Lint v. State
| Decision Date | 06 March 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 33702.,33702. |
| Parties | Scott Lee LINT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Scott Lee Lint, St. Anthony, pro se.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Scott Lee Lint appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing his application for post-conviction relief. Because we conclude that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing on some of Lint's claims, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Lint pled guilty to manufacturing a controlled substance, methamphetamine. I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(A). The district court sentenced Lint to a unified term of ten years, with five years determinate. Lint filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence, which the district court denied. Lint appealed, contending that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence and by denying his Rule 35 motion. In an unpublished opinion, this Court affirmed Lint's sentence and denial of his Rule 35 motion. State v. Lint, Docket No. 31218 (Ct.App. Aug. 3, 2005).
Lint, acting pro se, filed a verified application for post-conviction relief. Lint's application set forth claims that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to compel discovery, failing to file a motion to suppress evidence, and coercing Lint to plead guilty by advising him that the state had enough evidence to convict him. The application also set forth a claim that the state violated Lint's right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Additionally, Lint's application set forth claims that the state violated his right to due process by breaking the chain of custody of the evidence, failing to send the evidence to the state crime lab, and failing to respond to his discovery request.1 Lint attached to his application two police reports and a discovery request from the underlying criminal proceedings. Lint also filed an affidavit in support of his application approximately three weeks later.
The first police report indicates that an officer investigated a call regarding an abandoned vehicle and determined from the license plate number that the vehicle belonged to Lint. The officer then noticed footprints in the snow, leading from Lint's vehicle to a nearby wooden shed located behind a private residence. The officer contacted the person who resided on the property containing the residence and the shed. The resident stated that Lint worked on the resident's automobiles but should not have been on the property for any reason that night. With the resident's permission to "check the property," the officer proceeded to the shed with the assistance of the lessee's thirteen-year-old son. The officer could see that the light was turned on in the shed and he yelled Lint's name. The officer advised Lint to exit the shed, heard "shuffling" and "banging" noises, and again ordered Lint to exit the shed. The officer tried to open the door to the shed but it was locked. Shortly thereafter, Lint exited the shed and indicated that he was working on a motorcycle in the shed but had no answer when the officer asked him why he had parked in the driveway next door to the property containing the shed. The officer entered the shed, smelled a strong chemical odor, and discovered items used to manufacture methamphetamine. The officer arrested Lint and secured the shed until police could obtain a search warrant.
A report by a second officer who conducted a further investigation indicates that Lint was a friend of the resident of the property, and Lint was permitted to keep some of his belongings in the shed. The resident informed the second officer that she had not been in the shed in over one year and that Lint kept a lock on the door to the shed but normally checked in with the resident when he arrived on the property. In Lint's affidavit, Lint averred that he asked his counsel to file a motion to suppress the evidence found in the shed, but counsel informed him that there were no grounds to suppress the evidence. Lint further averred that he had a "verbal contract" with the lessee of the property to "occupy" the shed. Lint also averred that he would not have pled guilty if he had known that the state never responded to his discovery request and had no evidence to convict him. According to Lint's affidavit, however, Lint's counsel coerced him to plead guilty by telling him that the state had enough evidence to convict him.
The state filed a motion for summary dismissal of Lint's application and filed an affidavit sworn by Lint's counsel. Counsel averred that he discussed the possibility of filing a motion to suppress with a senior attorney at the public defender's office after reviewing the police reports and the additional evidence provided by the state. According to counsel's affidavit, Lint never told him that the lessee of the property had rented the shed to Lint in exchange for Lint's services. Counsel averred that Lint made the decision to enter into the plea agreement after counsel discussed with Lint the possibility of filing a motion to suppress. The district court issued a notice of intent to dismiss Lint's application. Lint filed a response to both the state's motion to dismiss and the district court's notice of intent to dismiss. The district court then summarily dismissed Lint's application, relying on the reasoning set forth in the notice of intent to dismiss. Lint appeals.
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature. State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct.App.1992). Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. I.C. § 19-4907; Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 654, 656 (Ct.App.1990). An application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. An application must contain much more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1). Rather, an application for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with the application. I.C. § 19-4903. In other words, the application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal.
Idaho Code Section 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. Summary dismissal of an application pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct.App.1991); Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct. App.1988); Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 89, 741 P.2d 374, 376 (Ct.App.1987). Summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction relief may be appropriate, however, even where the state does not controvert the applicant's evidence because the court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct.App.1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct.App.1986).
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, we determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions, and admissions together with any affidavits on file; moreover, the court liberally construes the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 896, 865 P.2d 985, 987 (Ct.App.1993).
Lint set forth claims in his application that the state violated his right to due process by breaking the chain of custody of the evidence seized from the shed, failing to send the evidence to the state crime lab, and failing to respond to his discovery request. The district court ruled that these claims were unsupported by admissible evidence and were waived by Lint's valid guilty plea.
We conclude that the district court properly dismissed these claims on the basis that they were unsupported by admissible evidence. A conclusory allegation, unsubstantiated by any fact, is insufficient to entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary hearing. Nielson v. State, 121 Idaho 779, 780, 828 P.2d 342, 343 (Ct.App.1992); King v. State, 114 Idaho 442, 446, 757 P.2d 705, 709 (Ct.App. 1988). Lint did not aver how the evidence was affected when the state allegedly broke the chain of custody or what would have been revealed by a test of the evidence at the state crime lab. Lint did not aver that the evidence would have ultimately proven to be something other than ingredients commonly used to manufacture methamphetamine. Additionally, Lint did not demonstrate what items the state failed to provide in response to the discovery request. Lint's due process claims were therefore properly dismissed without an evidentiary hearing on the basis that they were conclusory...
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