an "out-of-state offender" as determined by the Parole Board. Sargent Beggs, Crime Unit Supervisor of the Seneca Barracks, received the correspondence on or about December 8, 1997 along with several reproduction-ready copies of a "Megan's Law Out-Of-State Offender Community Notification Flier" which included Plaintiff's photograph, full name and current address. In addition, the flier contained the following language:

This is to inform you that the below listed individual has been designated for "Community Notification" by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole outlined in title 42, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, Chapter 97, Subchapter H, Sexually Violent Offenders, pursuant to Subsection 9795(c)[.]

* * *

The subject was convicted of Pennsylvania Crimes Code Section: 3121 or in the case of Out-of-State Offenders, the appropriate equivalent.

* * * COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION IS REQUIRED FOR THIS DESIGNATION* * *

(S...

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