Linthecome v. Junious
| Decision Date | 26 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:11-cv-00923-AWI-BAM PC |
| Parties | MARCUS LEON LINTHECOME, Plaintiff, v. MAURICE JUNIOUS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
LEAVE TO AMEND, FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM; MOTION TO DENY
APPOINTMENT OF WIFE
Plaintiff Marcus Leon Linthecome is a former state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's complaint, filed June 8, 2011. (ECF No. 1.)
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," or that "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)).
Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are still entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, but the pleading standard is now higher, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted), and to survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at , 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The "sheer possibility that a has defendant acted unlawfully" is not sufficient, and "facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability" falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
Plaintiff may not bring unrelated claims against unrelated parties in a single action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a), 20(a)(2); Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff may bring a claim against multiple defendants so long as (1) the claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions and occurrences, and (2) there are commons questions of law or fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2); Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997); Desert Empire Bank v. Insurance Co. of North America, 623 F.3d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980). Only if the defendants are properly joined under Rule 20(a) will the Court review the other claims to determine if they may be joined under Rule 18(a), which permits the joinder of multiple claims against the same party.
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff shall choose which claims he wishes to pursue in this action. If Plaintiff does not do so and his amended complaint sets forth unrelated claims which violate joinder rules, the Court will dismiss the claims it finds to be improperly joined.
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff's constitutional or other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092(9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). To state a claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones, 297 F.3d at 934.
Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-49; Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1020-21; Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1235; Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Supervisors may be held liable only if they "participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them." Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009); Preschooler II v. Clark County School Board of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007); Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff brings this action naming seventy five defendants, however upon review of the complaint it appears that Plaintiff has named some individuals as defendants when they are witnesses to the events which he alleges occurs. Plaintiff's allegations appear to revolve around his being found to be suicidal, forcibly medicated, and transferred to another institution where he received mental heath treatment. Additionally, Plaintiff claims that he was prevented from corresponding with his wife and deprived of his property. It is unclear whether all the incidents Plaintiff is complaining about occurred at Kern Valley State Prison ("KVSP"), or whether some of the incidents occurred while he was being housed elsewhere for mental health treatment. Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief and monetary damages.
Although lengthy, 100 pages with exhibits interspersed though out, Plaintiff's compliant consists largely of general and/or conclusory allegations, which do not support any plausible claims for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. In the sections that follow, the Court will provide Plaintiff with the legal standards applicable to the claims it appears he is seeking to pursue. Plaintiff should carefully review the standards and amend only those claimsthat he believes, in good faith, are cognizable.
Although Plaintiff references the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), it is unclear what claims Plaintiff is attempting to bring under the ADA. Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability. Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). Title II provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subject to discrimination by such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Title II of the ADA applies to inmates within state prisons. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S. Ct. 1952, 1955 (1998); see also Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir. 2010).
To establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was "excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity's services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity;" and (3) "such exclusion or discrimination, or denial of benefits was because of his disability." Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1021 (citations omitted); Martin v. California Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 560 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009). "The ADA prohibits discrimination because of disability, not inadequate treatment for disability." Id.; Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1022. The treatment or lack of treatment of a plaintiff's disability does not provide a basis upon which to impose liability. Burger v. Bloomberg, 418 F.3d 882, 883 (8th Cir. 2005) (); Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) ().
Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination in programs "of a public entity" or "discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A public entity is defined, in relevant part as "any State or local government; [and] any department agency. . . of a State o States or local government. . . ." 42 U.S.C. §12131(1)(a)(b). A public entity as defined in the statute does not include individuals. Shebby v. Adams, No. 1:03-cv-06487-LJO-NEW (DLB), 2007 WL 2505569, * 2 (E.D.Cal. Aug. 31, 2007) (citations omitted). Plaintiff may not bring a claim under Title II ofthe ADA against a defendant in their individual capacity.
Plaintiff alleges that prison officials interfered with his legal mail and correspondence with his wife. Prisoner's have a right under the First Amendment to send and receive mail. Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). "However, a prison may adopt regulations which impinge on an inmate's constitutional rights if those regulations are 'reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.'" Witherow, 52 F.3d at 265 (quoting Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S. Ct 2254, 2261 (1987)). It has long been established that security of the institution is a legitimate penological interest. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413, 94 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 109 S. Ct. 1874 (1989). Courts have held that a temporary delay in the delivery of an inmate's mail does not violate the First Amendment. See Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1999) (); Sizemore v. Williford, 829 F.2d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 198...
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