Linke v. Northwestern School Corp.

• Decision Date: 21 August 2000
• Docket Number: No. 34A05-9910-CV-467.,34A05-9910-CV-467.
• Parties: Rosa J. LINKE, Reena M. Linke (By their next friends and parents), Scott L. Linke and Noreen L. Linke, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. NORTHWESTERN SCHOOL CORP., Appellee-Defendant.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

734 N.E.2d 252

Rosa J. LINKE, Reena M. Linke (By their next friends and parents), Scott L. Linke and Noreen L. Linke, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. NORTHWESTERN SCHOOL CORP., Appellee-Defendant.

No. 34A05-9910-CV-467.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

August 21, 2000.

Kenneth J. Falk, E. Paige Freitag, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellant.

Julia Blackwell Gelinas, John H. Daerr, Locke Reynolds, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

SULLIVAN, Judge

Appellants, Rosa J. Linke and Reena M. Linke (collectively "Linkes"), through their parents, appeal the trial court's denial of summary judgment.

We reverse and remand.

The facts reveal that the Linkes were both students at Northwestern School Corporation (NSC) when this suit was filed. Rosa was a junior and Reena was a freshman at Northwestern High School. At the time of the suit, Rosa participated in track, National Honor Society, Students Against Drunk Driving, the Prom Committee, and Academic Competition. Rosa also had her driver's license, and wanted to drive to school. Reena participated in choir, track, Academic Competition, Sunshine Society, and Fellowship of Christian Athletes.

NSC adopted a drug testing policy, the Northwestern School Corporation Extracurricular Activities and Student Driver Drug Policy, which became effective on January 12, 1999. NSC's primary objective in adopting its policy seemed to be protecting the health and safety of its students. NSC was also concerned about students representing the school system in the community. Although drug and alcohol use had increased among NSC students according to a 1995 Indiana Prevention and Resource Center (IPRC) study, the statistics did not dramatically alarm NSC officials to conclude that drug use was particularly affecting school discipline at NSC. However, a committee composed of parents and school employees was formed after two NSC students died from a drug overdose, and a recent NSC graduate was killed in a car accident involving the use of inhalants. NSC was more concerned about preventing future tragedies than combating an existing drug problem.

The NSC's policy applies to all NSC students in grades seven through twelve. The policy provides that students wishing to participate in athletics, certain extracurricular activities,¹ or certain co-curricular activities² must consent to random drug testing. Also, if students wish to drive to school, they must subject themselves to the testing. All students who wish to participate in the activities covered by the policy must sign a consent form agreeing to the random drug testing. If the student is involved in a co-curricular activity and he or she does not consent to a drug test, then the student may not participate in performances or competitions which take place outside of normal school hours, but still will receive class credit.

The drug testing is accomplished through a urinalysis. After a student is randomly chosen for testing, the student is escorted by the principal of the school to a trailer containing restroom facilities. The student then gives the urine sample, which is taken to a laboratory where it is tested for the substances prohibited by the policy.³ If the test is positive, the sample is re-tested, and after a second positive reading, the result is sent to the school. A conference is then held with the student and his or her parents, and the student is given an opportunity to explain the positive result. While the positive result does not become a part of the student's academic record, the penalties depend upon the circumstances. For example, the student may be banned from participating in extracurricular activities or from driving to school for a specified amount of time. A student may be re-tested after sufficient time has elapsed for the substance to be eliminated from the student's body. If the re-test is negative, then the student may return to the activity or drive to school. If the re-test is positive, then the school may conduct subsequent tests throughout the rest of the school year.

The Linkes and their parents believe that NSC's drug testing policy violates their constitutional rights. They feel the policy invades their personal privacy and are uncomfortable about the possibility of providing a urine sample for school officials. The Linkes both signed a consent form but have objected to the policy.

On February 26, 1999, the Linkes, along with their parents, filed a complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief. On June 10, 1999, the Linkes filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that the drug policy invaded their privacy rights. NSC filed a response on August 2, 1999. On September 13, 1999, the trial court denied the Linkes' motion for summary judgment and issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court denied the Linkes' requests for injunctive and declaratory relief, and entered a final judgment in favor of NSC. The trial court concluded that NSC's drug testing policy was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court also concluded that NSC's drug policy did not violate Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution.

Upon appeal, the Linkes maintain that NSC's drug testing policy is unconstitutional. Before examining the Linkes' argument which is based upon the Indiana Constitution, a discussion of the application of the Fourth Amendment to searches in schools and drug testing helps place the issue in perspective.

The Fourth Amendment provides "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Courts have traditionally interpreted the Fourth Amendment to require that searches and seizures be supported by probable cause and a warrant. Over time, however, courts have carved out exceptions to these general requirements.⁴

One such exception has been created through the development of what has become denominated as the "special needs" analysis. Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987) 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709. This analysis is employed when the government demonstrates a substantial interest beyond normal law enforcement activities which make the search or seizure necessary and requiring a warrant and probable cause would frustrate this interest. The United States Supreme Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 applied the balancing analysis in the public school context when a student's purse was searched by school officials after she was discovered smoking at school. In that case, the Court held that a search unsupported by a warrant was constitutional because requiring a warrant "would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools." Id. at 340, 105 S.Ct. 733. The Court also adjusted the level of suspicion required in order to conduct a search. It concluded "that the accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause...." Id. at 341, 105 S.Ct. 733. Instead, the Court, noting other situations in which courts have upheld searches based upon suspicions which were reasonable but did not amount to probable cause, concluded that the legality of the search of a student should depend upon reasonableness. Id. The Court did not specifically decide whether its reasoning could be extended to justify school authorities in conducting searches not supported by individualized suspicion. Id. at 347 n. 8, 105 S.Ct. 733.

Later, when considering the legality of drug testing in different contexts, the United States Supreme Court moved away from the requirement of individualized suspicion. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n (1989) 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639, suspicionless searches were upheld where random drug tests were conducted upon railroad personnel involved in train accidents. Similarly, in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab (1989) 489 U.S. 656, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685, the Court recognized that federal customs agents who carry arms and are involved in drug interdiction could be subject to random drug testing. In both of these cases, the Court recognized that state-compelled collection and testing of urine constitutes a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Skinner, supra at 617-18, 109 S.Ct. 1402; Von Raab, supra at 665, 109 S.Ct. 1384. The Court in Skinner focused upon the fact that drugs and alcohol had been a continuing problem with railroad personnel, and the government had a special need to protect public safety. Id. at 620, 109 S.Ct. 1402. Similarly, the Court in Von Raab held that customs agents directly involved in drug interdiction could not safely perform their jobs if under the influence of drugs. Id. at 668-70, 109 S.Ct. 1384. Both cases held that, in limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated are minimal and the governmental interest would be jeopardized by requiring individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable even if not based upon individualized suspicion. Skinner, supra at 624, 109 S.Ct. 1402; Von Raab, supra at 679, 109 S.Ct. 1384.

In 1995, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of random drug testing in the public school context. The Court upheld a school policy requiring student athletes to submit to random drug tests in Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton (1995) 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564. The policy in Vernonia was adopted after other...