Linnen v. Armainis
| Decision Date | 18 December 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-3350,92-3350 |
| Citation | 991 F.2d 1102 |
| Parties | Robert Jeffrey LINNEN, Appellant, v. Troopers John ARMAINIS; George J. Titler; Walter B. Davis; Daniel Mamrose; Norman Hilf; Det. Robert McKeown; Elizabeth Hoover, In Their Individual and Official Capacities, Appellees. . Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6) |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Robert J. Linnen, pro se.
Mark F. Haak, Pietragallo, Bosick & Gordon, Pittsburgh, PA for appellees Det. Robert McKeown and Elizabeth Hoover.
Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Atty. Gen., Gloria A. Tischuk, Deputy Atty. Gen., Calvin R. Koons, Sr. Deputy Atty. Gen., John G. Knorr, III, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Chief, Litigation Section, Office of Atty. Gen., of Present: SLOVITER, Chief Judge, HUTCHINSON and ROTH, Circuit Judges,
Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, PA, for appellees Troopers John Armainis, George J. Titler, Walter B. Davis, Daniel Mamrose and Norman Hilf.
Robert Jeffrey Linnen (Linnen) appeals an order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment to appellee police officers John Armainis, George J. Titler, Walter B. Davis, Daniel Mamrose, Norman Hilf, Robert McKeown, and Elizabeth Hoover (collectively the "officers"). The issue presented on appeal is whether Linnen's guilty plea to state possessory offenses precludes the civil rights claim he brought under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1981) for violation of his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. His § 1983 claim is based on the state's search and seizure of property for use as evidence against Linnen in the state criminal case in which he entered his guilty plea. In that criminal case, Linnen, while represented by counsel, had filed pro se motions to suppress the items the officers had seized but entered his guilty plea before those motions were decided. If Linnen had been successful in suppressing the evidence he claims the officers seized unconstitutionally, he would have had a complete defense to the possessory offenses charged against him in the state criminal case.
The state court that had accepted Linnen's guilty plea in the criminal case later denied his post-conviction attack on counsel's alleged ineffectiveness for failing to challenge the constitutionality of the officers' seizure of Linnen's property as evidence of crime. Linnen appealed, and that appeal is still pending in the state's intermediate appellate court as of the date of this opinion.
After the appeal was filed, the magistrate judge to whom the instant § 1983 case was referred concluded that Linnen's voluntary guilty plea "precludes a subsequent § 1983 action challenging the search and seizure of the evidence which was the object of the abandoned suppression motions." He therefore recommended that the district court grant the officers' motion for summary judgment. Linnen v. Armainis, No. 91-652, Magistrate's Report and Recommendation, at 8 n. 1 (hereinafter "Magistrate's Report and Recommendation"). In doing so, the magistrate judge relied in part on the state court's order denying the PCRA petition that is the subject of Linnen's pending state appeal. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and entered summary judgment for the officers.
We hold that the district court incorrectly decided that Linnen's guilty plea precluded him on the issue of the unconstitutionality of the search. We also hold that it erred in relying on the order that is the subject of Linnen's PCRA appeal as precluding his civil rights action. The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County's order denying his petition for post-conviction relief does not decide whether the officers' search and seizure of any of Linnen's personal property violated the Constitution. Nevertheless, a final disposition of Linnen's pending state appeal of that order may or may not be preclusive on the constitutionality of the search and seizure. If it is, it could determine his § 1983 action one way or the other. Therefore, in order to avoid unnecessary conflict with a final decision of a state court that may affect the constitutional question, we will vacate the district court's order and remand with instructions to stay this action pending final resolution of Linnen's state court appeal from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.
The district court exercised federal question jurisdiction over Linnen's civil rights claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3), (4). This Court exercises appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291.
In January 1990, Linnen pled guilty to three separate criminal informations charging him with twelve counts of violating the Pennsylvania Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, 35 Pa.Stat.Ann. §§ 780-101 to 780-144 (Purdon 1977 & Supp.1992), three counts of firearms violations, and two counts of criminal conspiracy. In March 1990, Linnen pled guilty to three additional controlled substance charges and one additional criminal conspiracy charge. The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County sentenced Linnen to an aggregate five- to ten-year prison term. He filed a pro se motion for modification and reconsideration of his sentence, which was denied.
Instead of pursuing a direct appeal, Linnen, in August 1990, filed a pro se petition under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. §§ 9541-9546 (Purdon 1982 & Supp.1992). Appointed counsel filed an amended petition in April 1991. The court of common pleas denied this petition on January 29, 1992. Linnen's appeal from the denial of PCRA relief is currently pending before the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
On April 12, 1991, Linnen commenced this federal action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 against seven police officers. In it, he claimed that their search of his apartment and his subsequent arrest on the charges to which he pled guilty violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. He sought $1,500.00 in compensatory damages and $2,000.00 in punitive damages against each of the seven officers.
The officers filed a motion to dismiss Linnen's civil rights complaint, asserting the defense of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion. In support, they argued that Linnen's guilty plea determined the issue of their liability for the constitutional torts he claims they committed against him when they seized his property and arrested him. In the alternative, they asked the district court to stay the § 1983 action pending resolution of Linnen's state PCRA proceedings. 1 The case was referred to a magistrate judge.
Initially, on September 19, 1991, the magistrate judge filed a report recommending that the officers' motion to dismiss be denied but that the action be stayed pending resolution of the state PCRA proceedings. The officers filed objections to the magistrate's report along with a motion for reconsideration. To their motion and objections they attached papers from the state court record concerning Linnen's pro se motions to suppress evidence obtained during the allegedly illegal search. Linnen responded with objections to the officers' motion. On April 21, 1992, the district court accepted the magistrate's recommendation and denied the officers' motion to dismiss, but stayed Linnen's action pending a final decision in Linnen's PCRA proceedings.
Thereafter, the officers filed a "Status Report" advising the district court that the court of common pleas had denied Linnen's PCRA petition, and that an appeal of its denial was pending before the superior court. The magistrate judge then issued a new report in which he recommended that the officers' objections to his prior report be treated as motions for summary judgment which should be granted on grounds of collateral estoppel. Linnen filed objections to the magistrate judge's new report and with them presented his own motion for partial summary judgment. The magistrate judge recommended Linnen's motion be denied. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's new report and recommendation and granted summary judgment in favor of all the officers. Linnen filed a timely notice of appeal.
The district court's order granting summary judgment is subject to plenary review. Accordingly, this Court applies the same test that the district court utilized in rendering its decision. Sacred Heart Medical Center v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 537, 543 (3d Cir.1992) (citing Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038, 97 S.Ct. 732, 50 L.Ed.2d 748 (1977)). Summary judgment should be granted where there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
Because Linnen had the opportunity to litigate his suppression motions but failed to do so, the district court concluded his guilty plea bars his § 1983 action under principles of issue preclusion. Therefore, we must first consider whether "[p]laintiff's decision to plead guilty rather than proceed with his motion to suppress is the equivalent, in this case, of an admission that the motion to suppress was meritless." Magistrate's Report and Recommendation, at 6-7.
Under Pennsylvania law, a guilty plea constitutes an admission to all facts alleged in the indictment. Commonwealth Dep't of Transp. v. Mitchell, 517 Pa. 203, 535 A.2d 581, 585 (1987); Commonwealth v. Anthony, 504 Pa. 551, 475 A.2d 1303, 1307 (1984). In Mitchell, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that summary judgment may be granted in a civil proceeding based upon a guilty plea in a criminal case if the operative facts in the criminal case are identical to those that would be litigated in the civil case. However, "[r]easonable doubt as to what was decided by a prior judgment should be resolved against using it as...
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...claims in abeyance until state appellate proceedings that may affect the outcome of the federal action are decided." Linnen v. Armainis, 991 F.2d 1102 (3d Cir.1993). In the earlier decision of Bailey v. Ness, 733 F.2d 279 (3d Cir.1984), the Third Circuit held that it was improper for the di......
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